Grain banks: An institutional and impact evaluation by Bhattamishra, Ruchira
  
 
GRAIN BANKS: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND IMPACT EVALUATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Ruchira Bhattamishra 
January 2008
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2008 Ruchira Bhattamishra
 GRAIN BANKS: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND IMPACT EVALUATION 
Ruchira Bhattamishra, Ph.D. 
Cornell University 2008 
 
This dissertation consists of an institutional and impact evaluation of grain banks in 
southwest Orissa, India.  Grain banks are village-level institutions which provide loans 
in the form of grains to help households smooth food consumption over the 
agricultural cycle. 
In the first chapter, I discuss grain banks in the context of the food insecurity 
situation in Orissa and compare them to similar interventions in India and elsewhere. 
In the second chapter, I examine the key institutional and socioeconomic 
determinants of the likelihood and duration of grain bank survival.  This study is 
motivated by the fact that the majority of grain banks have ceased to function over 
time.  I find that a number of village-level factors have a significant impact on the 
likelihood and duration of survival, indicating the importance of the socioeconomic 
environment where grain banks are implemented and the need for careful geographic 
targeting for improving sustainability. 
In the third chapter, I examine the impact of grain bank participation by 
households on young children’s health outcomes using propensity score matching.  
This study is motivated by the gap in knowledge on the impact of grain banks on 
household and individual food insecurity.  I also examine whether this impact varies 
by the lifespan of the grain bank to test the hypothesis that children in participating 
households in longer-lived grain bank villages benefit more due to intergenerational 
effects.  I find that grain banks do not have a statistically significant impact on various 
anthropometric measures examined, indicating that they may not be effective in 
improving children’s health status. 
 In the fourth and final chapter, I examine the impact of grain bank participation 
by households on the incidence of borrowing from private, informal moneylenders, 
again using propensity score matching.  This study is motivated by anecdotal evidence 
that grain banks displace borrowing from moneylenders.  I also examine how this 
impact varies by the lifespan of the grain bank. I find that grain banks have a large, 
statistically significant displacement effect on moneylenders, and this effect is even 
larger in longer-lived grain bank villages. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CONTEXTUALIZING GRAIN BANKS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This study consists of an institutional and impact evaluation of community grain banks 
in the southwest part of Orissa, a state in the eastern part of India.  This region, which 
has a high proportion of Orissa’s tribal population, is one of the most economically 
depressed and food-insecure parts of the state.  In recent years, community grain banks 
have become an important component of the food security strategy of the government 
as well as rural development NGOs active in this region.  Described simply, a grain 
bank is a village-level institution which allows households to borrow grains during the 
lean season which are returned with interest (also in the form of grains) at the 
conclusion of the following harvest season.  By extending consumption credit, grain 
banks provide households with the opportunity to smooth food consumption over the 
agricultural cycle.  Grain banks also provide an alternative source of credit to 
households in a region with limited credit market competition.  Anecdotal evidence 
collected initially suggests that grain banks have had a displacement effect on 
borrowing from local informal moneylenders, who have traditionally offered credit to 
households at unfavorable terms. 
The main aims of this project are to examine (1) the institutional and 
environmental factors behind the continuing operation of community grain banks, 
given that a large proportion of grain banks have ceased to function following their 
establishment; (2) the impact of household participation in grain banks on young 
children’s health status using anthropometric measurements; and (3) the impact of 
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household participation in grain banks on the incidence of borrowing from local 
informal moneylenders. 
The remaining sections of the chapter are structured as follows.  In Section 1.2, 
we discuss the food security situation in India as well as the performance of existing 
food security programs, followed by a reexamination of the same issues with respect 
to the state of Orissa, and tribal Orissa in particular.  In Section 1.3, we describe the 
grain banks in Orissa and compare them to similar interventions elsewhere.  In Section 
1.4, we provide an overview of the data used for the study.  Finally, in section 1.5, we 
present a brief summary of the questions posed in the research project, the motivations 
for the questions, the empirical methods applied to address them and the main 
findings.   
 
1.2 An overview of the food security situation 
Food security can be broadly defined as the condition of having access to adequate 
nutrients in order to lead a healthy life.  The concept of food security has evolved over 
time, with earlier definitions looking at the availability of food at the aggregate level 
to recent, more disaggregated definitions, both static and dynamic, that take household 
and individual-level access to food into account (Barrett 2002).   
In this section, we first present an overview of the food security situation in 
India, and discuss briefly the issues of both availability and access to food.  We then 
discuss the implementation of the main government programs that address food 
insecurity in India generally, and in Orissa specifically.  
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1.2.1 Food security in India 
India has been self-sufficient in food grain production since the 1970s.1  In 2002, 
government of India buffer stocks stood at 60 million tons, more than three times the 
minimum buffer stock norm of 18 million tons (Ministry of Finance 2003).  However, 
regional production patterns vary widely.  For example, the northern states of Punjab, 
Haryana and west Uttar Pradesh have much higher levels of production than the 
rainfed central and eastern states which include Orissa.  Regardless, adequate food 
availability at the national level does not necessarily imply adequate food access for 
all, as evident from recent household surveys on nutrition and health.  For example, 
the National Family Health Survey (NFHS 1998-99) finds that 47 percent of children 
below 3 years are underweight and that 40 and 37 percent of adult females and males 
are chronically energy-deficient, respectively. 
Insofar as income is seen as an important determinant of access to adequate 
food, it is useful to look at recent income poverty trends in India.  Adjusted estimates 
by Deaton and Dreze (2002) based on National Sample Survey (NSS) data indicate 
that there has been a decline in rural and urban poverty from 33 to 26 percent and 18 
to 12 percent during the 1990s, respectively.  Recent poverty estimates have however 
been mired in several controversies; consequently, the reliability of the poverty figures 
have been called into question.2  Notwithstanding, income poverty estimates as well as 
the extent of contribution to the overall decline in poverty vary significantly across 
regions and social groups with eastern and central states, which have a higher 
proportion of scheduled tribes (ST), showing smaller declines in poverty (ibid.).   
                                                 
1 We look at food grain production and access as indicators of food security, since grains constitute the 
largest component of caloric intake, especially in poor households.  This is discussed later in this 
section. 
2 The main issues of contention appear to be the use of the established ‘caloric norm’ basis for poverty 
measurement as well as the use of different recall periods in consumption expenditure surveys used in 
different rounds of the NSS.  There is also some concern that the poverty calculations may have been 
flawed.  See Deaton and Kozel (2005) for more on these issues. 
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Even if it is agreed that poverty has fallen overall, the question that naturally 
arises is: Has the decline in poverty translated into improved access to food and 
greater food security?3  Using anthropometric measures, estimates from the NFHS 
show that the percentage of underweight children fell from 53.4 percent in 1993-94 to 
47 percent in 1998-99.4  Similarly, BMI estimates from the National Nutrition 
Monitoring Bureau (NNMB) show that the proportion of chronically energy-deficient 
(CED) adult females declined from 45.8 in 1999 to 39.4 percent in 2001.  While these 
declines in the incidence of malnourishment are consistent with declines in income 
poverty, the absolute proportion of underweight children is much higher than the 
official and unofficial income poverty estimates for that year.  The finding is 
effectively the same if we take the proportion of CED adult males or females or 
stunted children.  
The food security picture is even bleaker if we consider micronutrient 
adequacy.  For example, estimates from NFHS 1998-99 reveal that 74.3 percent of 
children between 6-35 months and 51.8 percent of women between 15-49 years suffer 
from anemia.  These figures are much higher than the income poverty figures for the 
same period, which again points to the fact that adequate food production and access 
to calories are not sufficient for ensuring adequate micronutrient intake and 
absorption.  As mentioned before, dietary diversity as well as intervening 
environmental factors such as hygiene and sanitation, safe drinking water, primary 
health care, and hygiene awareness play an important role in achieving food security.   
                                                 
3 The NSS collects data on self-reported food adequacy, by asking a question to the head of the 
household regarding adequacy of food for all household members in the past year.  According to NSS 
data, households reporting that they have not had adequate food for some part or all of the past year 
have also declined systematically between the 1980s and 1990s, from 18.6 percent in 1983 to 5.1 
percent in 1993-94 and 3.4 percent in 1999-2000 in rural areas.  The corresponding numbers for urban 
areas are 6.4 percent, 1.6 percent and 0.9 percent respectively.  However, given that these figures differ 
hugely from more objective data on malnourished children and adults (using anthropometric measures, 
such as in the NNMB, NFHS, etc.), the NSS food adequacy data cannot be considered credible.  
4 The 1993-94 NFHS figures are for children below 4 years, while the 1998-99 figures are for children 
below 3 years.  
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Household surveys of the type conducted by the various major data collection 
agencies typically do a poor job of capturing the problem of seasonal food insecurity.  
As discussed in Zeller et al. (1997) and Sahn (1989), peasant societies that are 
characterized by seasonal variability in agricultural output are also often highly 
vulnerable to seasonal variability in consumption, which has adverse impacts on 
health and asset holdings both in the short- and long-term.  For example, using 
ICRISAT data for southern rural India, Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) find that 
reduced food intake during the lean season has a negative impact on future agricultural 
productivity.  Similarly, Lawrence et al. (1989) find for the Gambia that seasonal food 
shortages lead to losses in female body weight as well as low birth weights.  Clearly, 
seasonal food shortages can negatively impact health and productivity and can create a 
perpetual cycle of low productivity, low output and poor health.  Zeller et al. (1997) 
discuss the importance of extending consumption credit in order to enable agricultural 
households to smooth consumption and break the cycle of low productivity, depleted 
asset holdings, low output and food insecurity.  They cite empirical evidence from 
rural Nigeria, China, Pakistan, the Gambia and Madagascar which suggests the 
importance of credit for consumption purposes, particularly among poor households.  
 
1.2.2 Government interventions to promote food security 
The government of India has established a host of programs designed to improve 
access to food, including three of the world’s largest food security programs in the 
form of the Public (Food) Distribution System (PDS), the Integrated Child 
Development Scheme (ICDS) and Mid-Day Meals Scheme (MDM).  However, none 
of these programs were designed with seasonal food insecurity in mind; if anything, 
the intended objective of these programs was to address perennial food insecurity.  
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Below, we provide a brief overview of these three programs, describing their goals, 
important design features, and implementation issues and performance.   
The PDS, which comprised around 455,000 fair price shops (ration outlets) in 
2000 (Ministry of Food and Consumer Affairs 2000, as quoted in Umali-Deininger 
and Deininger 2001), distributes mainly subsidized rice and wheat worth over Rs. 150 
billion to around 180 million households (Asthana and Medrano 2001).  In 1997, the 
PDS was transformed from a universal to a targeted program; this was done largely in 
an attempt to stem leakages and to reduce the fiscal burden of food subsidies.  Under 
the targeted PDS, households were classified as either Above Poverty Line (APL) or 
Below Poverty Line (BPL) with BPL households entitled to 35 kilograms of grains per 
month at specially subsidized prices.  The reforms also included changing PDS rations 
from a per-adult equivalent basis to a per-family basis.  As discussed in Swaminathan 
(2000), the monthly entitlement for a BPL household with 5 persons translates to 35 
percent of the caloric intake norm recommended by the Indian Council of Medical 
Research.  
Due to its high procurement, storage and distribution costs, the PDS cannot 
function without a hefty central government subsidy, which has nearly tripled in real 
terms over the last two decades, from Rs. 29.4 billion in 1980/81 to Rs. 90 billion in 
1998/99 (Umali-Deininger and Deininger 2001).  Imperfect targeting, poor coverage, 
the misappropriation of food grains, corruption, the irregular supply in fair price shops 
and the low quality of food grains are some of the major problems that prevent the 
PDS from achieving its objective of providing food security for the poor.5  The 
diversion of grain from the PDS to the open market is estimated to be of the order of 
36 and 31 percent in the case of wheat and rice, respectively (Asthana and Medrano 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Dreze 2001, Surayanarayana 2001, and Kriesel and Zaidi 1999 (as cited in Umali-Deininger 
and Deininger 2001). 
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2001).  Food stock deterioration is also a serious problem for the Food Corporation of 
India (FCI) (the parastatal body in charge of running the PDS), with about half of its 
stocks being more than 2 years old in 1997 (Sinha 1997, as cited in Umali-Deininger 
and Deininger 2001).  Moreover, as FCI stocks also feed into other government 
programs such as employment schemes, ICDS and MDM programs, the impact of 
poor quality FCI grains is not confined to the PDS alone. 
The ICDS and MDM schemes also aim to address the nutritional needs of 
members of poor households.  Initiated in 1975, the ICDS has universal coverage (at 
least in principle) and provides free services with the intent of addressing the 
nutritional, health care and educational needs of children under the age of 6 as well as 
the needs of pregnant or nursing mothers and young girls (Radhakrishna et al. 1997, 
Gupta et al. 1998).  Under the ICDS program, an anganwadi center, literally a 
courtyard, is made available in each settlement of 1,000 people (in the case of tribal 
areas or rough terrains, in settlements of 700 people).  The anganwadi is the focal 
point of delivery of ICDS services, which, among others, include a cooked mid-day 
meal that provides 300 calories and 10-12 grams of protein to children and 500 
calories and 20-25 grams of protein to mothers.  By locating anganwadis in poor 
localities, typically in villages or urban slum areas, the ICDS employs self-selection as 
its targeting mechanism.  However, as discussed by Gragnolati et al. (2006), states 
which are poorer and with the highest rates of undernutrition, have the poorest 
coverage and the smallest government budgetary allocations per malnourished child.  
In addition, Das Gupta et al. (2005) find that a larger proportion of wealthier villages 
have the ICDS program than do poorer villages, indicating that the ICDS may not be 
reaching all its intended beneficiaries.  Among other things, the ICDS is also 
characterized by poor quality services, poor quality of equipment for weighing and 
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growth promotion, irregular food availability and overburdened anganwadi workers 
(Graganolati et al. 2006). 
Although the MDM program was formally initiated in 1995, it was not 
implemented in the majority of states until 2001 following a Supreme Court order.  At 
present the program covers about 50 million children in primary schools.  However, it 
is still to be introduced in some states such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand 
(Dreze and Goyal 2003).  Under the MDM program, a nutritious cooked mid-day meal 
with a minimum content of 300 calories and 8-12 grams of protein is to be provided 
each day of school for a minimum of 200 days per year in all government and 
government-assisted primary schools.  PDS grains are provided free of cost by the 
central government.  Like the ICDS, the MDM program also uses self-targeting as the 
mechanism to reach children in poor households.  Unfortunately, both the ICDS and 
the MDM program are faced with a host of problems, including leakages to non-
priority groups, poor infrastructure, lack of universal coverage (due to incomplete 
reach), irregular food availability, and large differences in the quality of meals across 
and within states.6 
 
1.2.3 Reduction of cereal consumption in the 1990s 
Given that the provision of cereals (such as rice and wheat) is the focus of food 
security programs in India, we now turn to a brief discussion of the importance of 
cereals in the diets of low-income households in India.  As noted in Suryanarayana 
(2000), cereals account for more than 85 percent of caloric intake in poorer 
households, especially in rural areas.  In addition, in terms of food expenditure, cereals 
constitute about 60 percent of total expenditure for these households.  Although 
estimates based on NSS data indicate a decrease in average cereal consumption over 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Dreze and Goyal 2003, Graganolati et al. 2006 
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the 1990s, Deaton and Dreze (2002) contend that this trend is largely driven by a 
decrease in cereal consumption and substitution towards ‘superior food items’ (such as 
vegetables, milk, fruit, fish and meat) among higher income households.7  Hanchate 
and Dyson (2000), as cited in Deaton and Dreze (2002), compare rural food 
consumption patterns in 1973-74 and 1993-94 to show that while average per capita 
cereal consumption declined in this period, it actually rose amongst the poorest 
households.  Thus, the overall decline can be attributable to a reduction in cereal 
consumption among higher expenditure groups.  Deaton and Dreze (2002) also find a 
similar relationship at the state level, with poorer states such as Orissa and Bihar 
having higher cereal consumption than richer states such as Punjab or Haryana.  We 
can thus conclude that cereals account for the largest share of calories consumed by 
low-income households and that this share appears to be holding steady among low-
income households.  In light of these facts, cereals (should) occupy an important place 
in any food security intervention for the poor. 
 
1.2.4 Food security in Orissa 
In this subsection, we provide an overview of existing food security programs in the 
context of the food insecurity problem in tribal Orissa.  According to estimates based 
on the 50th round of the National Sample Survey (NSS), 15.4 percent of the population 
of Orissa reported not having two square meals a day for part or whole of the year in 
the year preceding 1993-94 (NSSO 1997).  More objective indicators of nutritional 
status, such as anthropometric measures, indicate an even more serious problem.  For 
example, National Family Health Survey (NFHS-2) estimates indicate that the infant 
mortality rate in Orissa between 1994-98 was 81.0, compared to the national average 
                                                 
7 As discussed in Deaton and Dreze (2002) average cereal consumption per capita fell from 13.5 kg per 
month to 12.7 kg per month in rural areas and from 10.6 kg to 10.4 kg in urban areas between 1993-94 
and 1999-2000. 
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of 67.6.8  Similarly, the proportion of underweight children in Orissa in 1998-99 was 
found to be 54 percent, compared to the national average of 47 percent.  To cite 
another example, 48 percent of women between 15-49 years of age were found to be 
chronically energy deficient in 1998-99, compared to the national average of 35.8 
percent.  
While Orissa fares poorly on a range of social and economic development 
indicators compared to the rest of the country, the state of social and economic 
development of the tribal population within Orissa is considerably worse even 
compared to the Orissa average.  Recent data on adequacy of food intake collected by 
the NSS reveal that while 8 percent of the rural population in Orissa reports not having 
two square meals a day for part or whole of the year in the year preceding 1999-2000, 
the corresponding number for the tribal population is 10.1 percent (NSSO 2001).  
Table 1.1 presents a range of health-related indicators by socioeconomic groups, all of 
which consistently show that the tribal population in Orissa fares worse compared to 
all other socioeconomic groups in the state.  While the infant mortality rate (or the 
probability of dying before the first birthday) for Orissa is 89.5 per 1,000 live births, 
the corresponding figure for the tribal population is 98.7.9  Similarly, the child 
mortality figure (or the probability of dying between the first and the fifth birthdays) 
in Orissa is 28.8 per 1,000 live births, while the corresponding figure for the tribal 
population is considerably higher, at 44 per 1,000 live births. As discussed by IIPS 
and ORC-Macro (2000b), one of the main objectives of the child health-care system in 
India is to achieve universal immunization coverage against six preventable diseases 
(namely, tuberculosis, measles, polio, diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus) under 
the Universal Immunization Programme (UIP).  NFHS-2 data from Orissa, however, 
                                                 
8 Infant mortality rate calculated per 1,000 live births. 
9 Infant and child mortality rates calculated for the 10-year period preceding the NFHS-2 (1998-99) 
survey. 
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reveal that by the age of 23 months, only 43.7 percent of children had received all 
childhood vaccinations, with the corresponding figure for tribal infants even lower, at 
26.4 percent.  A related objective of the UIP was to record all vaccinations received on 
a card.  However, according to NFHS-2 figures, less than half of children in Orissa 
below 23 months had a vaccination card at the time of the survey, while the 
corresponding figure for tribal infants was below 30 percent.  Similarly, the tribal 
population consistently performs poorly, compared to the all-Orissa average, on other 
indicators of health (such as vitamin A supplementation), health-related knowledge 
(such as knowledge of diarrhea treatment using oral re-hydration) as well as taking up 
treatment by going to a health facility/provider. 
 
Table 1.1: Selected health indicators in Orissa, by socioeconomic group  
Health indicator 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Scheduled 
Caste 
Other 
Backward 
Castes 
Other 
All-
Orissa 
Infant mortality a 98.7 83.9 95.6 79.1 89.5 
Child mortality b 44.0 42.4 20.1 15.0 28.8 
Percent of children age 12-23 
months who received all childhood 
vaccinations 
26.4 44.5 48.5 49.3 43.7 
Percent of children age 12-23 
months showing vaccination card 
29.7 44.7 49.5 56.1 46.2 
Percent of children age 12-35 
months who received at least 1 dose 
of vitamin A 
30.5 42.1 45.8 46.3 42.0 
Percent of mothers who know about 
ORS packets for treating diarrhea 
53.7 76.5 76.8 82.1 72.9 
Percent of children under age 3 who 
had diarrhea in 2 weeks preceding 
survey and were taken to health 
facility/provider  
21.2 48.1 55.1 53.8 46.9 
Source: NFHS-2.  
Notes: a Probability of dying before first birthday, calculated on a per-1,000 basis, for the 10-year 
period preceding the survey. b Probability of dying between first and fifth birthday, calculated on a 
per-1,000 basis, for the 10-year period preceding the survey. 
 12 
We now turn to a brief discussion of Orissa’s tribal population, followed by an 
overview of the food insecurity problem in tribal Orissa. 
 
Overview of Orissa’s tribal population and food insecurity problem 
Of the 533 communities currently recognized by the Indian government as Scheduled 
Tribes (ST) (Ministry of Tribal Affairs 2000-01), the largest number, 62 tribes, reside 
in the state of Orissa.  With over 7.6 million tribal people in rural areas, Orissa also 
has one of the highest concentrations of tribal populations among Indian states.10  
While the ST population comprises about 8 percent of the national population, the 
tribal population comprises about a quarter of the total rural population of Orissa 
(Census 2001).  More significantly, in many of the less economically developed 
districts in Orissa, in particular, in the southwest, the tribal population comprises over 
half the total population. 
Until 1992, Orissa was divided into 13 districts.  Of these, the KBK districts – 
Kalahandi, Bolangir and Koraput – in the southwest region comprised the tribal belt of 
Orissa.11  After 1992, the 13 existing districts were subdivided into 30 smaller 
districts.  The KBK region currently includes the 8 districts of Nuapada, Kalahandi, 
Bolangir, Sonapur, Rayagada, Nabarangbur, Koraput and Malkangiri.12  The region 
accounts for 30.6 percent of the geographical area of the state but only 20 percent of 
the population of Orissa, indicating the low population density relative to other parts 
of the state.  It is also one of the poorest parts in Orissa, as well as in India.  This study 
will use household, village and grain bank data from two of the new districts – 
                                                 
10The tribal population in India is classified under the Scheduled Tribe (ST) social group as defined by 
the Census of India. These numbers therefore reflect the population classified as ST. 
11 The ST population also forms a majority of the population of Mayurbhanj district in the northeast and 
Sundargarh district in the northwest of Orissa. 
12 Erstwhile Kalahandi was divided into Nuapada and Kalahandi, erstwhile Bolangir into Sonapur and 
Bolangir, and erstwhile Koraput into Rayagada, Nabarangbur, Koraput and Malkangiri.   
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Koraput and Rayagada – carved out of erstwhile Koraput.  Figure 1.1 shows a district 
map of Orissa denoting malnutrition levels.  The map shows that the malnutrition rate 
is much higher in the southern KBK districts compared to the rest of the state. 
 
 
Notes: Data from DWCD (2002-03) for age-group 0-3 years, based on data for Grades II, III, and IV 
malnutrition. The Districts are classified according to the prevalence of malnutrition. Districts which 
have a percentage of malnutrition lying 2-3  standard deviations (SD) below  the overall mean are 
classified as ‘Low Prevalent’; 0-2 SD below the mean as ‘Moderate Prevalent’; 0-1 SD above the 
mean as ‘High Prevalent’ and 2-3 SD above the mean as ‘Very High Prevalent’ districts. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Prevalence of malnutrition in Orissa, by district 
 
Table 1.2 indicates the extent to which the ST population of Orissa is 
concentrated in Rayagada, Nabarangpur, Koraput and Malkangiri districts, carved out 
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of erstwhile Koraput.  Firstly, these districts together are home to almost a quarter of 
the total ST population in Orissa.  The largest tribes include the Kandha, Paraja, 
Sabara, Gadaba, Bhumia, Koya, Durua, Matia, Bonda, Halwa and Didayee.  In 
addition, while the ST population comprises 22 percent of the total population of 
Orissa, the ST population of these 4 districts comprises 54 percent of their total 
population (Census 2001). 
 
Table 1.2: Orissa, KBK region and districts of erstwhile Koraput 
 
Total population 
Share of 
population that is 
Scheduled Tribe 
(percent) 
Literacy rate 
(percent) 
Share of total 
workers who are 
cultivators or 
agricultural laborers 
(percent) 
Orissa 36,804,660 22 54 65 
KBK region 7,286,923 38 36 77 
Koraput 1,180,637 50 30 73 
Rayagada 831,109 56 30 75 
Nabarangpur 1,025,766 55 28 83 
Malkangiri 504,198 57 25 83 
Source: Census of India 2001. 
 
The population of erstwhile Koraput is predominately rural and characterized 
by low levels of development.  In Table 1.2, we see that the literacy rates in the 
selected districts, and the KBK region as a whole, are much lower compared to the 
Orissa average.  In addition, these districts also have a higher share of workers 
engaged as cultivators or agricultural laborers relative to the Orissa average, indicating 
the high degree of dependence on agriculture as a means of livelihood in the KBK 
region. 
The KBK region spans the Southwestern Plateau (part of the Deccan Plateau) 
and a section of the hills of the Eastern Ghats (Meher 2001).  The rugged terrain, 
together with the poor physical infrastructure in the region, makes access and 
communication a problem for many villages in this region.  Electricity, telephone 
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cables and satellite coverage are virtually nonexistent in the rural areas.  Many 
settlements in rural areas, which are characterized by extremely low levels of 
population density, are located away from motorable roads, limiting access to public 
and private social services and markets.  During the monsoon season, some villages in 
this region are inaccessible as they are not connected by an all-weather passable road, 
indicating the extreme level of physical isolation of tribal settlements in this region. 
In addition to the hilly terrain, the KBK region is also characterized by poor 
soil and low-productivity agriculture (Meher 2001).  However, as evident from Table 
1.2, there is a high level of dependence on agriculture, which is characterized by 
primitive agricultural tools and a lack of mechanization.  Podu cultivation, or 
cultivation on hill slopes cleared by burning forest cover, is a common feature in this 
area, and has contributed to the increasing level (and rate) of deforestation in erstwhile 
Koraput.  This has adversely affected the collection of forest products (such as tendu 
leaf, sal leaf, honey), which have traditionally formed a major component of the tribal 
economy along with shifting as well as settled agriculture.  Agriculture in the KBK 
region is mainly rain-fed, although traditional irrigation systems such as munda (check 
dams) and terracing are also used.  Few government-sponsored irrigation schemes are 
present, and recurring droughts in the region have adversely affected the economic 
circumstances of its people.  
Poverty levels among the tribal population are higher than poverty levels for 
the general population.  According to a survey conducted by the Panchayati Raj 
Department, Government of Orissa (as cited in Meher 2001), rural poverty in the KBK 
region is higher than in rural Orissa overall.  For example, 91.6 percent of rural 
households in erstwhile Koraput were found to be Below Poverty Line (BPL) 
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compared to 79.1 percent of rural households in Orissa.13  More significantly, more 
than half of these BPL households belonged to the tribal population.  One of the most 
pressing problems faced by these households is the lack of food security.   
Unfortunately, the performance of government schemes in reducing the 
prevalence and acuteness of food insecurity in Orissa in general, and tribal Orissa in 
particular, is abysmally poor.  According to Shariff and Mallick (1999), only 4-5 
percent of poor and ST/SC households used the PDS in 1990.  As in the rest of the 
country, leakages, poor grain quality, inadequate ration quantity, as well as poor 
coverage are some of the main problems that plague the PDS in Orissa.  Even after 
targeting reforms, there is a very small difference between purchase of grains from the 
PDS between eligible and ineligible households.  Using data from the 55th round of the 
NSS (1999-2000), Dreze and Khera (2003) find that the average grain consumption 
from the PDS was 1.74 kilograms per person per month for the poor and 1.44 
kilograms per person per month for the non-poor in rural Orissa.  Many eligible 
households in rural Orissa, and the KBK region in particular, cannot participate in the 
program as they have not received the BPL cards required to avail themselves of low-
priced foodgrains.  For example, about a third of the households sampled in the 
household survey serving as the source of data for this study have not received the 
BPL card, in spite of being eligible.  In addition, since the PDS monthly quota has to 
be purchased in a single installment, the poorest households are not able to avail 
themselves of their full quota as they lack the ability to pay a lump-sum amount.  
Again, using data collected for this study, we find that approximately three-quarters of 
the sampled households report not being able to afford their PDS monthly quota. 
                                                 
13 A BPL household is defined as a family with an annual income below Rs. 11,000 which is roughly 
equivalent to a dollar a day (1992 rupees).   
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Although the coverage of the ICDS and MDM programs is higher than that of 
the PDS, the quality of services delivered by these programs is poor and susceptible to 
irregular grain supply and corruption (Misra and Behera 2001).  For example, due to 
the poor physical infrastructure, hilly terrain and low population density in the KBK 
region, many anganwadi centers are not attended regularly by the workers.  In 
addition, caste differences between the anganwadi workers (who are typically higher 
caste) and ICDS beneficiaries – tribal mothers and children – also result in non-
delivery of important ICDS services, such as taking weight measurements of children 
to monitor health and development status.  For example, in more than half of the 
villages sampled for the household survey in this study, ICDS beneficiaries reported 
not feeling ‘comfortable’ with the anganwadi worker. 
In addition to the PDS and ICDS programs, a set of programs that indirectly 
promote food security includes wage employment and self-employment generation 
schemes.  These include the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) and the Employment 
Assurance Scheme (EAS).  The latter has the explicit goal of providing 100 days of 
employment for constructing public works during the agricultural lean season.  
However, between 1992-98, these and other anti-poverty employment programs 
together covered less than 16 percent of BPL households in the KBK region, 
indicating that many poor households do not receive any assistance from these 
programs (Meher 2001).  Even households that do receive assistance often do not 
receive 100 days of employment or do not receive wages for days worked.  In 
addition, while public works schemes provide temporary employment during the 
summer months, they are not implemented during the monsoon months of the 
agricultural lean season. 
For generations, the principal strategy used by tribal households confronted 
with food shortages in the lean season has been to borrow grains (or cash in order to 
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buy grains) from the local moneylender at exorbitantly high interest rates or to 
participate in bonded labor markets under exploitative conditions and terms. Other 
coping strategies commonly adopted in the lean season include distress migration, 
distress sales of livestock and other productive assets, and the consumption of 
undesirable forest food products such as wild roots and leaves.14 
Unquestionably, there is a genuine and urgent need for superior interventions 
that smooth food consumption across the agricultural cycle for poor households.  In 
this context, grain banks have been touted as a highly successful food security 
intervention, particularly with respect to addressing seasonal food insecurity.  Over the 
past two decades, NGOs in Orissa have established grain banks in order to directly 
confront cyclical episodes of hunger and food insecurity. They have also been adopted 
by the government as an integral component of the food security strategy for tribal 
communities.  
 
1.3 Grain banks: Concept and rationale 
What are grain banks? Grain banks in tribal Orissa are a descendent of the traditional 
system of grain golas in tribal villages, where surplus grains post-harvest were 
collected into a common pool which was controlled by the village head and from 
which disbursements were largely discretionary.  This system has long since 
disappeared.  The version found on the ground now has appeared only in more recent 
times.   
                                                 
14 The practice of turning to forest product collection from agriculture during the lean season is a 
common coping strategy in traditional societies that are not integrated into the modern economy. 
Scudder (1962) and Newman (1970) record similar customs among the Gwembe Tonga of Zambia and 
the Sandawe of Tanzania, respectively. Reardon and Matlon (1989) document the consumption of 
leaves gathered from common property resources as a famine food strategy of farmers in the Sahel 
region of Burkina Faso.  However, this strategy may not continue to be feasible given ecological 
changes, deforestation and environmental degradation. 
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The current grain bank is initiated by a one-time grant from an external agency 
– an NGO or the government – with or without the requirement of contributions by 
participating (member) households.  Once established, the grain bank is managed by 
the member households themselves.  The grain bank provides loans in the form of 
grain to member households at times of food scarcity, typically during the lean season.  
These loans are returned with interest (also in the form of grain) after the following 
harvest season. 
 
1.3.1 Potential advantages of grain banks 
What are the advantages of grain banks?  To begin with, grain banks are unique across 
the gamut of food security interventions in that they provide consumption credit. 
While production credit and income generation programs can assist households with 
asset generation and growth and hence increase food security in the long-term, they 
are less able to address in a timely manner food shortage problems that arise in the 
short-term.  By channeling savings from the harvest period to the lean period, grain 
banks can enable households to self-insure and smooth consumption (Ministry of 
Tribal Affairs 2002).   
Second, grain banks can respond to seasonal food shortages in a timely manner 
since they are situated in and managed by the beneficiary community (ibid.).  Unlike 
existing government food security and nutrition programs, there are no transportation 
or distribution costs, as grains are stored and disbursed locally.  This aspect is even 
more important considering that tribal villages tend to be remote and have poor 
transport and communication facilities.  In addition, grain banks appear to be highly 
cost-effective as their operating costs are minimal – the only major cost is the one-
time expenditure related to the construction of the grain bank storage facility which is 
present in few villages.  This compares favorably with the PDS, which is an extremely 
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expensive program and, barring radical reforms, can only be maintained with a hefty 
subsidy from the central government (Umali-Deininger and Deininger 2001).  Since 
decisions are made and executed by the beneficiary community, there are fewer 
bureaucratic lags or barriers and a higher level of operational flexibility, compared to 
the PDS. 
Third, community oversight of grain banks can also enable high levels of 
accountability and transparency. Since small village communities typically have 
intimate knowledge regarding the circumstances and needs of member households, 
grain banks have a comparative advantage in targeting benefits to those households in 
need compared to external interventions.  As evident from a survey of social safety net 
programs in different countries, community participation in program design, 
implementation, and monitoring can lead to better targeting (Subbarao et al. 1997).  
Another example of the effectiveness of community participation in achieving better 
targeting outcomes is provided by Alderman (2002).  Using data from Albania, he 
finds that its social assistance system, which allows for community discretion in 
determining distribution, is better targeted to the poor relative to safety net programs 
in other countries which do not allow for community involvement.  He also finds that 
the poverty targeting in the social system in Albania achieves better outcomes than 
could be expected based on proxy indicators of targeting using household survey data, 
and concludes that community-level discretion in determining distribution permits the 
use of local information that is unlikely to be obtained from survey instruments.  
Conning and Kevane (2002) also discuss the potential benefits of community-based 
targeting for the implementation of social safety nets.  More recently, in a review of 
targeted anti-poverty programs in 48 countries, Coady et al. (2004) show that, on 
average, community-based selection performs well.  In the context of grain banks, 
members possess intimate knowledge of the output, asset holding and other resources 
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of fellow members, which can improve targeting outcomes.  However, like all other 
community-based institutions, grain banks are also susceptible to leakages, 
misappropriation and capture by local elites.15 
 
1.3.2 Relationship to cereal banks in Africa 
The grain banks of India have a distant cousin in the form of “cereal banks” in 
different parts of Africa, especially in the Sahel.  As described in the gray literature on 
cereal banks, these institutions largely function as village cooperatives that buy, store 
and sell food grains.  In the quintessential model, villagers receive a start-up grant or 
loan from an external agency (usually an NGO) to purchase grains after the harvest, 
when prices are low (CRS 1998).  During the lean season when prices are high, the 
cereal bank sells its stock in the village above the original purchase price but below 
the prevailing market price, using the revenues generated as a revolving fund to 
refinance its operation in the following year (ibid.).  Apart from providing the start-up 
grant or loan, the external agency also finances the construction of a storage facility. 
The cereal bank also assists producers to market their grains in urban markets where 
consumer prices are higher.  Thus, the main objectives of cereal banks appear to be the 
provision of better marketing services for grain producers and consumers at the village 
level, the reduction of post-harvest losses, the creation of local emergency stocks as 
well as building organizational capacity at the village-level (ibid.). 
Given their storage and trading roles, African cereal banks are probably best 
described as mechanisms for commodity-price stabilization.  There is a well-
developed literature on commodity-price stabilization (e.g., Newbery and Stiglitz 
1981, Williams and Wright 1991, Deaton and Laroque 1996) which discusses the role 
                                                 
15 See Mansuri and Rao (2004) for a summary discussion of imperfections in community-based 
targeting due to capture by local elites. 
 22 
of storage by forward-looking agents in order to decrease variability in prices.  In the 
absence of storage or futures markets, government intervention in the form of price 
stabilization schemes can improve the welfare of consumers and producers.  As 
discussed in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), the main objectives of such price 
stabilization schemes include, inter alia, raising producer prices and incomes and 
reducing the price-related risks faced by both producers and consumers. 
Commodity price stabilization via storage and improvements in infrastructure 
can also improve welfare in the presence of interseasonal flow reversals, that is, the 
post-harvest flow of grains at low prices from rural areas to urban areas followed by 
the reverse flow of higher priced grains during the lean season as rural grain stocks 
become depleted . Providing evidence of price reversals in Madagascar, Barrett (1996) 
shows how this phenomenon can adversely affect peasant households that are net 
grain buyers in the lean season.  He concludes that interventions that diminish the 
spatial concentration of food grains storage help to improve the welfare of peasant 
households.  Are the grain banks found in Orissa motivated by this concern?  This is 
probably unlikely, since markets do not appear to be well-integrated in southwest 
Orissa and there is scant evidence of inter-seasonal flow reversals in this area.  In 
addition, the majority of rural households are semi-subsistence producers, engaging in 
market trade only to a limited degree, usually in local rural markets. 
Clearly, there exist substantive differences between the grain banks in tribal 
Orissa and the cereal banks in Africa.  We draw attention to two important 
distinguishing elements.  First, they do not engage in arbitrage either spatially (taking 
advantage of the difference between high urban and low rural post-harvest prices) or 
temporally (taking advantage of the different between low postharvest prices and high 
lean season prices).  Second, and more importantly, the raison d’etre of grain banks in 
Orissa is to provide consumption credit to member households for the purpose of 
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smoothing food consumption across the agricultural cycle rather than to serve as a 
mechanism for stabilizing grain prices across the agricultural cycle via storage.  
Notwithstanding these differences, grain banks in Orissa are similar to their African 
counterparts in that they are both managed by the beneficiary community. 
To some extent, the source of inspiration for grain banks is most likely found 
in the homegrown Self-Help Group (SHG) movement in the informal banking sector 
in India.  The SHG movement was started by social development NGOs in the 1980s 
to promote group savings and lending associations, primarily among women 
(Morduch and Rutherford 2003).  SHGs mobilized women to pool their savings into 
loans, often for short-term consumption.  Features that are common across grain banks 
and SHGs include the provision of consumption credit as well as member ownership, 
though grain banks lack the feature of joint liability which typifies many SHG credit 
schemes.  
 
Government of India’s Village Grain Bank Scheme 
Under the village grain banks scheme initiated by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs in 
1996-97, community grain banks are established in villages having a majority ST 
population (Ministry of Tribal Affairs 2002).  Member households can borrow grains 
from these grain banks during the lean season as well as during natural disasters such 
as droughts or cyclones in order to combat food insecurity and starvation.  In addition, 
they can also borrow grains to cope with idiosyncratic shocks such as illness or death 
of a family member (ibid.).  The stated objective of the scheme is to provide a safety 
net to protect households, especially for young children and pregnant and lactating 
mothers, from a drop in nutritional standards in the face of covariate as well as 
idiosyncratic shocks.   
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According to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, there are plans to expand the 
scheme to cover all endemically drought- and migration-prone areas and tribal villages 
across the country (Press Information Bureau 2002, 2004).16 Apart from Orissa, the 
scheme is currently operational in 12 other states including Andhra Pradesh, West 
Bengal, Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Tripura, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, 
Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Manipur.  Out of the 1483 grain banks established 
between 1996-97 to 2003-04 under this scheme, the largest number – 530, or about 37 
percent – are in Orissa.  The scheme is operational in 69 blocks in the undivided KBK 
districts.  However, to date, these have been no rigorous evaluations of the efficiency 
and impact of grain banks, and their reputation is based largely on anecdotal evidence 
and case studies of ‘model’ grain banks.  The aim of this project is to fill this gap in 
knowledge.   
 
1.4 Data 
Given the unavailability of relevant data required for performing either the impact or 
institutional analysis, a small-scale panel village and household survey was conducted 
in the predominantly tribal districts of Rayagada and Koraput where a high 
concentration of grain banks have been set up by Agragamee, one of the more 
prominent rural development NGOs currently active in Orissa and the largest player in 
terms of the number of grain banks instituted in the state.  Using these data, a number 
of questions on the impact and survival of grain banks are investigated.  
                                                 
16 Recently, the grain bank scheme has been revised and transferred to the Ministry of Consumer 
Affairs, Food and Public Distribution.  Under the revised scheme, there is an increased focus on 
targeting and community participation (especially of women) and enforcing repayment, by linking the 
grain banks scheme to the TPDS entitlements of members. BPL/Antyodaya Anna Yojana families in 
villages identified by the government as chronically food deficit areas are targeted for this scheme.  
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Survey data collection comprised of three phases, and involved the use of 
village, grain bank, and household survey instruments.  Details on the survey 
methodology and sampling issues are provided in a separate appendix.   
The first wave of the household survey was conducted in the post-harvest 
season (January-March 2005) in Kashipur block in Rayagada district.  The total 
sample size was 28 villages, which included 14 villages with functioning grain banks 
and 14 villages with failed grain banks or villages where grain banks were never set up 
were sampled.  Within each selected village, 20 households were sampled randomly.  
The total usable sample size was 544 households.  Out of these households, 269 lived 
in villages where grain banks were active, and 275 in villages where grain banks were 
absent. 
A village and grain bank survey was also implemented in these 28 villages to 
collect village and grain bank information.  In villages where grain banks failed, only 
retrospective information on grain bank design and functioning was gathered, whereas 
in villages with surviving grain banks, both contemporaneous and retrospective 
information on grain bank design parameters and functioning was gathered. 
The first wave of the household survey was followed shortly by a village and 
grain bank survey (April-May 2005) in the adjoining block of Dasmantpur, Koraput 
district, which served as the data for the institutional analysis.  The survey was fielded 
in a balanced sample of 40 villages where grain banks were operational and 40 
villages where grain banks were established but were no longer functional as of the 
time of the survey.17 
The second wave of the household survey (accompanied by a pared down 
version of the original village and grain bank survey) was conducted in Kashipur in 
                                                 
17 Some of the villages have no hamlets, i.e., all households live in one cluster.  This is true for most of 
the smaller villages.  However, some villages have more than one hamlet, and grain banks were 
established separately in each hamlet.  In this case, data was collected at the level of the hamlet. 
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the lean season (August-early October in the same year), when food stocks tend to be 
at their lowest.  The timing of the second wave coincided with the period when loans 
are provided to member households, and was completed before the minor crops (small 
millets) are harvested.  The survey was conducted in 26 of the 28 villages selected for 
the first wave.  A rotating panel sample design was adopted for the selection of 
households.  Within each sample village, attempts were made to contact 15 out of the 
20 sample households selected in the first wave and to contact 5 new households 
based on the original household listings.  Contact was reestablished with 400 
households from the first wave, and 99 new households were added.  This brought the 
total usable sample to 499 households; 250 households were in grain bank villages, 
and 249 were in non-grain bank villages. 
 
1.5 Objectives and methodology 
The objective of this study is to implement an institutional and impact analysis of 
grain banks.  The remaining chapters are organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, we 
examine what factors promote or impair grain bank survival.  The study is motivated 
by the fact that a large share of grain banks have ceased to function over time.  It is 
also motivated by the fact that, despite this, the government and rural NGOs are 
increasingly scaling up their grain bank activities.  In light of this, the insights 
provided here could help inform decision-making on design and implementation.  The 
factors that we examine comprise of village, grain bank member, and grain bank 
design and operational characteristics.  We examine the determinants of the 
probability of grain bank survival as well as the duration of grain bank survival using a 
binomial probit model and Cox proportional hazards model respectively.  We find that 
village characteristics appear to matter for both outcomes, whereas grain bank member 
characteristics and grain bank institutional features, given the variation found in the 
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data, mainly do not appear to matter.  In sum, the findings suggest the particular 
importance of program placement (i.e., site characteristics) for grain bank 
sustainability.  
In Chapter 3, we examine the impact of community grain banks on young 
children’s health outcomes.  The study is motivated by the Indian government’s 
proposal of expanding the grain bank initiative with the objective of improving 
nutritional outcomes in spite of the lack of quantitative evidence of the impact of 
existing grain banks.  In particular, we examine children’s height-for-age and weight-
for-height standardized scores as well as the change in children’s height, which are 
standard, objective indicators of children’s nutritional status.  The study contributes 
evidence on the impact of grain banks on children’s health outcomes in order to 
inform future food security policy interventions.  In order to arrive at an appropriate 
comparison group, we use propensity score matching estimators.  We also examine if 
the effect is stronger in villages with older surviving grain banks to test the hypothesis 
that children in participating households in longer-lived grain bank villages benefit 
more due to intergenerational effects (through, for example, the transmission of health 
benefits to children via mothers).  We find that grain banks do not have a statistically 
significant impact on any of the outcomes we examine, regardless of the duration of 
their lifespan.  This evidence suggests that grain banks, given their current design, 
may not be effective in meeting the objective of improved health outcomes for young 
children. 
In Chapter 4, we examine whether community grain banks have displaced 
informal moneylenders, traditionally the main source of credit for households.  The 
study is motivated by widespread anecdotal evidence of such an effect.  In addition, it 
is motivated by the possibility of welfare gains for grain bank beneficiary households 
given that the institution offers credit at more favorable terms.  The study contributes 
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evidence on the effects of grain banks, at a time when the government and rural NGOs 
are increasingly scaling up their grain bank activities, as well as contributes to the 
presently thin literature on the effects of increased competition in credit markets.  We 
estimate the effect of grain bank participation by households on the incidence of 
borrowing from moneylenders via propensity score matching.  We find that 
participation in grain banks has a large negative effect on the incidence of borrowing 
from moneylenders.  Further, we find that this effect is even larger when we examine 
participation in villages with older surviving grain banks.  This evidence combined 
with some less rigorous evidence of smaller loans when grain bank beneficiary 
households do borrow from moneylenders suggests welfare gains for them. 
While the findings of this study are not meant to be generalizable to grain 
banks in other parts of Orissa (such as the coastal districts) or India, the survey site 
represents one of the poorest and most food-insecure regions of the country.  Thus, an 
understanding of the functioning and effectiveness of a promising food security 
intervention in this region can act as a useful resource in enabling similarly vulnerable 
tribal communities to achieve an improvement in their food security status, and 
informing the grain bank movement generally. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DETERMINANTS OF GRAIN BANK SURVIVAL AND LONGEVITY  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, using data from a small-scale village and grain bank survey in 
Koraput, Orissa, we investigate the key institutional and socioeconomic factors that 
affect the likelihood and the duration of survival of community grain banks.  To date, 
there has been no rigorous quantitative analysis of grain bank sustainability despite the 
fact that the majority of grain banks that were established in this region have ceased to 
function.  Such an analysis is important in light of the fact that rural development 
NGOs as well as the government of India have adopted grain banks as an integral part 
of their tribal food security strategy, although not much is known about the factors that 
affect their sustainability and performance.  In addition, grain banks have some unique 
features, discussed in Chapter 1, that make them a promising complement to existing 
food security programs, such as the provision of consumption credit, membership-
based management and ownership and the ability to respond to food shortages in a 
more timely manner, given that the institution is situated locally within the community 
of intended beneficiaries.   
The remaining sections of the chapter are organized as follows.  In Section 2.2, 
we provide an overview of the institutional features of grain banks in the region, 
including a discussion of whether and how grain banks help households to manage 
risk and their role in promoting household savings.  In Section 2.3, we describe the 
data used and provide an overview of the socioeconomic characteristics of the sample 
villages.  We also discuss the salient design features of the sample grain banks.  In 
Section 2.4, we lay out the methodological framework for the empirical analysis of the 
determinants of grain bank survival and duration.  In Section 2.5, we present our 
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empirical results and discuss them.  We also present how our results fare when 
subjected to a series of robustness checks.  Section 2.6 summarizes the main findings 
and concludes. 
 
2.2 Institutional features 
Grain banks fall under the rubric of membership-based voluntary community-based 
organizations (CBOs) that play a prominent role in the provision of credit, insurance 
and other financial services, especially in rural areas in developing countries where 
formal financial institutions are largely absent.  They are membership-based, in that 
they are owned and managed completely by the beneficiaries themselves.  Grain banks 
are established in each village community, with participation limited to community 
members, as a result of which individuals are likely to possess a rich set of 
information on their fellow members.  In addition, participation is voluntary, as no one 
is forced to become a member of a particular group, unlike stricter kinship-based 
systems (see Dercon et al. 2005 for further discussion). 
Why did grain banks originate in their current form?  Given issues of poor 
coverage and irregular supply endemic to the major government food security and 
nutrition programs especially in rural and remote parts of Orissa as well as the 
recurring occurrence of seasonal food shortages and hunger in these parts, grain banks 
were introduced by social activists in Orissa as a community level solution that was 
not susceptible to the vagaries of these government programs. By lending and 
collecting loans in kind, grain banks fit into the barter system that was familiar to the 
tribal population.  In the absence of formal credit markets, they provided an alternative 
source of (consumption) credit at interest rates lower than those charged by local 
moneylenders, without the threat of the loss of collateral.  Grain banks were swiftly 
and enthusiastically embraced by the NGO sector engaged in promoting food security 
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and reproduced widely in different parts of Orissa and elsewhere. Lately, the 
government of India has started to establish its own grain banks in tribal villages 
across Orissa and other states as part of its tribal development program.   
Insight into the main institutional features of grain banks can be gained by 
comparing them to the cereal banks of the Sahel region in Africa. 18  Prima facie, the 
institutions appear to be very similar.  Both are community-based food security 
interventions.  They are initiated by an external agent (usually a NGO) and 
subsequently managed by members.  However, the main objective of cereal banks is to 
enable commodity price stabilization across the agricultural cycle through the 
provision of a physical storage facility.  On the other hand, the main objective of grain 
banks is to enable consumption smoothing across the agricultural cycle through the 
provision of consumption credit, and it does not depend on the provision of a 
dedicated physical storage facility.  As discussed later in Section 2.3.3, such a facility 
was constructed in very few instances in the case under study.  Thus, unlike cereal 
banks, the grain bank intervention provides mainly institutional infrastructure, not 
physical infrastructure.    
To some extent, grain banks enable member households to cope with 
idiosyncratic risk.  However, as discussed below, their main function appears to be the 
provision of a commitment savings product, possibly for addressing issues of self-
control, problems of intra-household allocation or coordination problems associated 
with social claims on liquid assets.   
                                                 
18 For a more detailed comparison of the main features of African cereal banks and Indian grain banks, 
see Chapter 1.   
 37 
Grain banks for managing household risk 
Due to the fact that grain bank membership is confined to members of the same 
village, community grain banks cannot help member households cope with covariate 
risk such as climatic shocks.  Carter (1997), using data from semiarid Western Africa, 
shows that households are able to insure idiosyncratic risk locally, but not covariate 
risk.  To the extent that covariate risk is important in this region, grain banks are not 
effective arrangements for the provision of mutual insurance, as all member 
households default simultaneously in the event of drought and associated crop failure.   
However, studies such as Townsend (1994) have shown that idiosyncratic risk 
dominates covariate risk for poor rural households.  This is also shown by Lybbert et 
al. (2004) among pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, a population that is extremely 
vulnerable to climatic, epidemiological and other covariate risks.  To the extent that 
grain banks provide consumption loans to cope with illness shocks or household-level 
crop failure, they can indeed help households manage idiosyncratic risk.  These are 
examples of grain banks insuring risk via mutual insurance.  In addition, as discussed 
later in Section 2.3.2, grain bank participants that default on their loan repayments 
typically do not immediately lose their membership, but instead given a grace period 
and allowed to return their loans with interest in the following harvest season.  Thus, 
the grain bank credit contract implicitly includes insurance.   
 
Grain banks for enabling savings 
Open-ended conversations with survey respondents as well as Agragamee field staff 
revealed a two-fold strategy households use to cope with food shortages in the 
agricultural lean season: a decrease in consumption and consumption credit from the 
local, private moneylender.  Typically, the moneylender was a non-tribal individual 
who was a trader or shopkeeper.  He did not require collateral for giving the loan, but 
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charged extremely high interest rates.  Repayment of loans to the moneylender 
constrained the ability of villagers to save during the harvest season, resulting in a 
cycle of borrowing and debt.  Behavioral factors – the lack of a savings habit and 
long-term planning – were also cited as a reason to explain the absence of savings 
prior to the establishment of grain banks.  According to respondents, by providing a 
one-time external grant, grain banks could break the cycle of debt.  Agragamee field 
staff reported that grain banks also provided villagers an opportunity to cultivate a 
savings habit that did not exist prior to the intervention. 
Using the terminology of behavioral economics, we posit that evidence of 
post-harvest festivals marked by high food and alcohol consumption in tribal Orissa, 
in contrast with severe food shortages in the lean season, may indicate time-
inconsistent or hyperbolic preferences and help explain the lack of a savings habit 
prior to grain banks.  According to standard economic theory, individuals are assumed 
to have time-consistent preferences, which imply exponential discount rates.  
However, a large body of literature has recorded evidence from both laboratory and 
field experiments that individuals suffer from time-inconsistency problems and do not 
discount the future exponentially (see, e.g., Laibson 1997 and O’Donoghue and Rabin 
1999).  As a result, they exhibit more impatience for near-term trade-offs compared to 
future trade-offs.  Since savings requires a delay in immediate rewards for future 
(greater) rewards, individuals with time-inconsistent preferences have a preference for 
short-term “over-consumption”.  In the context of food consumption in tribal Orissa, 
time-inconsistent preferences may result in over-consumption of food stocks after the 
harvest, even if that implies adverse consequences on consumption in the agricultural 
lean season.   
The evidence of cycles of reduced food intake and ritual feasting is not limited 
to the case of the tribal population in Orissa.  Fortes and Fortes (1936), as cited in 
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Messer (1989), interpret consumption practices among the Tallensi of Ghana as a 
problem of “misallocation of resources across seasons”.  The study documents “over-
consumption” in the post-harvest period in the form of liberal use of grains in beer 
brewing in contrast to the inadequacy of grains stored for the lean season, when 
energy requirements are high due to planting activities.   
More generally, there is evidence from different parts of the world that 
individuals demand appropriately-designed savings products or mechanisms that can 
reduce commitment problems and enable savings.19  For example, using data from 
Kenya, Gugerty (2001) shows that participants explicitly design their rotating savings 
and credit associations (ROSCAs) to enable exercise of self-control.  Similarly, 
Rutherford (1999) discusses numerous commitment devices used by individuals in 
rural East Africa to stick to savings plans, including buying a lock box and throwing 
away the key and the use of “money guards” in which individuals entrust their savings 
to someone else so that they cannot spend it.  Ashraf et al. (2006) provide evidence 
from an experiment in rural Philippines that individuals with time-inconsistent 
preferences have a higher demand for a commitment savings product, and that by use 
of this commitment savings product, they are able to increase both short-term and 
longer-term savings.  Duflo et al. (2005) use experimental data from rural western 
Kenya to show that commitment problems are a key factor determining the lack of use 
of fertilizer, in spite of the fact that it increases productivity and profitability.  They 
show that programs that help farmers to commit to buying fertilizers at the time when 
they have money result in the use of fertilizer in the future, demonstrating that farmers 
exhibit time-inconsistent preferences but are aware of their self-control problems and 
therefore have a demand for savings and commitment devices. 
                                                 
19 See Ashraf et al. (2003) for a review of commitment savings products 
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These studies imply that in the presence of time-inconsistency and self-control 
problems, products that place restrictions on present consumption can alter savings 
habits.  Similarly in tribal Orissa, post-harvest “over-consumption” and the absence of 
a savings habit prior to the establishment of grain banks can be interpreted as a result 
of time-inconsistent preferences.  In this context, grain banks can enable savings for 
members with self-control problems.   
Alternately, grain banks can potentially enable savings by addressing problems 
of intra-household allocation.  For example, Anderson and Baland (2002) show that 
ROSCAs can provide “spousal control” as they allow individuals to hide money from 
their spouse.  Informal interviews in tribal Orissa indicate that the unitary model of 
household decision-making may not be a correct representation of tribal households in 
these areas.  One piece of evidence is the presence of anti-liquor campaigns by women 
against liquor consumption by men in their households, which suggests differing 
preferences over the allocation of income to expenditures.  Since the grain bank 
committee, which oversees management of grain banks, is typically dominated by 
women, they may provide women with greater “spousal control”, in the case that 
women have a greater interest in ensuring household food security than men. 
Grain banks can also enable savings by reducing the rate of social taxation, or, 
in other words, resolving the coordination problem associated with social claims on 
liquid assets.  As discussed by Armendáriz and Morduch (2004), there is evidence that 
poor households have a desire to save, but due to the lack of access to formal savings 
facilities, are often compelled to save through imperfect informal means, such as 
leaving money with friends, neighbors or a deposit taker, hiding it in the house or 
joining ROSCAs.  These means are not efficient and vulnerable to losses, often due to 
constant requests for aid from friends, relatives and spouses.  In the case of grain 
banks, saving by oneself may not be efficient as it may be vulnerable to high rates of 
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social taxation due to requests from relatives and neighbors during times of need.  
However, saving in a community-level institution where decisions on disbursement 
are made only a few times a year and require the sanction of the management 
committee can lower the rate of social taxation, thereby making the savings decision 
attractive. 
 
Mechanisms for contract enforcement 
In chapter 1, we mentioned that group lending and joint liability, mechanisms used by 
local credit groups to overcome informational asymmetries, are not present in grain 
banks.20  How, then, are grain bank contracts enforced?   
Tribal agrarian societies are bound by close ties of clan and kinship, and 
individuals typically possess a rich set of information regarding fellow members.  
Thus, peer monitoring can be an effective and low-cost instrument for attenuating 
moral hazard problems.  In addition, the cost of social sanctions is high.  Therefore, 
the threat of social sanctions can maintain high repayment rates and overcome free 
rider problems in activities with a public good character, such as peer monitoring and 
auditing.  This has been shown theoretically by Besley et al. (1993) and Besley and 
Coate (1995), and empirically by Miguel and Gugerty (2004) in the provision of 
public goods in Kenya.21 
Grain banks share the feature of dynamic incentives with prominent 
microcredit institutions such as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, Banco-Sol in Bolivia, 
Bank Rakyat in Indonesia and the Foundation for International Community Assistance 
                                                 
20 In any case, joint liability is not a panacea for overcoming information problems and enforcing 
contracts.  Besley and Coate (1995) construct a model in which group lending generates both positive 
and negative effects on repayment incentives. 
21 However, Mude (2006) shows how the informational advantages  provided by close kinship ties in 
small communities are diminished if incentives for patronage and favor-peddling are present, providing 
a cautionary note on the limitations of peer monitoring in small, traditional communities. 
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(FINCA) village banks.  As discussed by Morduch (1999), dynamic incentives in 
repeated games, whereby loan sizes are increased over time, can also result in low 
default rates, even in the absence of group lending.  Dynamic incentives are more 
effective in areas with relatively low mobility, since a threat to withhold future (larger) 
loans is not credible if the lending game is finite.  In tribal regions of Orissa (and 
elsewhere in India), seasonal food shortages can therefore be interpreted as a repeated 
game in which there are few (and no better) alternatives than grain banks. 
  
2.3 Data and sample 
Background 
The data used in this study come from Dasmantpur block, Koraput district in the tribal 
belt of southwest Orissa, one of the poorest regions in the state (see Figure 2.1 for a 
district map of Orissa with the tribal belt shaded in gray). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: District map of Orissa 
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According to a population census conducted by the government of Orissa in 
1997, 89 percent of households in Dasmantpur were classified as poor or Below 
Poverty Line (BPL).22  In terms of occupational distribution, 47.4 percent of all 
workers are self-employed farmers, followed by 40.6 percent as agricultural laborers 
(Census 2001).  The overall adult literacy rate is 23.3 percent, with female literacy 
abysmally low at 11.8 percent.  Roughly 61 percent of Dasmantpur’s population is 
tribal, with the Paraja and the Kandha constituting the two main tribes.   
Due to the lack of storage mechanisms and poor transport and communication 
facilities in this region, markets tend to be poorly integrated over space and time.  As a 
result, food consumption is tied closely to the agricultural calendar and the 
composition, quality and quantity of food consumption changes with the seasons.  
Between October-February, when produce is harvested, the tribal population 
consumes staples such as rice, millet and maize.23  Between March-May, consumption 
depends on food stocks as well as purchases using earnings from daily wage labor 
(mainly in labor-intensive public works programs).  Food shortages are experienced in 
the ‘hungry’ season (June-September), during which time food stocks tend to be low 
and daily-wage labor employment is unavailable due to the monsoon rains.  During 
this period, meals are limited to gruel made from millet flour or flour from dried seeds 
(tamarind and mango), food consumption levels generally fall, and a decrease in the 
average body mass is observed.24  Existing public assistance programs have not been 
able to eliminate these seasonal food shortages.  In recent years, grain banks have been 
                                                 
22 A BPL household is defined as a family with an annual income below Rs. 11,000 which is roughly 
equivalent to a dollar a day (1992 rupees).  The percentage of households classified as BPL in Koraput 
district by the same survey is 84 percent. 
23 Cereals form the most important part of tribal diets.  Pulses (mainly kandula, which is grown locally) 
are also consumed.  However, few fruits and vegetables are consumed, as these are grown mostly for 
marketing purposes.  Meat is only consumed during festivals or when there are guests.  Milk and eggs 
are generally not consumed.   
24 Individual-level data on body weights was not collected for the village survey. However, as 
mentioned in chapter 3, data collected during the post-harvest and lean seasons as part of the household 
survey in Kashipur indicate a decrease in average body weight for adult women across the seasons.   
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seen as a welcome alternative for coping with seasonal food shortages and addressing 
credit constraints.  We discuss below the grain banks implemented by Agragamee, a 
rural development NGO that has been active in the tribal region of Orissa for over two 
decades. 
Community grain banks constitute one of the core components of the NGO 
food security strategy in tribal Orissa.  Agragamee, one of the pioneers of the grain 
bank movement in this region, began its grain bank initiative in Kashipur, Rayagada in 
1981 to combat starvation deaths and hunger there.  Initially, it established grain banks 
in a few villages that were in the vicinity of its headquarters in the town of Kashipur.  
Following heavy rains in Rayagada, Koraput, Kalahandi and Bolangir districts during 
the monsoon of 1992, press reports of starvation deaths in the region prompted action 
by the government of Orissa.  Together with UNICEF, the state government sponsored 
a food security project that was implemented by two NGOs: Agragamee in Rayagada 
and Koraput, and by Friends Association for Rural Reconstruction (FARR) in 
Kalahandi and Bolangir.  For this project, within each district, one block where food 
insecurity was a particularly acute and chronic problem was selected – Kashipur block 
in Rayagada, Dasmantpur in Koraput, Tureikela in Bolangir and Lanjigarh in 
Kalahandi.  Agragamee and FARR were chosen to administer the project on the basis 
of their long experience working with the tribal population in the region.   
Thus, in 1993, supported by funds from the government of Orissa and 
UNICEF under the Orissa Household Food Security Project (OHFSP), Agragamee 
expanded its grain bank initiative to all villages in Kashipur block (Rayagada district) 
and adjoining Dasmantpur block (Koraput district).  The interventions introduced as 
part of this project included the promotion of grain savings through the establishment 
of grain banks, increase in food availability by strengthening the public distribution 
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system, income generation through participation in self-help groups and the 
establishment of village-level committees to oversee the project.   
 
Survey sample 
The data used in this study come from a small-scale survey of grain banks conducted 
in Koraput and Rayagada districts in southwest Orissa, an area with a high 
concentration of grain banks.25  A total of 232 grain banks were established in 
Dasmantpur block, Koraput district between 1993-98 by Agragamee.  In April-May 
2005, a village and grain bank survey was fielded in 40 villages where grain banks 
were operational (surviving grain bank villages) and 40 villages where grain banks 
were once present but were no longer operational at the time of the survey (failed 
grain bank villages).26    
The sample numbers of surviving and failed grain bank villages are balanced 
and not proportionate to the population numbers of surviving and failed grain bank 
villages.  According to the most recent records available from Agragamee, out of the 
232 grain banks initially established, 71 were still operational.  Thus, the population 
proportion of operational grain banks is 30.6 percent.  Proportional sampling would 
have resulted in a lower number of observations of surviving grain banks, and given 
the objectives of the study to study the factors that influence grain bank sustainability, 
we intentionally oversampled operational grain bank villages.  We however check the 
sensitivity of our empirical findings to this sampling decision and find that they are 
robust to correcting for the reported population proportion of operational grain banks 
                                                 
25 Data for the impact analysis implemented in Chapters 3 and 4 is from a household and grain bank 
survey conducted in a separate set of villages in adjoining Kashipur block, Rayagada district.  
26 Details of the survey and sampling methodology are provided in a separate appendix. 
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as well as proportions bracketing the reported population proportion, given possible 
inaccuracies in Agragamee’s records.27   
The survey questionnaire was addressed jointly to village elders and as well as 
villagers who were likely to have a detailed knowledge of grain bank functioning, 
such as former or existing committee members.  The survey was administered by 
trained local enumerators.  To reduce response bias, each survey team was formed by 
enumerators from Dasmantpur block together with enumerators from Kashipur block, 
who would not have any close social connections with the respondents.     
 
2.3.1 Overview of sample villages 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for selected variables for the survey sample.  On 
average, 65 percent of the households in sample villages faced food inadequacy for at 
least one month of the year. 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of selected village characteristics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Distance from closest weekly market (km)1    6.36   4.29 1.00   35.00 
Distance from main road (km)   4.03   6.03 0.00   50.00 
Distance from block headquarters (km) 25.98 17.34 1.00   62.00 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office (km)   6.81   3.69 0.00   21.00 
Total number of households 53.46 35.04 5.00 179.00 
Share of households without land2   0.29   0.24 0.00    0.92 
Share of households that reported food insufficiency    0.65   0.29 0.03    1.00 
Share of ST households   0.77   0.32 0.00    1.00 
Share of SC households   0.09   0.17 0.00    0.90 
Notes: N = 80.  1 Data for all distance variables was collected as part of the village survey and reflect 
reports by a group of village leaders and elders.  They should be interpreted as the approximate distance 
by foot, as this was the most common mode of transport.  2 Without land here actually means without 
formally titled land. 
                                                 
27 Specifically, apart from estimating our regression model taking account of the actual population 
proportion of surviving grain banks, namely 0.31, we also estimate the model using a lower population 
proportion of 0.25 (1 in 4 surviving) and a slightly higher population proportion of 0.33 (1 in 3 
surviving). These additional results are presented in an appendix of tables at the end of this chapter. 
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The sample villages and hamlets vary in size from 5 households to 179 households, 
with more than half the villages composed of 21-50 households (see Table 2.2).  As a 
result of the small village size and strong kinship ties, members of the village 
community are likely to possess a rich set of information regarding fellow members.   
 
Table 2.2: Distribution of sample villages by number of households 
Number of households (h) Frequency  Share (%) 
20h ≤    6   7.5 
20 50h< ≤  45 56.3 
50 80h< ≤  13 16.3 
80 h<  16 20.0 
 80 100.0 
 
Ethnic composition 
Seventy-six of the sample villages have some tribal population, with the Kandha and 
Paraja tribes constituting the two main tribes.  Twenty-nine of these villages have 
exclusively ST population, while the other villages have a mixed population 
(Scheduled Castes (SC), Other Backward Castes (OBC) and General caste).  The high 
proportion of tribal population indicates the high level of ethnic homogeneity in this 
region. 
 
Transport and communication infrastructure 
The transport and communication facilities of villages in this area are very poor.  The 
mean distance from the sample villages to the block headquarters, which is the seat of 
local government offices and public agencies, was reported to be about 26 kilometers 
(roughly about 16 miles).  Note that this distance has to be interpreted in the context of 
the extremely poor road and vehicle conditions, where a stretch of 25 kilometers 
(about 15.5 miles) can take more than an hour by road, and in light of the fact that the 
main mode of transport for villagers in this region is walking.  Table 2.3 presents the 
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distribution of villages by distance from block headquarters.  This information was 
collected from reports by villagers and reflects, in most cases, the distance of the path 
taken by foot (and not the distance on motorable road), as this was the most common 
mode of transport. 
 
Table 2.3: Distribution of sample villages by distance to block 
headquarters 
Distance from block headquarters (km) Frequency Share (%) 
0 5d≤ <  13   16.3 
5 25d≤ ≤  25   31.3 
25 d<  42   52.5 
 80 100.0 
 
In order to travel to the block headquarters, villagers frequently reported that they had 
to traverse a combination of mud paths, untarred (kachcha) and tarred (pucca) roads.  
In more than half the sample villages, walking (either by itself or in combination with 
another mode of transport) was reported to be the most common mode of transport, 
followed by “private vehicle” run by private operators, sometimes on a weekly basis 
(see Table 2.4).  Thus, travel to the block headquarters in order to avail of medical 
facilities or to obtain identification cards (such as a BPL card) could be an entire day’s 
affair, starting with a long walk from the village to the main connecting road on which 
buses and other vehicles operate, usually on an infrequent and irregular schedule. 
 
Table 2.4: Distribution of sample villages by main mode of transport to 
block headquarters 
Main mode of transport Frequency Share (%) 
Walking 33   41.3 
Private vehicle  19   23.7 
Public bus 16   20.0 
Other (combination of walking & private vehicle; 
cycle) 
12   15.0 
 80 100.0 
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Village physical infrastructure 
Physical infrastructure in these villages is generally nonexistent.  When present, it is of 
extremely low quality.  The main source of lighting in the sample villages is firewood.  
Only nine villages (11 percent) reported being connected to the electrical grid.  In 
these villages, the average share of households with an electrical connection is less 
than 17 percent.  Fifty-five sample villages (70 percent) reported that their access and 
internal roads are wholly kachcha or untarred, while the rest reported these roads as 
being partially or fully tarred.  As a result, in the monsoon season, these roads become 
muddy (and are not usable in some cases).  The roads are also difficult to keep from 
becoming contaminated and may serve as an important source of parasitic infections, 
as most villagers walk barefoot.28   
Tribal settlements tended to form close to groundwater sources, typically near 
natural springs.  Due to ecological changes in the area, mainly precipitated by 
collective human actions, drying up of natural water sources has made the tribal 
population dependent on tube wells established by the government for drinking water 
supply purposes.  Although virtually all of the sample villages obtain drinking water 
from tube wells installed within the village (one village reported having access to 
piped water), inadequate water supply was commonly reported as a problem.  Table 
2.5 presents the distribution of tube wells across villages by village size categories.  
On average, across the 79 villages, one tube well was available for every 33 
households.29   
                                                 
28 Dirt floors in homes have also been shown to increase the likelihood of parasitic infections, diarrhea 
and anemia in children, which can in turn reduce cognitive ability (see, e.g., Anderson and May 1991 
and Behrman 1996).  Thus, poor physical infrastructure such as dirt floors and untarred roads can have 
serious deleterious impacts on current and future health and labor productivity. 
29 One village had no tube wells but had access to piped water. 
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Table 2.5: Distribution of sample villages of different sizes by number of 
tube wells 
 Number of villages by size categories 
No. of tube wells 
20 
households 
or less 
21-50 
households 
51-80 
households 
More than 80 
households 
Total 
1 4 27 7 1 39 
2 2 12 1 6 21 
3 0   4 4 4 12 
4 0   1 1 2   4 
5 0   0 0 2   2 
6 0   0 0 1   1 
Notes: The remaining village had piped water but no tube well. 
 
Economy 
Agriculture was the main source of employment and livelihood in the sample villages, 
followed by seasonal daily wage labor.  The latter was available mainly in the summer 
season in connection with large public works projects.  The main crops cultivated in 
this area are cereals including paddy and different varieties of millet.  Other crops 
include corn, oilseeds, pulses and vegetables (such as eggplant, potato, chillies and 
tomato).  Items not produced by the villagers (such as salt and clothing) are purchased 
using cash or by bartering at the local weekly markets in each of the gram panchayats. 
 
Food insufficiency 
In all sample villages, villagers indicated that households faced food insufficiency 
during at least one month of the year.  Thirty-seven villages reported that they faced 
food insufficiency for five to six months out of the year, while the rest reported facing 
food insufficiency for three to four months out of the year.  While the months most 
commonly cited as food shortage months were the late summer and monsoon months 
of Landi, Aashad and Shravana (mid-May to mid-August), some villages reported 
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having households that faced food shortage from Baishak to Kartik (from mid-April to 
mid-November).  
 
Development programs 
Within the sample villages, the most commonly-found government programs include 
labor-intensive public works programs, especially during the summer months, and 
watershed management programs.  Roughly two-thirds of the villages reported having 
had a food-for-work program within the 10 years preceding the survey, while roughly 
two in five villages reported having had a watershed management program within the 
same time period.  At the time of the survey, three in four villages had one or more 
operational microcredit groups, called self-help groups, for organizing income-
generating activities.  These self-help groups generally obtain credit from state-run 
banks for the purpose of retail business and marketing, including making and 
marketing jhadus (brooms), dry fish, disposable leaf plates, etc.  The credit is often 
used to buy items at a wholesale rate and then sell at a higher price, with profits shared 
equally among members.  In villages with operational self-help groups, the share of 
participating households varied from a fifth to all households, with mean participation 
in these villages at around three-fifths of households.  The size of these self-help 
groups varied, with larger villages often having more than one group, and groups 
ranging in size between 10 and 100 members, with the average membership size being 
about 32 members. 
 
Health and education 
At the time of the survey, 63 of the sample villages (about 78 percent) reported having 
functional primary schools.  However, school infrastructure is of extremely poor 
quality, at best comprising of a single roofed room often without a blackboard.  Few 
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resources, if any, are available to the teacher, who single-handedly manages young 
children of varying ages. 
Sixteen villages (or 20 percent) reported not having a functional anganwadi 
center (the point of delivery of ICDS services), while the rest have a functional center 
or sub-center in the village.  However, of the 66 villages with a functional anganwadi 
center, only 19 reported regular (daily or weekly) visits by the anganwadi worker.  
The frequency of attendance by the anganwadi worker is shown in Table 2.6.  Only 25 
of the sample villages (about 31 percent) reported having a mass immunization 
campaign in the five years preceding the survey. 
 
Table 2.6: Distribution of sample villages by frequency of attendance by 
anganwadi worker 
Frequency of attendance Frequency Share (%) 
Daily 8   10.0 
Weekly 11   13.8 
Monthly 37   46.2 
Less frequently or never 24   30.0 
 80 100.0 
Notes: 16 villages had no functional anganwadi center or sub-center.   
 
Shocks 
Roughly three in four sample villages reported experiencing three or more disasters 
(such as a landslide, drought, crop failure due to insect blight, flood, conflict, land 
seizures and forest fires) in the five years preceding the survey.  Crop failure due to 
droughts or insect blight was a commonly occurring problem in this area.  This raises 
the question on whether grain banks are sustainable in this area, as their sustainability 
depends on sufficient agricultural output.  In fact, a large number of failed grain banks 
occurred in the years following a severe drought, which is illustrated in a later section.  
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Governance 
Table 2.7 shows the distribution of villages by the share of villagers that attended 
village-level meetings to discuss issues that affected the entire village, from social 
functions and festivals to the progress of the village school, self-help group, etc.  Apart 
from one village, the remaining villages reported holding village-level meetings which 
were attended by all or a majority of households.  Roughly half of the villages 
reported holding meetings whenever the need arose.  A little over a quarter of villages 
reported holding meetings on a monthly basis, while the remainder reported meeting 
on a weekly or fortnightly basis.  
 
Table 2.7: Distribution of villages by the share of households that attend village 
meetings 
Share of households Number Share (%) 
All 56   70.0 
More than half 21   26.3 
Less than half   2     2.5 
 79 100.0 
Notes: One village reported not having village-level meetings. 
 
Surviving grain bank villages versus failed grain bank villages 
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 summarize the means of important variables for the sample of 
surviving grain bank villages and failed grain bank villages. 
In Table 2.8, among other things, we see that the share of households reporting 
food inadequacy for at least one month in the year preceding the survey was 
significantly higher in villages with surviving grain banks than those with failed grain 
banks. 
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Table 2.8: Means of continuous variables, by village grain bank status 
Variable 
SGBV  
(1) 
FGBV  
(2) 
SGBV-
FGBV 
(1)-(2) 
Village-related variables    
Distance from main road (km)  3.74     4.33   -0.59 
Distance from block headquarters (km) 23.95   28.01   -4.06 
Time taken to travel to block headquarters by main 
mode of transport (minutes) 
99.00 123.00 -24.00 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office (km)   6.88     6.74   0.14 
Distance from the closest weekly market (km)   7.00     5.71    1.29 
Distance from the closest post office (km)   5.26     4.23       1.03 * 
Total number of households 55.01    51.9    3.30 
Share of landless households   0.28     0.29   -0.01 
Share of ST households    0.76     0.78   -0.02 
Share of households that have reported food 
inadequacy for at least 1 month in past year 
  0.73     0.57        0.16 ** 
Grain bank-related variables    
Grain bank membership size (at inception) 41.35   36.28   5.10 
Amount of grain bank contributed by villages (at 
inception) 
442.8 393.50 49.30 
Share of ST members in grain bank   0.78     0.82  -0.03 
Number of committee members   6.43     6.95  -0.52 
Share of committee members who are female   0.55     0.51   0.03 
Notes:  SGBV refers to surviving grain bank villages; FGBV refers to failed grain bank villages.   
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level;  ** at the 5 percent level; and *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
 
In Table 2.9, we see that the proportion of villages with functional self-help 
groups, meeting on a needs-basis and also having an elected government 
representative in the five years preceding the survey (“ward member”) is significantly 
higher in the surviving grain bank village sample than in the failed grain bank village 
sample.  This may indicate that grain banks survive in villages with a higher degree of 
social interaction and leadership.  The results discussed here are unconditional, and 
serve as a precursor to the conditional analysis.   
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Table 2.9: Means of dichotomous variables, by village grain bank status 
Variable 
SGBV 
(1) 
FGBV 
 (2) 
SGBV-FGBV 
(1)-(2) 
Share of villages (in percent) having   
Functional primary school 80.0 77.5 2.5 
Midday meals at school 72.5 77.5 5.0 
Anganwadi center or sub-center 77.5 82.5 -5.0 
Regular (daily/weekly) visits by anganwadi worker 22.5 25.0 -2.5 
Vaccination drive in last 5 years 30.0 32.5 -2.5 
Electrical connection 7.5 15.0 -7.5 
Tarred village road 22.5 40.0      -17.5 * 
New road in last 5 years 75.0 77.5 -2.5 
Walking as main mode of transport to block 
headquarters 
37.5 45.0 -7.5 
Self-help groups 85.0 65.0      20.0 ** 
Village-level meetings on a need-basis 75.0 30.8        44.2 *** 
Ward member in last 5 years 77.5 55.0      22.5 ** 
Watershed management program in last 10 years 40.0 45.0 -5.0 
Food-for-work program in last 10 years 75.0 57.5   17.5 * 
Drought in last 5 years 80.0 77.5  2.5 
Landslide in last 5 years 87.5 77.5 10.0 
Forest fire in last 5 years 55.0 37.5 17.5 
Notes:  SGBV refers to surviving grain bank villages; FGBV refers to failed grain bank villages.   
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level;  ** at the 5 percent level; and *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
 
2.3.2 Overview of sample grain banks 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the 80 sample grain banks, which 
include 40 surviving and 40 failed grain banks.30  Grain banks were established 
between 1993-1998.  The distribution of sample grain banks by year of establishment 
is presented in Table 2.10 to see if there is any evidence of a difference in the failure 
pattern based on year of inception.  For example, are the earliest grain banks more 
likely to fail?  In other words, is there a demonstration effect or learning by doing?  
However, from the table below we find no statistically significant difference in the 
                                                 
30 One shortcoming of the sampling frame is that the sample did not take into account the year of 
inception.  Thus, from the current sample, we cannot make any inferences about a chronology of grain 
bank failure in the population.  To the extent possible, we try to address this shortcoming in the data by 
including a variable on the year of inception in the conditional analysis. 
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proportion of surviving and failed grain banks based on the year in which they were 
established.31  
 
Table 2.10: Distribution of grain banks by year of establishment 
Year 
Surviving grain banks Failed grain banks All 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
1993   8   20.0   9   22.5 17   21.3 
1994   8   20.0   9   22.5 17   21.3 
1995 21   52.5 18   45.0 39   48.8 
1996   2     5.0   3     7.5   5     6.3 
1997   1     2.5   0     0.0   1     1.3 
1998   0     0.0   1     2.5   1     1.3 
Total 40 100.0 40 100.0 80 100.0 
Chi-squared test of independence: Pearson chi-squared statistic = 2.55; p-value = 0.769. 
 
Grain bank membership is voluntary, and in principle is open to the entire 
village community.  In practice however, the entire village community became grain 
bank members in only 10 villages (or in 12.5 percent) of the sample.  In villages with 
less than 80 households, on average about four out of every five households became 
grain bank members.  In larger villages, on average about three out of five households 
became grain bank members.  Two types of households did not become grain bank 
members – households that were food-secure and did not require borrowing grains 
from grain banks to smooth consumption, and households that were not accepted into 
grain banks because of liability risks or caste differences. 
The grain banks were established in the monsoon season through a grant in the 
form of grains provided by Agragamee.  In over three-quarters of the sample grain 
banks, villagers also made a matching contribution in order to double grain bank 
stocks.  This was actively promoted by Agragamee field staff, who felt that this 
                                                 
31 Note that this result is based on village and grain bank data from Dasmantpur.  In Kashipur, the site 
of the household survey, grain banks established prior to the OHFSP differed from later grain banks in 
the level of involvement on the part of Agragamee.  
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contribution increased the community’s sense of ownership of the grain bank, thereby 
potentially positively affecting the likelihood of grain bank sustainability. 
Grain bank operations were overseen by a committee comprising of, on 
average, seven elected representatives, who were also grain bank members.  On 
average, slightly over half of the committee members were female.  Female 
representation was considered important for grain bank sustainability since the staff 
implementing the program felt that women would value the grain bank more.  This 
was rooted in the implicit belief that women are more concerned about the nutritional 
and health status of their children than the male members of the household.32  This 
design feature of Agragamee’s grain banks is not unique.  Transfer programs instituted 
by developing countries are increasingly delivering the benefits to the mother directly.  
For example, in Bangladesh, Mexico and elsewhere, conditional cash and in-kind 
transfer programs aimed at improving children’s health and educational outcomes 
provide the benefit directly to mothers (Rawlings and Rubio 2005).  
At the time of inception, interest rates were set at 100 percent for the standard 
duration of the loan.33  This was done in order to help generate surplus reserves in the 
grain banks.  In subsequent years, when sufficient reserves were achieved, the interest 
rate was lowered to 20-25 percent by the majority of sample grain banks.  
The member households meet twice a year, once after the harvest when loan 
repayments are made and the cases of defaulters assessed, and once at the start of the 
lean season when loans are disbursed.  Decisions on the loan amounts to be disbursed 
as well as the interest rate to be charged were usually made collectively by the entire 
                                                 
32 For evidence on women’s bias in channeling own-income towards expenditures on health and 
education for their children, see Thomas (1990) and Duflo (2003).   
33 This interest rate, although high, is lower than the interest rates set by moneylenders, which often 
include non-transparent and implicit rates, such as in tied credit-labor contracts. 
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member community, although the grain bank committee was responsible for 
collections, disbursements and bookkeeping.   
Enforcement of repayment takes place through peer monitoring and the threat 
of social sanctions.  Across the sample of surviving grain banks, on average, about 
two-fifths of households had not returned their loans from the previous year at the 
time of the survey.  However, defaulters did not immediately lose grain bank 
membership.  Instead, they were given a grace period and were asked to return their 
loans with interest in the following harvest season.  Thus, the grain bank credit 
contract implicitly includes insurance, as in the credit contracts in northern rural 
Nigeria, examined by Udry (1990), in which repayments depend on realizations of 
random shocks by both borrowers and lenders.  This practice of state-dependent 
repayments is also similar to other community-based rural credit cooperatives, such as 
the German credit cooperatives discussed by Ghatak and Guinnane (1999).  These 
cooperatives granted an extension to borrowers who could not repay, based on their 
ability to see the extenuating circumstances of the borrower, such as illness or crop 
failure.  In the case of our grain banks, the most common reasons for default included 
crop failure or insufficient agricultural output, followed by marriage expenses, events 
which are readily and highly observable to the entire community.   
 
2.3.3 Overview of surviving sample grain banks 
This section provides an overview of surviving grain banks in the survey sample.  As 
mentioned before, 40 surviving grain banks were surveyed, all of which were 
established in the monsoon season, between 1993-97.  However, more than half were 
set up in 1995 (see Table 2.10).  At the time of inception, Agragamee provided a grant 
in the form of grains.  Unlike the villages in Kashipur where Agragamee had 
established grain banks prior to the OHFSP, villagers were not obliged to contribute a 
 59 
matching amount to the grain bank when the grain bank was established.  The average 
number of member households at the time of inception ranged between 10 and 125 
households, with the mean number of households around 41.  Between the time that 
grain banks were established and the time of the survey, the average membership size 
had increased by about two households, indicating little change in membership size 
from inception.   
Twelve of these surviving grain bank villages had only ST population, while 
the rest had a mixed population comprising of ST, SC, OBC or General caste 
members.  Only three villages had no ST population.  At the time of inception, in the 
remaining 37 villages, the average share of ST households that were grain bank 
members was about 85 percent.   
Almost all villages cited shortage of food grains as one of the main reasons for 
setting up grain banks.  In addition, 29 villages cited advice from Agragamee, while 
18 villages cited the desire to gain respite from local moneylenders as being another 
important reason.  The average amount of grains given by Agragamee at start-up was 
close to 19 kilograms per household.  In contrast, the government of India granted 100 
kilograms per household in its grain bank scheme (Government of India 2003-04). 
The management of grain banks was undertaken by a village committee, which 
comprised both men and women.  These committees ranged in size from three to eight 
members, with the average committee size equal to about six members.  On average, 
females formed the majority of committee members, and the share of females in the 
committee ranged from about 38 to 100 percent.  While the grain bank committee was 
officially in charge of loan disbursement and collection, in several villages, decision-
making authority was shared more widely and involved all grain bank members.  
Specifically, 22 villages reported that in addition to having a grain bank committee, all 
grain bank members participated in decision-making regarding important matters. 
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The share of borrowers in the year preceding the survey ranged from 13 to 100 
percent of the membership base, with the average share of borrowers across villages at 
84 percent, indicating that a large proportion of grain bank members used the 
borrowing facility. 
In terms of the reported benefits of grain banks, 39 villages indicated that the 
intervention had reduced their dependence on the local moneylender.  Thirty-six 
villages reported that the availability of grains in a timely manner was another 
important benefit.  Twenty-five villages also reported that borrowing from the grain 
bank allowed them to pay a lower interest rate than borrowing from other sources.  
At the time of inception, the interest rate that was charged on grain bank loans 
was 100 percent in 32 villages, while it varied between 20-50 percent in the remaining 
eight villages.  The reason cited for the high initial interest rate was the desire on the 
part of the grain bank members to increase the grain stock.  In subsequent years, as the 
grain bank stocks increased, 34 out of 40 villages lowered the interest rate.  The 
majority of grain banks (30 villages) charged between 20-25 percent, while the 
remaining 10 villages charged 50 percent.  In examining the distribution of interest 
rates in effect at the time of the survey, we find that the median interest rate is 25 
percent with an interquartile range of 12.5 percentage points. 
Table 2.11 presents summary statistics on the stocks of different types of 
grains stored in the grain banks.  Millet, the traditional staple in this region, is the most 
commonly stored grain, followed by paddy, and in a few cases, rice.  Informal 
conversations with villagers and Agragamee staff indicated that millet may be more 
suitable for storage purposes, as it is more resistant to pests and the type of climate in 
the region.   
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Table 2.11: Summary statistics of grain bank stocks by membership size in the year 
preceding the survey (in kilograms) 
Grain N Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. 
Paddy 32 20.7 18.7 81.8 3.0 
Millet 34 19.7 15.7 64.0 2.8 
Small millet 29 11.0   9.0 32.0 1.8 
Notes: Statistics reported only for surviving grain banks.  N denotes the number of villages that 
reported positive holdings for each of the grains types reported above.  Statistics not reported for rice, 
as only 5 villages reported positive holdings of rice. 
 
Grains were stored in large bamboo baskets known as dudis or in polythene 
sacks.  These baskets were kept in a member’s house, as a dedicated storehouse for the 
grain bank was reported in only one of the 80 sample villages.34  This provides an 
interesting and important insight into the defining characteristics of grain banks, as it 
indicates that the innovation is purely institutional rather than for storage purposes.  It 
also presents an important distinction from the cereal banks in the Sahel region, one of 
whose main objectives is to provide an improved physical facility for storage.  
Table 2.12 presents summary statistics on the share of paddy and millet 
holdings lost due to pests in an average year.  These figures represent approximate 
amounts as reported by one or more committee members that possessed information 
on grain bank holdings and losses.  The average share of paddy lost is higher than the 
average share of millet.35  The lack of proper storage facilities was cited as one of the 
most common problems, and 39 villages reported that constructing storage facilities 
would improve grain bank functioning.  Seven villages reported that increasing the 
grant amount or providing a seed grant would also help to improve grain bank 
functioning. 
 
                                                 
34 We do not have household-level data on storage losses that would allow us to compare the rate of 
personal storage losses for households that host the grain banks’ stocks with the rate of storage losses of 
grain banks.  Therefore, we cannot test if there is a moral hazard problem whereby the host may take 
better care of his or her own stocks relative to grain bank stocks. 
35 This corroborates the claim by NGO field staff and management that millets are better suited for 
storage purposes, given the local climate and storage facilities.   
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Table 2.12: Summary statistics of share of grain bank losses due to pests by type of 
grain in the year preceding the survey 
Grain N Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. 
Paddy 24 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.0025 
Millet 25 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.0040 
Notes: Statistics reported only for surviving grain banks.  In most cases, amounts reported are 
approximations, as reported by one or more grain bank committee member.  N denotes the number of 
villages that reported positive holdings for each of the grains types reported above.  Summary statistics 
not reported for small millet and rice as only 0 and 2 villages reported losses for these grains, 
respectively.  
 
2.3.4 Overview of failed sample grain banks 
Forty failed grain banks were surveyed, all of which were established in the monsoon 
season, between 1993-98.  The average number of member households at the time of 
inception ranged between 5 and 139 households, with the mean number of households 
at 36.  Seventeen of these villages had only ST population, while the rest had a mixed 
population comprising of ST, SC, OBC or General caste members.  Only one village 
had no ST population.  In the remaining 39 villages, at the time of inception, the 
average share of ST households in the grain bank membership was about 84 percent, 
almost the same as in the sample of villages with surviving grain banks. 
Similar to the surviving grain bank villages, almost all cited shortage of food 
grains as one of the main reasons for introducing grain banks.  In addition, 24 of these 
villages cited advice from Agragamee; nine villages cited respite from the 
moneylender as being an other important reason.  The average amount of grains given 
by Agragamee at start-up was close to 21 kilograms per household.   
As with the surviving grain bank villages, the grain bank management 
committee comprised both male and female members, with the average committee 
size equal to about seven members.  Females formed the majority of committee 
members, while the share of females in the committee ranged roughly between 30 and 
70 percent.   
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In addition to the grain bank committee, all grain bank members participated in 
the decision-making process in only 10 sample villages.  This was significantly 
different from the surviving grain bank villages, where a larger number reported the 
involvement of the entire membership base. 
Figure 2.2 plots the distribution of sample grain banks by year of collapse.  It 
shows that more than half of sample grain banks collapsed between 1997-2001.  These 
years also coincided with years of very low rainfall in Koraput district, indicating that 
insufficient agricultural output in those years probably played a large role in the 
closure of the grain banks.  This may indicate that covariate shocks, rather than slow 
decline, drives grain bank failure.36 
The proximate reasons for grain bank collapse, as reported by the villagers, 
include poor management or misappropriation by committee members (27 villages).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Frequency distribution of failed grain banks by year of failure 
                                                 
36 We cannot perform a conditional analysis of whether rainfall shocks are a significant determinant of 
grain bank failure or success, since the dataset is from a small geographical region that faces the same 
weather shocks at any given time.  Due to the lack of variation in the weather data, we are not able to 
include it as one of the explanatory variables, though we have reason to suspect that it may be an 
important one. 
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This indicates that there was a lack of managerial skills on the part of the grain bank 
committee, and that, in order to be successful, future grain bank schemes should 
include the necessary training to enable the grain bank committee members to perform 
their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. 
The second-most reported reason for grain bank failure, which corroborates the 
claim that poor rainfall plays an important role in grain bank failure, was crop failure 
or insufficient output (14 villages).   
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of the life span of failed grain banks, which 
ranges from 1 to 10 years.  The median lifespan of failed grain banks was five years, 
with an interquartile range of 3.5 years.  Interestingly, there does not appear to be any 
discernible pattern in the relationship between grain bank life span and the incidence 
of collapse.  Thus, we do not find any evidence of sorting (i.e., “low-quality” grain 
banks collapse within a short time after establishment and have a short life span, while 
the “higher-quality” grain banks survive).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Frequency histogram of years of operation before failure 
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2.4 Empirical framework  
2.4.1 The binomial probit model 
In order to examine the determinants of a successfully functioning grain bank, where 
success is defined by whether the grain bank is surviving or not, we estimate a discrete 
choice process using a latent variable regression model.  The model assumes that there 
is an underlying latent response variable *y  defined by the regression relationship 
(1) *y ε′= +x β  
where *y  is the net benefit obtained from a grain bank, x  is a vector of village and 
grain bank characteristics, β  is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and ε  is a 
stochastic error term.  The latent response variable *y  is not observed.  Instead, a 
dummy variable y is observed, such that  
(2) 
*
*
1 if 0
0 if 0
y y
y y
= >
= ≤
 
From (1) and (2), we have  
(3) Pr( 1) Pr( ) 1 ( )y Fε ′ ′= = > − = − −x β x β  
where F is the underlying cumulative distribution function for the error term ε .   
In the analysis of discrete choice models, two commonly used distributions for 
the error term include the normal and logistic distributions, which give rise to the 
probit and logit model, respectively.  The logistic distribution is similar to the normal 
distribution except in the tails, where it is heavier.  Both models are estimable via 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).  For the normal distribution, the log-
likelihood is 
(4) 
0 1
ln ln[1 ( )] ln[ ( )]
i i
i iy y
L
= =
′ ′= −Φ + Φ∑ ∑x β x β  
While there is no conclusive resolution on which distribution is more appropriate, 
Greene (2002) discusses that predictions from both models tend to be similar, 
especially in a balanced sample (equal number of responses, i.e., 1y = , and non-
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responses, i.e., 0y = ), which is true by sample construction in our case.  Therefore, 
we only estimate the probit model.   
As the estimated parameters are difficult to interpret given that they are related 
to the underlying latent structure, we compute the associated marginal effects, which 
we present in the appendix.  In large samples, marginal effects evaluated at the sample 
means give the same result as computing the average of the marginal effects at every 
observation (see Greene 2002).  However, the problem with the former is that if the 
x vector contains dummy variables (which is the case in this study), then we may be 
evaluating the marginal effect at a nonexistent or nonsensical value.  In addition, the 
sample used in this study is small, which increases the likelihood that the marginal 
effects at the sample means are not the same as the average marginal effects.  For this 
reason, we also compute the average of marginal effects computed at each 
observation, which is also the favored practice currently (see Greene 2002).  These are 
also presented in the appendix. 
A second set of results that take the sampling design into account is also 
presented.  In order to have a balanced sample, data was collected from an equal 
number of surviving and failed grain banks villages.  This was done because the 
number of surviving grain banks is much fewer than failed grain banks, and given that 
the total sample is small, proportional sampling would have resulted in very few 
observations on surviving grain banks.  Out of 232 grain banks initially established, 
only 71 were still operational by the latest available Agragamee records, which 
implies that at the time of the survey, about 31 percent of grain banks that were 
initially established were still surviving.  Therefore, in our survey, surviving grain 
banks were oversampled.  Oversampling results in a choice-based sample or an 
endogenous-stratified sample.  Maximizing a random-sample likelihood function as in 
(4) with choice-based sampling will yield inconsistent parameter estimates .  A 
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relatively simple estimator which yields consistent estimates under choice-based 
sampling is the Weighted Endogenous Sampling Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
(WESMLE) developed by Manski and Lerman (1977), as cited in Greene (2002).  In 
order to arrive at population parameter estimates, survey weights have to be used.  
This requires that the true population proportions of ones and zeros, 1ω and 0ω , be 
known, which is the case in our study.  Then, if 1p and 0p are the sample proportions 
of ones and zeros, the estimator is obtained by maximizing the weighted log likelihood 
function 
(5) 
0 1
ln ln[1 ( )] ln[ ( )]
i i
i i i iy y
L w w
= =
′ ′= −Φ + Φ∑ ∑x β x β , 
where the weight is given by 1 1 0 0( / ) (1 )( / )ω ω= + −i i iw y p y p . 
 
2.4.2 The Cox proportional hazards model 
As a complementary exercise, we also implement an analysis of the determinants of 
duration of grain bank survival, using the semiparametric Cox proportional hazards 
model.  Survival models answer a different question than the probit model discussed 
previously.  While the probit regression model estimates the probability of grain bank 
survival, the proportional hazards models estimate the likelihood of grain bank failure, 
conditional on having survived until the previous period.  The normality assumption 
for time to an event conditional on the covariates is unreasonable in many cases 
(Keifer 1988), and models such as the probit model or linear regression model which 
make the normality assumption may be inappropriate to model time until failure.  
However, in such a case, survival models make more reasonable assumptions on the 
distribution of the error term.  Which distribution is more appropriate depends on the 
assumption on the shape of the baseline hazard function.  For example, if there is 
reason to assume that the baseline hazard function is constant over time, then the 
exponential model may be most appropriate.  This implies that the failure rate is 
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independent of time.  In this case, the failure process is said to lack memory.  If the 
hazard function is assumed to be monotonically increasing or decreasing over time, 
then the Weibull model may be more appropriate.  If, on the other hand, the hazard 
function is believed to be non-monotonic (i.e., increasing and then decreasing), then 
the log-normal accelerated failure-time model is more appropriate.  A correctly-
specified parametric hazards model provides efficient estimates.   
However, if we do not have any reason to believe a priori that the hazard 
function follows a particular shape, the Cox proportional hazards model may be more 
appropriate as it does not assume any functional form for the baseline hazard (Cox 
1972).  This gives the Cox model a particular advantage over parametric models that 
may be using an incorrect specification for the distribution of the error term, thus 
biasing the parameter estimates.  This gain however comes with a potential loss in 
terms of efficiency relative to maximum likelihood estimation of a correctly specified 
parametric survival model. The Cox model uses partial maximum likelihood to 
estimate how the covariates 
j
x  shift the hazard function ( | )h t
j
x .   
As discussed in Kiefer (1988), in the proportional hazards specification, the 
effect of the explanatory variables is to multiply the hazard function by a scale factor.  
In contrast, in the accelerated failure-time model, the effect of the explanatory 
variables is to rescale the time axis.  The exponential and Weibull parametric models 
can be written in both the accelerated time metric as well as the proportional hazard 
metric.  Although the results are equivalent, the advantage of choosing the hazard 
metric is that the estimates are more easily comparable to the Cox estimates.37  Using 
the proportional hazard metric, we can write the hazard function for village j as 
follows:  
                                                 
37 The log-normal accelerated failure time model has no proportional hazards interpretation.  However, 
we find it attractive for conducting robustness checks, because of the flexible assumption on the shape 
of the underlying hazard function – first increasing and then decreasing. 
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(6) 0( | ) ( ) exp( )h t h t=j j xx x β , 
where the vector of regression coefficient 
x
β  are to be estimated from the data.  In our 
data, 
j
x  is a vector of time-invariant village and grain bank covariates for village j.  
The parameter 
x
β measures the semi-elasticity of the hazard with respect to 
j
x .  The 
baseline hazard, 0 ( )h t , is assumed to be the same for all observations in the data.  As a 
result, the ratio of the hazards for the jth village and the kth village, which is given by  
(7) 
( | ) exp( )
( | ) exp( )
h t
h t
=j j x
k k x
x x β
x x β
 
is constant, giving these models their name (“proportional” hazards).  As mentioned 
earlier, in the Cox model, 0 ( )h t  is not assumed to have any functional form.
38  
The second problem addressed by models of duration analysis, including the 
survival models used in this study, is censoring (see Keifer 1988).  In our data, the 
observations on surviving grain banks are right censored, as they may fail in the time 
periods following the survey.  This is not taken into account by the probit model used 
in the study, which puts all surviving grain banks at the time of the survey into one 
category.  This problem is the lesser of the two and can be dealt with easily with the 
use of censored regression models such as the Tobit model, but survival models have 
the advantage of addressing censoring without assuming that the error term is 
distributed normally.  It is important to note here that the right censoring resulting 
from when the survey was implemented is, conditional on the covariates and the grain 
bank’s survival to a particular time, independent of the future value of the hazard for 
the grain bank. 
                                                 
38 For the exponential model, we assume that 0 ( ) exp( )h t a= , where a  is an extra parameter that has to 
be estimated from the data.  In this model, the baseline hazard function is constant over time.  For the 
Weibull model, we assume that 
1
0 ( ) exp( )
p
th t p a
−
= , where a  and p are extra parameters that have to 
be estimated from the data.  In this model, the hazard function is monotonic.   In the case of accelerated 
failure-time models, we have exp( )
j j
tτ = −
j x
x β .  For the log-normal regression model, 
j
τ  is 
distributed as log-normal with parameters 0( , )β σ  which are estimated from the data.   
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To test the robustness of the results of the survival analysis, estimates from the 
different models are compared.  In addition, in order to ascertain if the semi-
parametric Cox model can provide potentially credible results, tests of the underlying 
assumption of proportional hazards are also implemented. 
 
2.5 Empirical results and discussion 
Informal conversations with Agragamee field staff indicated a belief that membership 
size and the degree of social heterogeneity (i.e., proportion of tribal and non-tribal 
households) increase loan default rates. In addition, they posited that member 
contributions at the time of inception of the grain bank seem to decrease loan default 
rates.  These and other hypotheses are tested in this analysis. 
The explanatory variables in the various regressions can be roughly grouped as 
follows:  
1. village-level characteristics (e.g., village size, degree of remoteness, 
infrastructure, share of landless households, community cohesion, presence of 
other community-level groups); 
2. socio-economic characteristics of grain bank members (e.g., ethnic diversity, 
share of females in grain bank committee); and 
3. grain bank characteristics (e.g., establishment period, membership size, source 
of start-up grains). 
 
Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 2.13. 
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Table 2.13: Descriptive statistics for estimation sample 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Village level variables     
Total households 53.46 35.04 5.00 179.00 
Distance from block headquarters (km) 25.98 17.34 1.00   62.00 
Share of households with no pata (deeded) land   0.29   0.24 0.00     0.92 
Quality of village road (1 = untarred)   0.69   0.47 0.00     1.00 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes)   0.53   0.50 0.00     1.00 
Presence of self-help group (1 = present)   0.75   0.44 0.00     1.00 
     
Grain bank level variables     
No. of member households in grain bank 38.81 25.67 5.00 139.00 
Share of female members in grain bank committee   0.53   0.14 0.00     1.00 
Share of grains contributed by villagers at grain bank 
inception 
  0.37   0.23 0.00     1.00 
Ethnic diversity index    0.14   0.19 0.00     0.66 
Established in 1993-94 (1 = yes)   0.43   0.50 0.00     1.00 
Notes: N = 80.  The summary statistics for the first three variables are reported in Table 2.1, but are 
presented in this table along with those of other variables that are included in the conditional analysis. 
 
Discussion of explanatory variables 
Village characteristics 
The distance from block headquarters is used as a proxy for the degree of remoteness.  
Our hypothesis is that the more distant the village is from block headquarters, the less 
likely it is to access government services available there, and the greater its 
dependence on a village-level institution such as a grain bank.  This may increase the 
probability of grain bank survival, as villagers with fewer alternatives may strive 
harder to sustain grain bank operations.  In addition, given that Agragamee’s head 
office is located in the block headquarters, the closer a village is to the block 
headquarters, the more likely it is to have operational support from the NGO. For this 
reason too, the distance from block headquarters may increase the probability of grain 
bank survival. 
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The quality of the village road – whether pucca (tarred) or kachcha (untarred) 
– is used as an indicator of the quality of physical infrastructure and the overall level 
of development of the village, since no other indicators of infrastructure with 
sufficient variation are available.  We include a dummy variable for the quality of the 
village road, where 1 denotes whether the road is wholly or partially pucca and 0 if it 
is wholly kachcha.  We hypothesize that less-developed villages obtain a higher level 
of utility from a functional grain bank as they face higher food insecurity risks 
(possibly attenuated by functional grain banks) and have fewer alternatives (possibly 
making functional grain banks even more valuable).  Thus, we hypothesize that the 
probability of grain bank survival is likely to be higher in villages which are less 
developed (as indicated by road quality). 
We include the share of landless households as another determinant of grain 
bank survival and duration of survival.  Agriculture is the primary source of 
employment and livelihood of all households in the sample villages and almost all 
households practice podu cultivation on land cleared of forest cover.39  However, they 
do not have formal titles to these lands, which are called anabadi (or encroached) 
land.  Due to the lack of formal property rights, we define all households that do not 
have access to titled land as landless (even if they cultivate anabadi land).  Using data 
from Pakistan, Heltberg and Del Ninno (2006) show that there is a positive correlation 
between landlessness and economic vulnerability.  In our study, we hypothesize that 
villages having a higher share of landless households derive higher utility from a 
functional grain bank, since they are more vulnerable and face higher food insecurity. 
A dummy variable for the presence of a self-help group in the village is 
included in the specifications as a proxy for social cohesion.  We posit that the 
presence of a self-help group can improve grain bank functioning by increasing the 
                                                 
39 See chapter 1 for more details on Podu cultivation. 
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level of social cohesion.  A dummy variable indicating the frequency of village-level 
meetings is included as another proxy of social cohesion and community unity.  In 
villages that reported organizing village-level meetings whenever the need arose, we 
hypothesize that grain banks are more likely to survive, as villagers may be more 
proactive and unified.  
We also include the village size (as indicated by the total number of 
households) as a village-level variable that may impact the successful functioning of a 
grain bank.  Anecdotes gathered during the survey from Agragamee field staff indicate 
that grain banks are more likely to fail in larger villages, since it could increase the 
costs of monitoring and coordination.  This hypothesis is reinforced by a large body of 
literature, starting with Olson (1965), which demonstrates the negative impact of 
group size on collective action and the provision of public goods, as free rider 
problems are more likely to occur as group size increases.   
 
Grain bank characteristics 
Grain bank characteristics included as explanatory variables are the membership size, 
ethnic diversity of the membership, share of female committee members, share of 
grains contributed by grain bank members at the time of inception and establishment 
period.   
The same argument applies for grain bank membership size as for village size 
in determining grain bank survival and longevity, namely, as group size increases, 
there may be an increase in coordination and free rider problems for the provision of 
activities that have features of a public good, such as peer monitoring.40  A quadratic 
specification for membership size is also included to examine potential non-linearities 
                                                 
40 See, for example, Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) for a discussion of group size and microcredit 
institutions. 
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in the conditional relationship between membership size and grain bank survival.  
Specifically, the quadratic term will help to capture if, for example, there is a concave, 
non-monotone effect of membership size on institutional survival – the likelihood that 
survival increases until a certain membership size (due to, for example, some amount 
of risk sharing) but then falls as it increases further (due to, for example, increasing 
informational costs).  
Following the literature on ethnic diversity and public goods provision, we 
include an index of ethnic diversity as a quantitative indicator of ethnic diversity.  
Similar to Alesina et al. (1999), Easterly and Levine (1997) and Miguel and Gugerty 
(2004), we construct an ethnic diversity index jED  for community j which measures 
the probability that two randomly chosen people from the population are from distinct 
ethnic groups.  This is related to a Herfindahl index, and is calculated as 
2
1
ej
j
e j
n
ED
N
 
= −   
 
∑ , 
where ejn  is the number of people in ethnic group e in community j, jN  is the total 
population in community j, and e ={Scheduled Tribe, Scheduled Caste, Other 
Backward Castes, General Caste}. 
The share of women in the grain bank committee is included to test the 
hypothesis that a larger share of women results in a higher likelihood of grain bank 
sustainability.  Many microcredit and conditional cash transfer programs are targeted 
at women.  For example, out of a membership of over 2.4 million, nearly 95 percent of 
Grameen Bank clients are female (Morduch 1999).  Similarly, nearly 95 percent of the 
members of FINCA are women.  One reason behind this is that women have been 
found to be less likely to default on their loans compared to men, perhaps due to fewer 
outside alternatives.  Thus, women are better potential clients, and their presence on 
the committee may improve sustainability.  Programs that target credit at women have 
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also been shown to increase consumption and children’s health more than credit 
targeted at men (see, e.g., Pitt and Khandker 1998, Pitt et al. 2001).  More generally, a 
study of women’s participation in local government bodies, called panchayats, from 
Rajasthan and West Bengal has shown that increased female participation in decision-
making bodies results in policy decisions that are closer to the preferences of women 
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004).  Similarly, we hypothesize that a higher share of 
women in the grain bank management committee can increase the probability of grain 
bank survival and duration, as grain bank survival contributes to increased 
consumption and household food security and better children’s health outcomes, 
assuming these are “women’s goods”. 
A variable indicating the amount of grains contributed by villagers as a share 
of the total grains collected at grain bank inception.  This was included to test the 
hypothesis posited by Agragamee field staff that a higher level of “ownership” 
increased the likelihood of grain bank survival.  The ostensible claim for this was that 
a higher level of contribution on the part of villagers increased the level of “vested 
interest” in it; i.e., if villagers contributed more, they had more to lose if the grain 
bank collapsed.  While this may be true, another explanation for why a higher 
contribution share at grain bank inception may increase grain bank survival is that it 
may be indicative of a higher savings rate which enables a lower loan default rate, 
which, in turn, contributes to grain bank survival.  However, while we can test if the 
contribution level is a significant determinant of grain bank survival and longevity, it 
is not possible to distinguish between competing explanations behind why it may be 
so. 
We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the grain bank was 
established in an earlier or later period.  This variable equals one if the grain bank was 
instituted in 1993-94 (the “early” years), and zero otherwise.  This variable can 
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provide some evidence on whether chronology of grain bank establishment matters for 
survival.  For example, if there is learning by doing, then we should find that the 
earliest established grain banks are more likely to fail. 
 
Main findings 
Here, we first present the results from estimating a binomial probit model of the 
determinants of grain bank survival.  We then present the results from estimating a 
Cox proportional hazards model of the determinants of grain bank duration.   
For each regression model, four sets of results are presented.  We refer to these 
as the results for specification 1 (village variables only), specification 2 (grain bank 
variables only), specification 3 (both village and grain bank variables, but no 
interaction terms), and specification 4 (both village and grain bank variables, including 
interaction terms).  Specifications 3 and 4 include all village and grain bank 
explanatory variables included in specifications 1 and 2, except village size (since it is 
highly correlated with grain bank membership size included in specifications 3 and 4, 
which we feel is a better variable to capture the impact of group size on institutional 
survival and longevity).  These two specifications include the same explanatory 
variables, except for the interaction between the grain bank ethnic diversity index and 
membership size, which we include in specification 4 only.41  We refer to specification 
4 as the “full” specification, as it has the most complete set of explanatory variables. 
 
A. Binomial probit estimates 
Estimated coefficients from fitting a binomial probit model to the data via MLE are 
reported in Table 2.14.  For ease of interpretation, the corresponding marginal effects 
                                                 
41 Interactions between ethnic diversity and incidence of needs-based meetings /share contributed by 
villagers at inception/ share of female committee members were found to be statistically insignificant in 
both the probit and survival models, and were not included in the final specification. 
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at the sample means (MEMs) as well as average marginal effects (AMEs) are 
presented in Tables 2.A1 and 2.A2, respectively in the appendix.  As expected, given 
the small sample size, there are significant differences between the MEMs and the 
AMEs. 
 As presented in Table 2.14, from specifications 1, 3 and 4, it appears that grain 
banks in villages at lower levels of development, as indicated by the quality of village 
road dummy, are more likely to survive.  This result is highly statistically significant 
across the alternative specifications.  We interpret the magnitudes of the estimates 
from the full specification by referring to the AMEs (see Table 2.A2).  We find, 
ceteris paribus, that a village having pucca (tarred) roads is, on average, about 37 
percentage points less likely to have a surviving grain bank.  The presence of a self-
help group is found to have a statistically significant and positive effect on the 
likelihood of grain bank survival.  Specifically, the presence of a self-help group 
increases the probability of survival by, on average, 38 percentage points.  This may 
indicate that conditions that support self-help group formation also support grain bank 
survival, or that grain bank survival may depend on the implementation of parallel 
schemes such as self-help groups.  In the latter case, we can infer that the presence of 
another jointly-owned village institution such as a self-help group may increase the 
level of interaction between member households and the level of social cohesion, 
which in turn promotes successful operation of a grain bank.  Finally, villages where 
meetings are arranged according to demand or whenever the need arises are also found 
to be, on average, 59 percentage points more likely to have surviving grain banks.  
These two findings are also highly statistically significant and robust across alternative 
specifications. 
We now turn to the estimated coefficients associated with the grain bank level 
variables.  In specification 2, we find that the only variable that is statistically 
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significant is the amount of grains contributed by villagers as a fraction of total grains 
at grain bank inception.  However, the variable loses its significance in specifications 
3 and 4, once village-level variables are controlled for.  Thus, this finding is not robust 
to the inclusion of village-level covariates. 
We find that membership size is not statistically significant in any of the 
specifications.  The quadratic term for membership size is significant at the 10 percent 
level in the full specification only.  Moreover, it is insignificant in practical terms, as 
the estimated coefficient is very small.  The estimated coefficient on ethnic diversity is 
also statistically significant at the 10 percent level in the full specification only.  
Moreover, the sign of the estimated coefficient is not robust across alternative 
specifications.  We also find that the interaction between membership size and ethnic 
diversity has a statistically significant effect on grain bank survival at the 10 percent 
level. 
Table 2.15 presents the WESMLE probit estimates, using the reported 
population proportion.  As mentioned earlier, the proportion of surviving grain banks 
in the population is about 0.31.  The results are similar to those from the MLE probit 
estimates, both in terms of magnitudes as well as signs.  Quality of village roads, the 
presence of a functional self-help group and the incidence of needs-based meetings, all 
continue to be highly statistically significant.  Like the MLE probit estimates, the 
share contributed by villagers is statistically significant in specification 2, but this 
variable is not robust to the inclusion of village-level variables.  Similarly, like the 
MLE probit estimates, the interaction between ethnic diversity and membership size, 
in specification 4, is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 2.14: Determinants of grain bank survival: Estimated coefficients 
MLE binomial probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Surviving grain bank (1 = yes) 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.007    
 (0.006)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.002  0.002 0.000 
 (0.012)  (0.015) (0.016) 
Share of landless households 1.252  1.240 1.350 
 (0.817)  (0.876) (0.916) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -1.202***  -1.414*** -1.804*** 
 (0.419)  (0.519) (0.612) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 2.071***  2.453*** 2.697*** 
 (0.463)  (0.608) (0.670) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 1.446***  1.616*** 1.845*** 
 (0.465)  (0.521) (0.571) 
Membership size  0.013 0.003 -0.008 
  (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  1.569 1.951 2.503 
  (1.180) (1.558) (1.604) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  1.451** -0.606 -0.567 
  (0.684) (1.172) (1.239) 
Ethnic diversity index  -0.661 0.166 4.839* 
  (0.943) (1.099) (2.574) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.137 0.121 0.214 
  (0.294) (0.460) (0.518) 
Membership size*Ethnic diversity index    -0.122* 
    (0.062) 
Constant -2.589*** -1.636* -3.627** -4.366*** 
 (0.822) (0.860) (1.495) (1.635) 
LR χ2 38.82 8.72 42.92 47.71 
p-value 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.350 0.079 0.387 0.430 
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2   0.224 -0.048 0.171 0.196 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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However, unlike the MLE probit model, in specification 4, the quadratic term 
for membership size, which was significant at the 10 percent level in the MLE probit 
model, loses statistical significance.  In addition, the share of female members in the 
grain bank committee, which was not significant in the MLE probit model, gains 
significance at the 10 percent level in specification 3 and 4 in the WESMLE probit 
estimates.  However, since this finding is not robust across specifications in the 
WESMLE probit model, we discount this finding.  Finally, we also find that a higher 
share of landless households has a significant positive effect on grain bank survival. 
In both the MLE and WESMLE probit estimates, we find a negative 
relationship between the index of ethnic diversity and likelihood of grain bank 
survival in specification 2.  This finding is similar to other studies that have looked at 
ethnic diversity and the provision of public goods (e.g., Alesina et al. 1999, Alesina 
and La Ferrera 2000, Miguel and Gugerty 2004) or ethnic diversity and economic 
development (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997).  However, the relationship is not 
statistically significant.  This finding is robust to alternate specifications where the 
ethnic diversity index is substituted by a dummy variable for uniethnic grain bank 
membership.  This result is not surprising, given that there is a high degree of 
socioeconomic homogeneity in tribal Orissa.  However, the result may not be 
generalizable to other regions where there is greater socioeconomic diversity.42  The 
sign on the coefficient for ethnic diversity flips in specifications 3 and 4, and although 
it is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in the latter (only in the case of the 
MLE probit estimates), we discount this finding as the estimate is not robust across 
specifications.
                                                 
42Note, however, that even in the presence of social heterogeneity, it is possible that the benefits from 
grain banks outweigh the costs associated with interacting with other ethnic groups. For example, Wade 
(1994) shows that socially diverse farming communities in India that face greater crop risks due to lack 
of irrigation are more likely to develop effective collective action mechanisms to deal with this problem 
than communities with similar levels of heterogeneity but less crop risk.  
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Table 2.15: Determinants of grain bank survival: Estimated coefficients 
WESMLE binomial probit regression estimates 1( 0.31)ω =  
Dependent variable: Surviving grain bank (1 = yes) 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.008    
 (0.005)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.001  0.002 0.000 
 (0.010)  (0.013) (0.014) 
Share of landless households 1.325*  1.330* 1.370* 
 (0.736)  (0.753) (0.804) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -1.204***  -1.437*** -1.764*** 
 (0.428)  (0.451) (0.513) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 2.102***  2.417*** 2.611*** 
 (0.494)  (0.502) (0.534) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 1.524***  1.660*** 1.822*** 
 (0.514)  (0.491) (0.516) 
Membership size  0.013 0.006 -0.005 
  (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  1.543 2.090* 2.484* 
  (1.081) (1.256) (1.323) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  1.440** -0.488 -0.464 
  (0.657) (1.090) (1.214) 
Ethnic diversity index  -0.683 -0.041 4.252 
  (0.936) (1.152) (2.866) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.169 0.129 0.195 
  (0.287) (0.417) (0.470) 
Membership size*Ethnic diversity index    -0.111* 
    (0.062) 
Constant -3.166*** -2.108*** -4.301*** -4.827*** 
 (0.865) (0.778) (1.463) (1.416) 
Wald χ2 22.62 8.28 36.62 37.42 
p-value 0.001 0.219 0.000 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.350 0.077 0.386 0.420 
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2   0.208 -0.065 0.142 0.156 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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We find that membership size (both the linear and quadratic terms) has a very 
small impact on grain bank survival, and it is not statistically significant, except in 
specification 4 in the MLE probit estimates, where we find that the quadratic term has 
a positive effect on the probability of grain bank survival, though the magnitude is 
small.  This indicates that membership size is not an important determinant of grain 
bank survival.  In addition, village size is also found to have a very small, positive but 
statistically insignificant effect on the probability of grain bank survival.  This may be 
an indicator that village or grain bank membership size are not important determinants 
of grain bank survival in the data.  This is not surprising given the small population 
size of settlements, economic and social homogeneity across households, and the high 
degree of observability of household economic and social behavior by others in the 
community in the sample villages.   
 
Model diagnostics 
Robustness to alternative population proportions of grain bank survival 
To check if the results are sensitive to the use of alternative population proportions of 
surviving grain banks, we reestimate the WESMLE probit model with a population 
proportion lower than the reported population proportion of survival, namely 0.25, and 
a population proportion slightly higher than the reported population proportion of 
survival, namely 0.33.  Tables 2.A5 and 2.A6 present coefficients estimated from 
maximizing a weighted log likelihood using the lower and higher population 
proportions of survival, respectively.  We find that all the estimated coefficients have 
the same direction and comparable magnitudes as the estimated coefficients from the 
WESMLE probit model using the reported population proportion of survival of 0.31.   
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Goodness of fit 
McFadden’s likelihood ratio index (LRI) or pseudo-R-squared is provided at the 
bottom of Table 2.14 to compare the fit of the different specifications.  We find that 
the LRI is higher for specification 1, 3 and 4 than 2, and highest for specification 4.  
The LRI increases as the fit of the model improves (Greene 2002).  This implies that 
specification 4 (which we call the “full” model) provides the best fit.  However, the 
LRI also increases as the number of explanatory variables increase.  So, we also 
present the adjusted pseudo-R-squared  measure that takes into account the number of 
explanatory variables.  We find that the adjusted pseudo-R-squared is highest for 
specification 1, which also suggests that the explanatory power of the full model is 
driven by the village-level variables in the specification. 
 
Multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity can result in large estimated standard errors, thus impairing statistical 
inference.  Variance inflation factors are a widely used measure of the degree of 
multicollinearity.  It is essentially based on the R-squared value obtained by regressing 
the ith explanatory variable on the rest of the explanatory variables in the regression 
model.43   We find that the variance inflation factors for the set of variables used in 
each of the three specifications is found to be around one.  The rule of thumb 
commonly applied is that a value of 10 or higher is a sign of severe multicollinearity.   
Our findings indicate that multicollinearity is most likely not a problem in our model, 
even by conservative measures.   
                                                 
43 The diagnostic information for multicollinearity is obtained by estimating specifications 1-4 via 
ordinary least squares even though the dependent variable is dichotomous.  Menard (2002) argues that 
this is permissible as the relationship under scrutiny is that between the independent variables in the 
model and the functional form for the model of the dependent variable is not relevant.     
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Percentage of correct predictions  
As an alternate measure of the predictive ability of the model, we look at the 
percentage of correct predictions made by specification 4.  Tables 2.A7 and 2.A8 in 
the appendix provide a summary of the predictive ability of specification 4 fitted using 
the MLE and WESMLE probit models respectively.  For the former model (which has 
a balanced sample of surviving and failed grain banks), we use the threshold value of 
0.5, on the basis that we should predict a one if the model says a one is more likely 
than a zero.44  We find that specification 3 predicts 65 out of 80, or about 81 percent of 
observations, correctly.   
To examine the predictive ability of a probit model for an unbalanced sample, 
Heckman and Smith (1999) discuss the inappropriateness of the use of 0.5 as the 
cutoff, and recommend instead the use of the population probability as the threshold 
value.   Therefore, in the case of the WESMLE probit model, we use the population 
probability (which in our case is 71/232, or approximately 0.31) as the threshold 
value.  Thus, we predict an observation to be a one if it has ˆ 0.31p ≥ and a zero 
otherwise.  Using this criterion, we find that 63 out of 80, or about 79 percent of 
observations are predicted correctly. 
 
Hypothesis testing using linear restrictions 
We use the likelihood ratio (LR) test to see if all the point estimates in the probit 
model are zero.  We place restrictions on the village level variables to test the 
hypothesis that the coefficients for all the village variables are simultaneously equal to 
zero.  We do this by nesting specification 1 in specification 4 (which we call the full 
                                                 
44 Use of 0.5 as the threshold may not be a good choice if the sample is unbalanced (Greene 2002).  In 
such cases, the percentage of correct predictions may not be a good measure of the predictive ability of 
the model as the result may be driven by a disproportionate number of either zeros or ones being 
predicted correctly.  However, the sample used in this study has an equal number of zeros and ones, and 
we also find that almost an equal number of zeros and ones are predicted correctly. 
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model).  From the results of the chi-squared test, we reject the null hypothesis that the 
village level variables are simultaneously equal to zero. 
Similarly, we perform a LR test of the hypothesis that all the grain bank 
variables are simultaneously equal to zero.  However, we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis.  This indicates that the results are driven by the village-level variables.  
This is also corroborated by the fit measures provided at the bottom of Tables 2.14 and 
2.15.  From the chi-squared test, we find that the model in specification 2 (grain bank 
level explanatory variables only) is not statistically significant, but the models in 
specifications 1, 3 and 4 are. 
 
Correction for potential heteroskedasticity 
To see if the estimates are biased due to heteroskedasticity, we estimate the MLE 
probit model with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (using the Huber-White 
sandwich estimator).  The estimates are presented in Table 2.A9.  We find that the 
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those presented in the MLE probit 
models in Table 2.14, which gives us some confidence that heteroskedasticity may not 
be a problem in our data.  However, given that the robust estimator is an asymptotic 
correction and our analysis is based on a small sample, we recognize that diagnostic 
check does not rule out the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
 
B. Cox proportional hazards estimates 
To estimate the hazards model, we create a duration variable.  This variable is 
uncensored for grain banks that have ceased to function and is right-censored for grain 
banks that were operational at the time of the survey, that is, for those that have not yet 
failed.  For failed grain banks, the duration variable is the number of years of 
operation (survival) until failure.  For surviving grain banks, the duration variable is 
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the number of years between inception and the year of the survey.  The explanatory 
variables used in this model are the same as in the probit model.  Further, as with the 
probit regression, four alternate model specifications are estimated, which we continue 
to refer to as specifications 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.   
The coefficients estimated by the Cox proportional hazards model are 
presented in Table 2.16.  For continuous variables, coefficients can be interpreted as 
follows: if the coefficient for distance from block headquarters is –0.015 (as in 
specification 4), then we say that a unit increase in the distance lowers the hazard of 
failure by roughly 1.5 percent, because exp(-0.015) = 0.985.  For dummy variables, 
coefficients can be interpreted as follows: if the estimated coefficient for presence of a 
self-help group is –1.996, then we say that villages with a functional self-help group 
(i.e., presence of self-help group = 1) face a hazard roughly 86 percent lower than 
villages where the self-help group is not functional, because exp(-1.996) = 0.14.  For 
ease of interpretation, we present hazard ratios associated with the estimated 
coefficients from the Cox model in Table 2.A10 in the appendix 
As presented in Table 2.16, we find that village size and grain bank 
membership size do not have a statistically significant effect on the hazard of grain 
bank failure.  Consistent with the probit estimates, the dummy variables for quality of 
village roads and social cohesion (indicated by the presence of self-help groups and 
meeting on as-needed basis) all have highly statistically, as well as economically, 
significant effects.  Interpreting the estimates in specification 4, we find that villages 
with pucca roads face more than four times the hazard of failure faced by villages with 
kachcha roads.  The hazard faced by villages with self-help group is about 86 percent 
lower, while the hazard faced by villages which hold meetings whenever need arises is 
90 percent lower.  These findings suggest the importance of social cohesion in 
extending time until grain bank failure. 
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The share of landless households does not appear to be an important 
determinant of time until failure.  This finding is the same as the results from the MLE 
probit estimates.  The share of female members in the grain bank committee has a 
large and highly statistically significant effect in specifications 3 and 4, but not in 
specification 3.  As with the probit estimates, the share of the contribution made by 
villagers at the time of grain bank inception is found to be statistically significant in 
the second specification, but the significance drops away with the addition of village-
level variables in the third specification.  Thus, we claim that these variables are not as 
important in determining grain bank survival as the village-level variables discussed 
earlier. 
 
Model diagnostics and robustness checks 
We perform a range of diagnostics to test the model specification and the underlying 
assumptions.  We also compare the results from the different survival models to test 
the robustness of the estimates to model specification.  
 
Regression misspecification test 
We use the link test to verify that the estimated coefficient on the squared linear 
predictor is insignificant.  As discussed by Cleves et al. (2004), the basis for this test is 
to first estimate the 
x
β  vector from the model being fitted, and then estimate 1β  and 
2β from a second round model 
2
2
ˆ ˆLRH ( ) ( )β β1= +x xxβ xβ .  Under the assumption that 
x
xβ is correctly specified, we have that 1β =1 and 2β = 0.
45  We find this to be the case 
in all four specifications.
                                                 
45 This result holds not only for survival models, but for all models. 
88 
Table 2.16: Determinants of time until grain bank failure: Estimated coefficients 
Partial-likelihood Cox proportional hazards model estimates 
Dependent variable: Hazard of grain bank failure 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households -0.004    
 (0.005)    
Distance from block headquarters -0.016  -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.011)  (0.014) (0.014) 
Share of landless households -0.465  -0.216 -0.268 
 (0.808)  (0.854) (0.845) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) 1.154***  1.302*** 1.479*** 
 (0.384)  (0.415) (0.416) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) -2.135***  -2.436*** -2.560*** 
 (0.419)  (0.505) (0.526) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) -1.536***  -1.771*** -1.996*** 
 (0.473)  (0.544) (0.570) 
Membership size  -0.020 0.008 0.013 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  -1.935 -3.066** -3.039** 
  (1.219) (1.393) (1.373) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  -1.361* 0.430 0.612 
  (0.694) (1.122) (1.128) 
Ethnic diversity index  0.349 0.293 -2.704 
  (1.007) (0.992) (2.064) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  0.096 -0.057 0.032 
  (0.325) (0.409) (0.407) 
Membership size*Ethnic diversity index    0.084* 
    (0.047) 
LR χ2 37.73 8.46 44.36 47.99 
p-value   0.000 0.207 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -145.85 -160.49 -142.53 -140.72 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Comparing estimates across Cox and parametric model estimates 
First, we compare the estimates from various parametric models to the Cox model 
estimates to see if they are robust across models.  The estimates from the exponential 
and Weibull models are presented in the appendix in Tables 2.A11 and 2.A12, 
respectively.  The latter are estimated in the proportional hazard metric.  The 
advantage of using this metric is that the estimates are directly comparable to Cox 
estimates.  We also present the estimates from the log-normal accelerated time metric 
in Table 2.A13.  While the estimates from the log-normal model are not directly 
comparable, we can compare the significance level and direction of the estimates with 
the Cox estimates.  If they prove not to be similar, then there is evidence of a 
misparametrized underlying baseline hazard. 
We find that the estimates from all three parametric models are roughly similar 
to the Cox estimates.  In particular, the coefficients on village road quality, the 
presence of functional self-help groups and the incidence of village meetings on a 
needs-basis are highly statistically significant across all specifications in the different 
survival models.  The estimated coefficient on the variable denoting the share of 
females in the grain bank committee is statistically significant in specifications 3 and 4 
(but not specification 2) across the Cox, Weibull and log-normal models, although it is 
not so in the exponential model.46  The estimates from the log-normal model, while 
not directly comparable to the Cox estimates, show that almost all the same variables 
have a statistically significant effect on the hazard rate and are in the same direction as 
those from the Cox.  For example, the incidence of meetings on a needs-basis and the 
                                                 
46This finding does not imply that the Cox estimates are questionable, as we find that the Weibull and 
log-normal models are a better fit for the data than the exponential model.  For the Weibull estimates of 
specification 3 and 4, a Wald test for 0 : ln( ) 0H p =  for which the test statistic is 5.20 and 5.52, 
indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that the hazard is a constant.  The likelihood ratio chi-
square test at the bottom of tables A2.11-A2.13 also indicate that, of the parametric models, the Weibull 
and log-normal models may be a better fit for the data. 
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presence of a functional self-help group has the effect of slowing down time (or 
delaying grain bank failure), while the effect of a tarred village road is to accelerate 
time (or hasten failure).  Thus, in general, we find that the results from the Cox model 
are similar to those from the parametric models. 
 
Estimating the baseline cumulative hazard and hazard contributions 
Although the Cox model does not produce a direct estimate of the relative hazard of 
grain bank failure, we can estimate the baseline cumulative hazard function from the 
vector of coefficients estimated by the model.  On examining the cumulative hazard 
function, we find it to be increasing, initially at a slightly increasing rate and then at a 
decreasing rate (see Figure 2.A1 in the appendix).  Since the baseline hazard is the 
derivative of the cumulative hazard, this may imply that the baseline hazard is 
increasing.  However, when the discontinuities associated with the step functions in 
the cumulative hazard function are smoothed out in order to estimate the baseline 
hazard, we find that the baseline hazard is first increasing and then falling (see Figure 
2.A2).47  While the shape of the hazard function is important for deciding which of the 
parametric models is more appropriate for our data, the accuracy of the Cox estimates 
does not depend on any assumption on the shape of the underlying hazard.  However, 
this exercise is informative in that it provides guidance on which of the parametric 
models is more appropriate as a test of robustness of the Cox model.  We find that the 
exponential model, which assumes a constant hazard, is not a good fit for the data and 
therefore, in this study, it is more appropriate to examine if the estimates from the Cox 
model are similar to the estimates from the log-normal or Weibull models, which we 
find to be the case. 
                                                 
47 To estimate the hazard, a standard kernel-smoothing methodology is used, as discussed in Cleves et 
al. (2004). 
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Tests of the proportional hazards assumption   
In order to test the underlying assumption of proportional hazards for each covariate, 
which underlies the Cox model, we conduct two tests of specification 4. 
Interacting analysis time with covariates 
First, we interact analysis time with the covariates (individually) to examine if the 
effects of the covariates on the hazard change with time, because the proportional 
hazards assumption states that the effects of the covariates do not change with time 
except in ways which we have already parameterized (Cleves et al. 2004).  The basis 
for this test is to first estimate the
x
β  vector from the model being fitted, and then 
estimate second round models separately for each covariate as follows: 
1 1LRH ( )x tβ= +xxβ and test 1 0β = , 2 2LRH ( )x tβ= +xxβ and test 2 0β = , and so on. 
We find this to be the case with the exception of the variable denoting distance to 
block headquarters.  In other words, the effects of the other interacted variables are not 
different from zero.   
 
Test of Schoenfeld residuals 
Second, we conduct a test of nonzero slope in a generalized linear regression of the 
scaled Schoenfeld residuals on functions of time.  As discussed by Cleves et al. 
(2004), the Schoenfeld residual for covariate , 1,...., ,ux u p=  and for observation j 
observed to fail is given by the residual 
ˆexp( )
ˆexp( )
j
j
uii R
uj uj
i R
x
r x
∈
∈
= −
∑
∑
i x
i x
x β
x β
, 
where ˆxβ  is the vector of estimated coefficients.  In words, ujr  is the difference 
between the covariate value for the failed observation and the weighted average of the 
covariate values (weighted according to the relative hazard from a Cox model) over all 
the subjects at risk of failure when subject j failed.  If we assume that the coefficient 
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on ux  does vary with time (that is, the proportional hazards assumption is violated), 
uβ can be written as  
( ) ( )u u jt q g tβ β= + , 
where jq  is some coefficient and ( )g t  is some function of time.  If the assumption of 
proportional hazards is valid, 0jq = .  In addition, if we graph a scaled Schoenfeld 
residual against jt  and the curve has zero slope, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of proportional hazards.   
Having estimated the Schoenfeld residuals after fitting the Cox model to the 
data, we find no evidence that our specification violates the proportional hazards 
assumption.  As with the previous set of tests where we interacted time with each 
covariate, we find that only the variable denoting distance from the block headquarters 
appears to violate the proportional hazards assumption.  This holds at the 10 percent 
significance level.  We also graph the scaled residuals against time for each covariate, 
and find that the curves are roughly linear (see Figures 2.A3-2.A12 in the appendix).  
Thus, we cannot reject the assumption of proportional hazards.   
 
Unobserved heterogeneity (“frailty”) 
As discussed in Kiefer (1988), heterogeneity arises when differences remain in the 
distribution after controlling the effect of observable variables.  In the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity (or “frailty”), the non-frailty model leads to downward 
biased estimates of the duration dependence in the true baseline hazard.  Thus, 
heterogeneity due to omitted variables, either observable but which were not captured 
during the data collection, or unobservable, can give rise to biased coefficients.  To 
address this problem, we can estimate a parametric survival model which also 
specifies a distribution for the unobserved effect.  Although Heckman and Singer 
(1984) demonstrate that the heterogeneity term is sensitive to the distributional 
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assumption, Kiefer (1988) discusses that this finding may instead be due to incorrect 
specification of the survivor function.  In our case, we estimate all three parametric 
models with a Gamma as well as inverse-Gaussian distribution for the heterogeneity 
term, to examine if our results are affected by unobserved heterogeneity.  The results 
are qualitatively similar, and in the appendix we present the results for the former (see 
Tables 2.A14-2.A16).  We find, with both the Gamma and inverse-Gaussian 
distributions for the heterogeneity term, that the estimated coefficients are very close 
to those from the model without frailty in specifications 1, 3 and 4.  The frailty 
distribution variances are close to zero and the p-values for the likelihood ratio test 
(that frailty variance equals zero) are close to one, indicating that there is likely 
negligible unobserved heterogeneity.  In the Weibull and lognormal models, in the 
case of specification 2 (i.e., grain bank variables only), we find evidence of 
unobserved heterogeneity, implying that there are omitted variables in this 
specification.  This problem, however, is rectified when we add in village-level 
variables as in specifications 3 and 4.  Thus, we can conclude that our estimates most 
likely do not suffer from a problem of unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
2.6 Summary and conclusion  
In this chapter, we present an overview of 80 villages surveyed as part of a study of 
community grain banks in Dasmantpur, Koraput.  We also examine the institutional 
and environmental factors behind the survival of community grain banks introduced as 
part of a food security project in the 1990s.  Such an analysis is important in light of 
the fact that the majority of grain banks established in this region have ceased to 
function.  Yet, they continue to be seen as an integral part of the food security strategy 
of the government as well as rural development NGOs in tribal Orissa.  In addition, 
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the government of India is expanding its grain bank scheme in tribal villages across 
the country to address the problem of food shortages in tribal areas. 
 In the first part of this chapter, using data from a recent survey of grain banks, 
we provide an overview of the socioeconomic features of the survey region.  The 
region is characterized by a rural subsistence economy.  Agriculture is the main source 
of employment and livelihood.  The sample villages are characterized by poor 
infrastructure and transport and communication facilities.  About 90 percent of the 
sample villages did not have access to the electric power grid.  For over half the 
villages, the distance to the block headquarters, which was the seat of government 
agencies, medical facilities and major markets, was reported to be over 25 kilometers 
(or over 15 miles).  But due to poor or non-existent transport facilities and poor road 
conditions, traversing this distance often took the better part of the day.  In the 
majority of villages, walking was reported to be the main mode of transport to the 
block headquarters.  More than two-thirds of the sample villager reported that their 
access and internal roads are wholly kachcha or untarred. 
Using self-reported measures of household food sufficiency, all the villages 
were found to have food insecure households for at least one month of the year.  
Thirty-seven villages reported having households that faced food insufficiency for 
almost half the year, while the rest reported having households that faced food 
insufficiency for 3-4 months.  The months most commonly reported as food shortage 
months were the late summer and monsoon months of Landi, Aashad and Shravana 
(mid-May to mid-August). 
In the second part of the chapter, we present an overview of the sample 
surviving and failed grain banks.  Due to the fact that grain bank membership is 
confined to members of the same village, grain banks cannot help member households 
cope with covariate risk.  However, in villages where grain banks continue to operate, 
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loans tend to be state-contingent: participating households who defaulted on loans due 
to crop failures typically did not lose grain bank membership; instead, their loan 
repayment period was extended.  To the extent that community grain banks provide 
consumption loans to cope with illness shocks or consumption shocks such as 
weddings, they provide member households with insurance against idiosyncratic risk.  
However, these types of loans are not the primary service of grain banks.  Rather, 
successfully-functioning grain banks provide loans to member households, typically in 
the summer and monsoon season, to alleviate short-term, seasonal food shortages.  
These loans are provided at an interest rate usually between 25-50 percent, which is 
lower than the interest rates charged by local moneylenders  In addition, according to 
anecdotal evidence collected from grain bank beneficiaries, these institutions have also 
helped to cultivate a savings habit that did not exist prior to the intervention.  The role 
of NGO field staff was reported as critical in this endeavor.  This is important to keep 
in mind for future grain bank schemes.  If the intervention is purely institutional in 
nature and its success depends on inducing a behavioral change, then simply 
replicating grain banks by providing an external grant, without the impetus and 
inspiration needed to influence behavior, may not be fruitful. 
One commonly-reported problem in grain bank operation was the lack of 
storage facilities, with only one of the 80 sample villages having a dedicated 
storehouse for the grains.  This shortcoming, if addressed in future grain bank 
interventions, can reduce grain loss due to poor storage facilities.  In addition, taking 
into account the type of grain that is most suitable for storage given the climatic 
conditions may also help to reduce losses due to storage. 
A preliminary, unconditional examination of grain bank failure by year of 
establishment does not reveal any pattern in the chronology of failure.  Contrary to 
expectation, earlier established grain banks did not collapse (which would have 
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indicated support for the “learning by doing” hypothesis).  However, grain bank 
failure is higher in years of poor rainfall and crop failure, indicating that these 
institutions are not able to cope well with covariate shocks.  Proximate reasons 
reported for grain bank failure also included mismanagement by the grain bank 
committee, indicating that there was a lack of managerial skills on the part of the grain 
bank committee.  Thus, future grain bank schemes should include the necessary 
training in order to enable grain bank committee members to perform their 
responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. 
Next, we estimate a binomial probit model of the determinants of grain bank 
survival.  We find that grain banks in a village at a lower level of development (as 
indicated by the village road quality) have a higher predicted probability of survival.  
We interpret this to mean that the net benefit from grain bank survival is higher in less 
developed villages.  We also find that the probability of grain bank survival is higher 
in the presence of a credit and borrowing group, known as self-help groups, and in 
villages where meetings are held on an as-needed basis.  This may indicate that the 
presence of other community-based programs and meetings increases social cohesion 
and enables the survival of grain banks, or that factors that support the successful 
functioning of a self-help group also support grain bank survival.  These findings are 
robust to specification. 
We also estimate a Cox proportional hazards model to examine the impact of 
selected village and grain bank covariates on the hazard of grain bank failure.  The 
results are qualitatively similar to the probit estimates – social cohesion (represented 
by the incidence of needs-based village meetings and presence of self-help groups) is 
found to decrease the hazard of failure, while a higher level of development 
(represented by better village road quality) is found to increase the hazard of grain 
bank failure.  We also find that a higher share of women in the grain bank committee 
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reduces the hazard of grain bank failure.  Given the strong assumption of 
proportionality underlying the Cox model, we also estimate parametric survival 
models based on the exponential, Weibull and log-normal distributions which do not 
make that assumption.  We find that, in general, the results are robust across model 
specifications.  We also implement other robustness checks, including tests of the 
proportionality assumption, which we find that we cannot reject. 
Grain banks have some unique features, such as the provision of consumption 
credit, membership-based management and ownership and the ability to respond to 
food shortages in a timely manner, that make them a promising complement to 
existing food security programs.  However, over two-thirds of grain banks established 
in the survey region and adjoining districts have ceased to function.  This raises 
questions about the efficacy of the intervention, at least in its current form.  Firstly, if 
the survival of grain banks depends crucially on village-level factors, such as the level 
of social cohesion, then implementing the same design in different environments does 
not bode well for enabling grain bank sustainability.  Thus, careful geographic 
targeting may be critical.   
Secondly, if community grain banks cannot cope with covariate shocks, then 
establishing these institutions in their current form in drought-prone areas is a recipe 
for failure.  A possible innovation that can mitigate grain bank collapse during weather 
shocks is including the provision of index-based crop insurance, where indemnity 
payments can be indexed to area yields or weather.48  Such insurance can provide 
households with consumption credit to cope with food shortages that occur due to 
recurrent covariate shocks without being vulnerable to moral hazard problems. 
                                                 
48 See Mahul and Skees (2006) for a description of an index-based livestock insurance program in 
Mongolia. 
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An issue that we are not able to examine is the impact of the level of 
capitalization on grain bank sustainability.  The data used in this study comes from 
grain banks from a small region subject to the same covariate shocks.  Yet, not all 
grain banks are observed to fail.  Therefore, it is possible that there exists a critical 
threshold level of capitalization above which grain banks can withstand a shock.  
However, in the absence of data on the level of grain bank stock prior to collapse, we 
are not able to examine this.  Such data could provide critical information for future 
interventions.  Other potential research projects for the future involve the analysis of 
grain bank data from a larger geographical area as well as the analysis of data from 
community grain banks having sufficient variation in the design features.  Grain bank 
data from a larger geographical area can also provide an estimate of the role played by 
weather shocks on survival.  In addition, data from grain banks having variation in 
design features can help to identify design parameters that determine grain bank 
sustainability and success.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 2.A1: Determinants of grain bank survival: Marginal effects at the mean 
MLE binomial probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Surviving grain bank (1 = yes) 
 Marginal effects evaluated at sample means (MEM) 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.003    
 (0.002)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.001  0.001 0.000 
 (0.005)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Share of landless households 0.500  0.495 0.538 
 (0.326)  (0.350) (0.365) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -0.443***  -0.505*** -0.600*** 
 (0.131)  (0.148) (0.140) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 0.699***  0.779*** 0.820*** 
 (0.108)  (0.114) (0.107) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 0.503***  0.543*** 0.587*** 
 (0.125)  (0.129) (0.123) 
Membership size  0.005 0.001 -0.003 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  0.626 0.778 0.998 
  (0.471) (0.622) (0.639) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  0.579** -0.242 -0.226 
  (0.273) (0.468) (0.494) 
Ethnic diversity index  -0.264 0.066 1.929* 
  (0.376) (0.438) (1.024) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.055 0.048 0.085 
  (0.117) (0.183) (0.205) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    -0.049* 
    (0.025) 
LR χ2, full model 38.82 8.72 42.92 47.71 
p-value 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.350 0.079 0.387 0.430 
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2   0.224 -0.048 0.171 0.196 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A2: Determinants of grain bank survival: Average marginal effects 
MLE binomial probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Surviving grain bank (1 = yes) 
 Average marginal effects (AME) 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.002    
 (0.001)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.001  0.001 0.000 
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Share of landless households 0.322  0.297 0.296 
 (0.203)  (0.203) (0.191) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -0.307***  -0.326*** -0.368*** 
 (0.094)  (0.098) (0.091) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 0.562***  0.593*** 0.591*** 
 (0.081)  (0.080) (0.077) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 0.358***  0.372*** 0.384*** 
 (0.094)  (0.093) (0.085) 
Membership size  0.005 0.001 -0.002 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  0.573 0.468 0.548* 
  (0.415) (0.362) (0.332) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  0.530 -0.145** -0.124 
  (0.229) (0.280) (0.271) 
Ethnic diversity index  -0.242 0.040 1.060* 
  (0.342) (0.263) (0.523) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.050 0.029 0.047 
  (0.108) (0.110) (0.111) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    -0.027* 
    (0.013) 
LR χ2, full model 38.82 8.72 42.92 47.71 
p-value 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.350 0.079 0.387 0.430 
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2   0.224 -0.048 0.171 0.196 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A3: Determinants of grain bank survival: Marginal effects at the mean 
WESMLE binomial probit regression estimates ( 0.31)ω =  
Dependent variable: Surviving grain bank (1 = yes) 
 Marginal effects evaluated at sample means (MEM) 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.002    
 (0.001)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.000  0.001 0.000 
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Share of landless households 0.402*  0.386* 0.369* 
 (0.214)  (0.209) (0.216) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -0.310***  -0.341*** -0.371*** 
 (0.091)  (0.087) (0.093) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 0.622***  0.681*** 0.698*** 
 (0.111)  (0.110) (0.118) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 0.348***  0.351*** 0.344*** 
 (0.083)  (0.085) (0.090) 
Membership size  0.005 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  0.527** 0.606 0.669* 
  (0.368) (0.369) (0.367) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  0.492 -0.141 -0.125 
  (0.222) (0.321) (0.332) 
Ethnic diversity index  -0.233 -0.012 1.144 
  (0.319) (0.334) (0.784) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.057 0.038 0.053 
  (0.096) (0.121) (0.128) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    -0.030* 
    (0.017) 
Wald χ2 22.62 8.28 36.62 37.42 
p-value 0.001 0.219 0.000 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.350 0.077 0.386 0.420 
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2   0.208 -0.065 0.142 0.156 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A4: Determinants of grain bank survival: Average marginal effects 
WESMLE binomial probit regression estimates ( 0.31)ω =  
Dependent variable: Surviving grain bank (1 = yes) 
 Average marginal effects (AME) 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.002    
 (0.001)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Share of landless households 0.325*  0.305* 0.293* 
 (0.169)  (0.164) (0.169) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -0.281***  -0.309*** -0.341*** 
 (0.083)  (0.076) (0.075) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 0.533***  0.549*** 0.555*** 
 (0.078)  (0.075) (0.076) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 0.344***  0.354*** 0.361*** 
 (0.081)  (0.077) (0.075) 
Membership size  0.004 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  0.512 0.479* 0.531* 
  (0.353) (0.283) (0.282) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  0.478** -0.112 -0.099 
  (0.208) (0.250) (0.258) 
Ethnic diversity index  -0.227 -0.009 0.909 
  (0.308) (0.264) (0.621) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)   0.030 0.041 
   (0.095) (0.099) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    -0.024* 
    (0.013) 
Wald χ2 22.62 8.28 36.62 37.42 
p-value 0.001 0.219 0.000 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.350 0.077 0.386 0.420 
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2   0.208 -0.065 0.142 0.156 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A5: Determinants of grain bank survival: Estimated coefficients 
WESMLE binomial probit regression estimates ( 0.25)ω =  
Dependent variable: Surviving grain bank (1 = yes) 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.008    
 (0.005)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.001  0.002 0.000 
 (0.010)  (0.013) (0.014) 
Share of landless households 1.344*  1.366* 1.385* 
 (0.724)  (0.747) (0.798) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -1.202***  -1.446*** -1.754*** 
 (0.436)  (0.460) (0.519) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 2.105***  2.400*** 2.582*** 
 (0.501)  (0.508) (0.540) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 1.540***  1.671*** 1.814*** 
 (0.514)  (0.493) (0.515) 
Membership size  0.013 0.007 -0.004 
  (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  1.526 2.147* 2.492* 
  (1.117) (1.266) (1.326) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  1.423** -0.435 -0.420 
  (0.650) (1.116) (1.243) 
Ethnic diversity index  -0.682 -0.099 4.052 
  (0.906) (1.133) (2.859) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.177 0.134 0.192 
  (0.283) (0.423) (0.472) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    -0.107* 
    (0.062) 
Constant -3.350*** -2.253*** -4.538*** -4.998*** 
 (0.860) (0.783) (1.488) (1.439) 
Wald χ2 21.33 8.10 35.28 36.51 
p-value 0.002 0.231 0.000 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.347 0.075 0.383 0.414 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A6: Determinants of grain bank survival: Estimated coefficients 
WESMLE binomial probit regression estimates ( 0.33)ω =  
Dependent variable: Surviving grain bank (1 = yes) 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.008    
 (0.005)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.002  0.002 0.000 
 (0.010)  (0.013) (0.014) 
Share of landless households 1.317*  1.317* 1.366* 
 (0.740)  (0.756) (0.808) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -1.204***  -1.433*** -1.769*** 
 (0.425)  (0.448) (0.510) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 2.099***  2.423*** 2.623*** 
 (0.492)  (0.500) (0.533) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 1.516***  1.655*** 1.825*** 
 (0.514)  (0.491) (0.516) 
Membership size  0.014 0.005 -0.006 
  (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  1.549 2.069* 2.483* 
  (1.066) (1.252) (1.322) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  1.445** -0.507 -0.480 
  (0.659) (1.080) (1.203) 
Ethnic diversity index  -0.682 -0.016 4.332 
  (0.947) (1.160) (2.865) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.165 0.128 0.196 
  (0.289) (0.415) (0.470) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    -0.112* 
    (0.062) 
Constant -3.091*** -2.048*** -4.208*** -4.761*** 
 (0.867) (0.775) (1.452) (1.407) 
Wald χ2 23.11 8.33 37.12 37.77 
p-value 0.001 0.215 0.000 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.351 0.078 0.387 0.422 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A7: Predictive ability of MLE probit model 
Specification 4  
 Predicted  
Actual ( )ˆ 0.5βΦ <x  ( )ˆ 0.5xβΦ ≥  Total 
D = 0 33   7 40 
D = 1   8 32 40 
Total 41 39 80 
 
Sensitivity Pr( +| D) 80.00% 
Specificity Pr( -|~D) 82.50% 
Positive predictive value Pr( D| +) 82.05% 
Negative predictive value Pr(~D| -) 80.49% 
   
False + rate for true ~D Pr( +|~D) 17.50% 
False – rate for true D Pr( -| D) 20.00% 
False + rate for classified + Pr(~D| +) 27.95% 
False – rate for classified - Pr( D| -) 19.51% 
   
Correctly classified  81.25% 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.A8: Predictive ability of WESMLE probit model ( 0.31)ω =  
Specification 4  
 Predicted  
Actual ( )ˆ 0.31xβΦ <  ( )ˆ 0.31xβΦ ≥  Total 
D = 0 31   9 40 
D = 1   8 32 40 
Total 39 41 80 
 
Sensitivity Pr( +| D) 80.00% 
Specificity Pr( -|~D) 77.50% 
Positive predictive value Pr( D| +) 78.05% 
Negative predictive value Pr(~D| -) 79.49% 
   
False + rate for true ~D Pr( +|~D) 22.50% 
False - rate for true D Pr( -| D) 20.00% 
False + rate for classified + Pr(~D| +) 21.95% 
False - rate for classified - Pr( D| -) 20.51% 
   
Correctly classified  78.75% 
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Table 2.A9: Determinants of grain bank survival:  Estimated coefficients corrected for 
potential heteroskedasticity 
MLE binomial probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Hazard of grain bank failure 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.007    
 (0.005)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.002  0.002 0.000 
 (0.010)  (0.012) (0.014) 
Share of landless households 1.252  1.240 1.350 
 (0.770)  (0.777) (0.841) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -1.202***  -1.414*** -1.804*** 
 (0.407)  (0.429) (0.499) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 2.071***  2.453*** 2.697*** 
 (0.481)  (0.491) (0.533) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 1.446***  1.616*** 1.845*** 
 (0.514)  (0.488) (0.528) 
Membership size  -0.137 0.121 0.214 
  (0.294) (0.404) (0.470) 
Square of membership size  0.013 0.003 -0.008 
  (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) 
Share of female members in committee  0.000 0.000 0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  1.569 1.951 2.503* 
  (0.965) (1.223) (1.305) 
Ethnic diversity index  1.451** -0.606 -0.567 
  (0.667) (1.020) (1.141) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.661 0.166 4.839* 
  (1.006) (1.202) (2.803) 
Membership size*Ethnic diversity index    -0.122** 
    (0.061) 
Constant -2.589*** -1.636** -3.627*** -4.366*** 
 (0.880) (0.758) (1.381) (1.360) 
Wald χ2 25.52 8.54 39.59 39.35 
p-value 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.350 0.079 0.387 0.430 
Notes: N = 80.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A10: Determinants of time until grain bank failure: Hazard ratios 
Partial-likelihood Cox proportional hazards model estimates 
Dependent variable: Hazard of grain bank failure 
 Hazard ratios 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.996    
 (0.005)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.984  0.984 0.985 
 (0.011)  (0.014) (0.014) 
Share of landless households 0.628  0.806 0.765 
 (0.508)  (0.688) (0.646) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) 3.170***  3.677*** 4.387*** 
 (1.217)  (1.525) (1.826) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 0.118***  0.088*** 0.077*** 
 (0.049)  (0.044) (0.041) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 0.215***  0.170*** 0.136*** 
 (0.102)  (0.093) (0.078) 
Membership size  0.980 1.008 1.013 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) 
Square of membership size  1.000 1.000 1.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  0.144 0.047 0.048 
  (0.176) (0.065) (0.066) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  0.256* 1.537 1.845 
  (0.178) (1.724) (2.081) 
Ethnic diversity index  1.418 1.340 0.067* 
  (1.428) (1.329) (0.138) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  1.101 0.945 1.032 
  (0.358) (0.387) (0.420) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    1.088* 
    (0.051) 
LR χ2, full model 37.73 8.46 44.36 47.99 
p-value   0.000 0.207 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -145.85 -160.49 -142.53 -140.72 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
 108 
Table 2.A11: Determinants of time until grain bank failure: Estimated coefficients 
MLE exponential survival model estimates 
Dependent variable: Hazard of grain bank failure 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households -0.004    
 (0.005)    
Distance from block headquarters -0.011  -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.011)  (0.014) (0.013) 
Share of landless households -0.564  -0.348 -0.427 
 (0.796)  (0.829) (0.825) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) 1.011***  1.068*** 1.170*** 
 (0.372)  (0.399) (0.396) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) -1.911***  -2.104*** -2.147*** 
 (0.385)  (0.458) (0.467) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) -1.370***  -1.513*** -1.638*** 
 (0.452)  (0.510) (0.524) 
Membership size  -0.018 0.008 0.012 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  -1.703 -1.989 -1.876 
  (1.154) (1.238) (1.216) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  -1.286* 0.610 0.751 
  (0.690) (1.099) (1.103) 
Ethnic diversity index  0.423 0.257 -2.238 
  (1.005) (0.986) (2.106) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  0.003 -0.067 0.013 
  (0.325) (0.404) (0.402) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    0.067 
    (0.047) 
Constant -0.568 -0.943 0.050 0.079 
 (0.657) (0.773) (1.032) (0.998) 
LR χ2, full model 35.28 7.70 39.36 41.66 
p-value 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -73.142 -86.929 -71.101 -69.951 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A12: Determinants of time until grain bank failure: Estimated coefficients  
MLE Weibull survival model estimates 
Dependent variable: Hazard of grain bank failure 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households -0.004    
 (0.005)    
Distance from block headquarters -0.020*  -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.012)  (0.015) (0.014) 
Share of landless households -0.442  -0.159 -0.236 
 (0.825)  (0.874) (0.864) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) 1.348***  1.547*** 1.755*** 
 (0.390)  (0.422) (0.426) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) -2.492***  -2.926*** -3.107*** 
 (0.435)  (0.532) (0.561) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) -1.788***  -2.089*** -2.386*** 
 (0.486)  (0.564) (0.598) 
Membership size  -0.022 0.012 0.019 
  (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  -2.016* -3.399** -3.451** 
  1.202) (1.401) (1.369) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  -1.438** 0.637 0.818 
  (0.704) (1.121) (1.131) 
Ethnic diversity index  0.419 0.117 -3.235 
  (1.010) (1.005) (2.068) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.086 -0.220 -0.143 
  (0.331) (0.419) (0.415) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    0.095** 
    (0.047) 
Constant -1.690** -1.529* -0.523 -0.472 
 (0.769) (0.866) (1.119) (1.063) 
LR χ2, full model 47.25 9.17 55.48 60.18 
p-value 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -65.069 -84.109 -60.953 -58.604 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A13: Determinants of time until grain bank failure: Estimated coefficients 
MLE log-normal survival model estimates 
Dependent variable: Hazard of grain bank failure 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.003    
 (0.003)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.010  0.010 0.009 
 (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of landless households 0.443  0.375 0.376 
 (0.462)  (0.449) (0.447) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -0.617***  -0.669*** -0.706*** 
 (0.234)  (0.239) (0.242) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 1.341***  1.375*** 1.389*** 
 (0.249)  (0.271) (0.272) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 0.960***  0.945*** 0.962*** 
 (0.275)  (0.280) (0.281) 
Membership size  0.013 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  1.429 1.399* 1.412* 
  (0.921) (0.769) (0.765) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  0.973* -0.282 -0.327 
  (0.536) (0.621) (0.621) 
Ethnic diversity index  -0.431 -0.321 0.814 
  (0.745) (0.589) (1.291) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.189 0.047 0.023 
  (0.240) (0.232) (0.234) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    -0.028 
    (0.029) 
Constant 0.536 0.919 -0.071 -0.064 
 (0.419) (0.604) (0.645) (0.641) 
LR χ2, full model 39.98 8.94 46.81 47.82 
p-value 0.000 0.1768 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood   -65.554 -81.070 -62.136 -61.634 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
 111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.A1: Estimated baseline cumulative hazard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.A2: Estimated hazard function 
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Figure 2.A3: Variable – Distance from block headquarters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.A4: Variable – Share of landless households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.A5: Variable – Village road quality 
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Figure 2.A6: Variable – Distance from block headquarters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.A7: Variable – Presence of SHG group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.A8: Variable – Membership size 
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Figure 2.A9: Variable – Share contributed by villagers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.A10: Variable – Share of female committee members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.A11: Variable – Ethnic diversity index 
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Figure 2.A12: Variable – Grain bank establishment year 
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Table 2.A14: Determinants of time until grain bank failure: Estimated coefficients 
MLE exponential survival model with Gamma frailty 
Dependent variable: Hazard of grain bank failure 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households -0.004    
 (0.005)    
Distance from block headquarters -0.011  -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.011)  (0.014) (0.013) 
Share of landless households -0.564  -0.348 -0.428 
 (0.796)  (0.829) (0.825) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) 1.011***  1.068*** 1.170*** 
 (0.372)  (0.399) (0.396) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) -1.911***  -2.104*** -2.148*** 
 (0.385)  (0.458) (0.467) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) -1.370***  -1.513*** -1.638*** 
 (0.452)  (0.510) (0.524) 
Membership size  -0.018 0.008 0.012 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  -1.703 -1.989 -1.876 
  (1.154) (1.238) (1.216) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  -1.286* 0.610 0.751 
  (0.690) (1.099) (1.103) 
Ethnic diversity index  0.423 0.257 -2.238 
  (1.005) (0.986) (2.106) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  0.003 -0.067 0.013 
  (0.325) (0.404) (0.402) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    0.067 
    (0.047) 
Constant -0.568 -0.943 0.050 0.079 
 (0.657) (0.773) (1.032) (0.998) 
LR χ2, full model 35.28 7.70 39.36 41.66 
p-value 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -73.142 -86.929 -71.101 -69.951 
Frailty distribution variance θ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value (LR test of θ = 0) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A15: Determinants of time until grain bank failure: Estimated coefficients 
MLE Weibull survival model with Gamma frailty 
Dependent variable: Hazard of grain bank failure 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households -0.007    
 (0.007)    
Distance from block headquarters -0.019  -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.013)  (0.015) (0.014) 
Share of landless households -0.770  -0.159 -0.236 
 (1.008)  (0.874) (0.864) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) 1.409***  1.547*** 1.755*** 
 (0.463)  (0.422) (0.426) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) -2.797***  -2.926*** -3.107*** 
 (0.639)  (0.532) (0.561) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) -2.066***  -2.090*** -2.386*** 
 (0.650)  (0.564) (0.598) 
Membership size  -0.031 0.012 0.019 
  (0.055) (0.023) (0.023) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  -7.028 -3.399** -3.451** 
  (6.013) (1.401) (1.369) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  -3.859 0.637 0.818 
  (3.197) (1.121) (1.131) 
Ethnic diversity index  3.834 0.117 -3.236 
  (3.071) (1.005) (2.068) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  2.323* -0.22 -0.143 
  (1.351) (0.419) (0.415) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    0.095** 
    (0.047) 
Constant -1.495* -1.689 -0.523 -0.472 
 (0.891) (3.026) (1.119) (1.063) 
LR χ2, full model 37.37 10.90 45.01 49.71 
p-value 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -64.773 -78.008 -60.953 -58.604 
Frailty distribution variance θ 0.409 7.910 0.000 0.000 
p-value (LR test of θ = 0) 0.221 0.00 1.000 1.000 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.A16: Determinants of time until grain bank failure: Estimated coefficients 
MLE log-normal survival model with Gamma frailty 
Dependent variable: Hazard of grain bank failure 
 Coefficients 
Independent variables 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification  
4 
     
Total households 0.003    
 (0.003)    
Distance from block headquarters 0.010  0.010 0.009 
 (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of landless households 0.443  0.375 0.376 
 (0.462)  (0.449) (0.447) 
Quality of village road (1 = tarred) -0.617***  -0.669*** -0.706*** 
 (0.234)  (0.239) (0.242) 
Meeting on needs basis (1 = yes) 1.341***  1.375*** 1.389*** 
 (0.249)  (0.271) (0.272) 
Presence of self-help group (1 = yes) 0.960***  0.945*** 0.962*** 
 (0.275)  (0.280) (0.281) 
Membership size  0.006 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Square of membership size  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of female members in committee  1.500 1.399* 1.412* 
  (1.028) (0.769) (0.765) 
Share contributed by villagers at 
inception  0.849 -0.282 -0.327 
  (0.575) (0.621) (0.621) 
Ethnic diversity index  -0.832 -0.321 0.814 
  (0.635) (0.589) (1.291) 
Grain bank established 1993-94 (1 = 
yes)  -0.589** 0.047 0.023 
  (0.242) (0.232) (0.234) 
Membership size x Ethnic diversity 
index    -0.028 
    (0.029) 
Constant 0.536 0.687 -0.071 -0.064 
 (0.419) (0.574) (0.645) (0.641) 
LR χ2, full model 35.76 11.36 42.59 43.60 
p-value 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -65.554 -77.753 -62.136 -61.634 
Frailty distribution variance θ 0.000 2.448 0.000 0.000 
p-value (LR test of θ = 0) 1.000 0.005 1.000 1.000 
Notes: N = 80.  Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GRAIN BANKS AND CHILDREN’S HEALTH 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we use non-experimental data collected through a small-scale 
household sample survey in Rayagada, Orissa to examine the impact of grain banks on 
young children’s health.  Grain banks are community-level institutions that provide 
households with in-kind consumption credit during the “hungry” season.  In the 
absence of formal credit markets, grain banks provide an alternative source of 
consumption credit at interest rates lower than those charged by informal lenders such 
as local moneylenders, without the risk of loss of physical collateral or engaging in 
tied labor-credit contracts under exploitative terms.49 
Grain banks have been enthusiastically implemented by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) promoting food security in this area.  In recent years, grain 
banks have also been adopted by the Indian government’s ministry of tribal welfare 
with the purpose of combating short-term, seasonal food shortages in villages where 
the majority of the population belongs to tribal communities (Ministry of Tribal 
Affairs 2002).  In such times, grain banks are supposed to function as a safety net 
against deterioration in the nutritional status of particularly the most susceptible 
populations, namely children and lactating and pregnant women (ibid.).  To date, 
                                                 
49 While the average annual interest charged by grain banks is about 25 percent, local, private 
moneylenders charge at least double that rate.  In addition, unlike borrowing from private 
moneylenders, borrowing from grain banks does not involve risk of loss of collateral.  As a result, poor 
households who may otherwise be vulnerable to risk-rationing can become grain bank borrowers.  In 
risk rationing, lenders shift so much of the contractual risk to borrowers that the latter voluntarily 
withdraw from the credit market even when they have the collateral wealth to participate in a credit 
contract.  For empirical evidence on risk rationing, see, e.g., Boucher et al. (2005) and Boucher and 
Guirkinger (2005).   
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however, no rigorous evaluation of the impact of grain banks on health outcomes 
exists.   
The main contribution of this chapter is to fill this gap in knowledge by 
measuring the impact of grain bank participation by households on children’s health 
outcomes.  We do this using propensity score matching estimators.  Given that the 
tribal community forms one of the most socioeconomically disadvantaged groups in 
Indian society and has very poor nutritional status, evidence on the impact of grain 
banks on the health of this population would be particularly important.50  If grain 
banks indeed improve the health outcomes of participants, the case for scaling up this 
initiative would be strengthened.51  On the other hand, if grain banks are found not to 
have any quantifiable impact on health outcomes, then the case for scaling up would 
be significantly weakened and alternative interventions should be explored.   
Reduced nutrient and food intake can retard skeletal growth and reduce the 
accumulation of muscle and fat tissues in children.  Therefore, anthropometric 
measurements can be used to detect levels of malnutrition in a population.52  We 
examine the following outcomes: height-for-age (or haz scores) and weight-for-height 
standardized z-scores (or whz scores) as well as the rate of growth in height between 
children from participant households and children from non-participant households.53  
We do not use weight-for-age standardized scores as they cannot distinguish between 
                                                 
50 A brief overview of the the tribal community in India, as well as notes on the two main tribes in the 
survey region, are provided in a separate appendix. 
51 The strongest case would be made if the positive impacts that grain banks have are shown to be more 
cost-effective than the impacts from other interventions.  Currently, we do not possess data on the cost 
of the grain bank intervention.  However, given that grain banks are a community-based intervention, 
they are likely to have much lower storage, transportation and overhead costs relative to more 
centralized food security programs.  
52 See Morris (1999) for further discussion on how anthropometric data can detect malnutrition levels. 
53 The z-score is defined as the difference between the value for an individual and the median value of 
the reference population for the same age or height, divided by the standard deviation of the reference 
population (Cogill 2003). 
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chronic and acute malnutrition, and do not provide any information beyond what 
height-for-age and weight-for-height indicators provide (Alderman 2000).54   
Height-for-age standardized z-scores are commonly used in detecting levels of 
long-term or chronic malnutrition in young children.55  Low height-for-age relative to 
a child of the same sex and age in a reference population (or haz scores below -2) is 
referred to as “stunting”.  Since haz scores reflect the quality and not just the quantity 
of food intake and are useful in detecting long-term impacts, a preferred indicator of 
short-term changes in nutritional status that may occur due to seasonal fluctuations in 
food consumption is the weight-for-height standardized z-score (Morris 1999).  Low 
weight-for-height relative to a child of the same sex and age in a reference population 
(or whz scores below -2) is referred to as “wasting”.  Growth in height is also a good 
indicator of underlying health status.  Children experiencing slow growth in height are 
found to have poorer cognitive development, interact less frequently with their 
environment, have lower activity levels and acquire skills at a slower pace (Grantham-
McGregor et al. 1999; Lasky et al. 1981).  
Given that the majority of grain banks were established in the last decade, we 
focus on anthropometric outcomes of children below the age of 6 years or the children 
of the “grain bank era”.  We assume that the impact of grain banks on their health 
status is likely to be more pronounced than on older children or adults.  We examine 
the impact of household participation in grain banks on children’s health outcomes by 
comparing children of participating households in villages with grain banks to children 
                                                 
54These measures have been developed by the United States National Center for Health Statistics 
(NCHS) and are recommended for international use by the World Health Organization (WHO).  The 
reference population chosen by the NCHS is a statistically valid random population of healthy infants 
and children.  While questions regarding the validity of using a US-based reference standard for other 
ethnic populations are commonly raised, evidence suggests that until about 10 years of age, children 
from well-nourished and healthy households in both developing and industrialized countries grow at the 
same rate and have comparable height and weight, regardless of their ethnicity (Cogill 2003). 
55
See Alderman (2000) for a survey article on the use of anthropometric survey data. 
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in non-grain bank villages, within a matched sample.  We also examine the impact of 
household participation in grain banks on children’s health outcomes by comparing 
children in villages where grain banks have been in operation for at least 10 years to 
children in non-grain bank villages, again within a matched sample.  The latter 
comparison allows us to test the hypothesis that grain banks which have been in 
operation for a longer duration may have a more pronounced health impact due to 
intergenerational transmission effects through the improved health of mothers. 
Using local linear regression and kernel propensity score matching estimators, 
we find that household participation in grain banks does not have has a statistically 
significant effect on any of the children’s health outcomes that we examine.  We also 
find no statistically significant impact on these outcomes when we compare children 
in participant households in villages where grain banks have survived for a longer 
duration compared to children in non-grain bank villages.  Our findings raise questions 
about the efficacy of the current generation of grain banks in improving the nutritional 
outcomes of young children. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  In Section 3.2, we provide a 
brief review of the relevant literature.  In Section 3.3, we provide some background 
information on the survey location.  In Section 3.4, we provide an overview of the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the survey sample villages.  In Section 3.5, we 
describe the empirical methodology.  In Section 3.6, we discuss the data and main 
findings.  In Section 3.7, we provide some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
A number of empirical studies have documented the adverse impact of households’ 
inability to smooth consumption across the agricultural cycle on both short- and long-
term health outcomes.  For example, using ICRISAT data for southern rural India, 
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Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) find that reduced food intake during the lean season 
has a negative impact on future agricultural productivity.  Thus, a household that 
experiences seasonal food insecurity in one year faces the prospect of lowered wages 
and farm profits in the next, which can lead to a cycle of even lower nutrient intake in 
the following year.  Reardon and Matlon (1989) find evidence of reduced food intake 
during the cropping season in the Sudano-Sahel agroclimatic region in Burkina Faso, 
when demands for energy expenditure are the highest.  Lawrence et al. (1989) find for 
the Gambia that seasonal food shortages lead to losses in female body weight as well 
as low birth weights.  Given that lower birth weights are associated with lower height 
attainments in childhood and adulthood, and a consequent reduction in potential 
earnings, seasonal fluctuations in consumption not only have negative short-term 
effects but also negative long-term impacts (Martorell 1995, 1999; Glewwe and 
Jacoby 1995).   
Health outcomes of young children are of particular interest not only because 
of concern over their immediate welfare, but also due to the fact that nutrition in early 
childhood plays a crucial role in future physical and mental development, thereby 
affecting health status as adults and future labor productivity.56  A number of 
empirical studies, for example, show the relationship between early childhood 
nutrition and adult height and wages/productivity (see, e.g., Behrman and Deolalikar 
1989 for rural India, Haddad and Bouis 1991 for rural Philippines, Thomas and 
Strauss 1997 for Brazil).  Martorell (1999) and Maluccio et al. (2003) also provide 
general evidence on the impact of early childhood nutrition on adult nutritional status 
and cognitive achievement. 
                                                 
56 See World Bank (2006) for a review of the empirical evidence on the impact of early childhood 
malnutrition on various development outcomes, including schooling, productivity and income poverty.   
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There is also a growing body of literature that documents the impact of adverse 
shocks on children’s health outcomes, both concurrent and in the long-term.  For 
example, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) use panel data from Zimbabwe to show that 
children aged 12-24 months, especially those from poorer households, experience a 
slowdown in growth due to a drought.  They find that this cohort of children is not 
able to make up over time for this lost growth.  Given that adult height is strongly 
correlated with height achieved by age 3 and is also correlated with labor earnings and 
productivity, the authors posit that the inability to smooth consumption increases the 
likelihood of chronic poverty.  In addition, given the fact that taller women have, on 
average, healthier children, they posit that the impact of drought on female children 
can lead to the intergenerational persistence of poverty.  Similarly, Dercon and 
Hoddinott (2005) find that recent droughts in Zimbabwe resulted in reduced growth 
for children of preschool age.  They too find that this cohort is not able to catch up in 
terms of lost growth, as a result of which lifetime earnings are estimated to be roughly 
7 percent lower.  Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006) and Hoddinott (2006) 
provide further evidence of both the immediate as well as persistent impact of adverse 
shocks on children’s health outcomes.  Using longitudinal data from Zimbabwe 
between 1983-84, 1987 and 2000, Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006) show that 
improved nutritional status among children of pre-school age (as measured by height-
for-age standardized z scores) is associated with increased height as a young adult, as 
well as better schooling attainment and a lower age at which the child started school.  
The authors use the 1982-83 and 1983-84 droughts as well as the civil war in the late 
1970s to identify differences in pre-school nutritional status.  Again using longitudinal 
data from Zimbabwe, Hoddinott (2006) finds that a severe drought in 1994-95 slowed 
down the rate of growth in height by 1.5-2.0 cm for children below 2 years of age, 
which is equivalent to a 15-20 percent loss in growth velocity.  He shows that even 
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four years after the drought, these children remain shorter than children of the same 
ago who did not experience the drought between 12-24 months age.  He finds that this 
result is particularly pronounced for children in less-wealthy households (as measured 
by livestock holdings).   
Given the above evidence, we examine whether grain banks indeed improve 
children’s health outcomes.  By enabling households to smooth consumption over the 
agricultural cycle, they have the potential to not only improve children’s health in the 
short term but to also mitigate the long-term adverse impacts of seasonal malnutrition.   
 
3.3 Background 
The data used in this study come from a village and household sample survey 
conducted in Kashipur block, Rayagada district in the tribal belt of southwest Orissa, 
one of the poorest regions in the state.57  According to a BPL (Below Poverty Line) 
census conducted by the government of Orissa in 1997, 72 percent of households in 
Kashipur were classified as poor (Sethi 2003).58   In terms of occupational 
distribution, 49.9 percent of rural workers are agricultural laborers, followed by 31.7 
percent as self-employed cultivators (Census 2001).  The overall literacy rate in rural 
areas is 29.9 percent.  The female literacy rate is even lower, at 18.3 percent.  Roughly 
62 percent of the rural population of Kashipur is tribal, with the Kandha and the Soura 
constituting the two main tribes.   
As described in Chapter 2 for the adjoining block of Dasmantapur, food 
consumption in this region is tied closely to the agricultural calendar and the 
composition, quality and quantity of food consumption changes with the seasons.  
                                                 
57 See chapter 2 for a district map of Orissa depicting the tribal belt. 
58 A BPL household is defined as a family with an annual income below Rs. 11,000 which is roughly 
equivalent to a dollar a day (1992 rupees).  The percentage of households classified as BPL in Koraput 
district by the same survey is 84 percent. 
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Between October-February, when produce is harvested, the tribal population 
consumes staples such as rice, millet and maize.59  Between March-May, consumption 
depends on food stocks as well as purchases using earnings from daily wage labor 
(mainly in labor-intensive public works programs).  Food shortages are experienced in 
the ‘hungry’ season (June-September), during which time food stocks tend to be low 
and opportunities for daily wage labor shrink due to the monsoon rains.  During this 
period, meals are limited to gruel made from millet flour or flour from dried seeds 
(tamarind and mango), food consumption levels generally fall, and a decrease in the 
average body mass is observed.  For example, the average weight of adult women in 
the survey sample declined from 42.3 kilograms in the winter to 40.9 kilograms 
towards the end of the monsoon season.  This inter-seasonal difference in body weight 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Against this backdrop, grain banks were introduced in Kashipur in 1981 by 
Agragamee, an NGO, as a potential community-level solution to recurring seasonal 
food shortages.  Initially, Agragamee established grain banks in villages in the vicinity 
of its headquarters in Kashipur town by providing a one-time grant (in the form of 
grains).  In some cases, villagers also provided a matching contribution in order to 
increase initial grain bank holdings.  Once established, these grain banks were 
managed internally by a grain bank committee comprised of individuals from grain 
bank member households.  During the agricultural lean season, member households 
could borrow from the grain bank.  These loans were to be returned with interest (also 
in the form of grain) after the following harvest season.  Following the droughts of the 
early 1990s, Agragamee expanded the grain bank initiative to all villages in Kashipur 
                                                 
59 Cereals form the most important part of tribal diets.  Pulses (mainly kandula, which is grown locally) 
are also consumed.  However, few fruits and vegetables are consumed, as these are grown mostly for 
marketing purposes.  Meat is only consumed during festivals or when there are guests.  Milk and eggs 
are generally not consumed.   
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block using funding provided by the state government as part of the Orissa Household 
Food Security Project (OHFSP).60  In the next section, we present a brief overview of 
the sample survey villages.  
 
3.4 Overview of sample villages 
Socioeconomic features of sample villages 
Table 3.1 presents selected socioeconomic outcomes across India, Orissa and the 
surveyed villages, in order to contextualize the development levels in the sample 
villages relative to all of Orissa and India.  We see that households in sample villages 
are at extremely low levels of development, both in absolute as well as relative terms.  
For example, the share of girls aged 6-14 years attending school in the sample villages 
is a mere 32 percent, compared to over 70 percent in Orissa and India. 
 
Table 3.1: Selected socioeconomic variables 
Statistic India a Orissa Sample villages 
Percent of females age 6-14 attending school 73.7 75.1 31.9 
Percent of households with electricity 60.1 33.8 0.9 
Percent of births in medical institutions b 33.6 22.6 0.6 
Percent of households with no toilet/latrine facility 64.0 86.5 99.6 
Source: India and Orissa statistics are from the 1998-99 National Family Health Survey (NFHS-2).  
Statistics for sample villages are own calculations from household survey data collected in winter 
2005. 
Notes: a Excludes the state of Tripura. b India and Orissa figures for births in the three years 
preceding the NFHS-2. 
 
The infrastructure in the sample villages is extremely poor or deficient.  Only 1 
of the 28 sample villages had an electricity connection.  Village roads were unpaved 
                                                 
60 For more details on the grain bank movement in Kashipur, see Chapter 2. 
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and the vast majority of homes have mud walls and floors.61  Almost no households 
had toilet/latrine facilities. 
 
Food security 
In all sample villages, villagers replied in the affirmative to a question on whether any 
households residing in the village faced food insufficiency during at least 1 month of 
the year.  The majority of villages included households that faced food insufficiency 
for at least 3 months out of the year, while some villages included households that 
faced food shortages for as much as 4-5 months.  The months most commonly cited as 
food shortage months were the monsoon months of Aashad, Shravana and Bhadrab 
(mid-June to mid-September). 
 
Health infrastructure 
At the time of the survey, 11 sample villages reported not having either an anganwadi 
center or sub-center.62  Of the remaining 17 villages which had an anganwadi center 
or sub-center, only 4 reported that the anganwadi worker (AWW) attended regularly – 
either daily or weekly.  Eleven reported monthly visits, while the rest reported 
irregular attendance.  AWW were reported to be from the tribal communities in only 7 
sample villages, although the populations of these villages are predominately tribal.  In 
more than half of the sampled villages, caste differences as well as the lack of 
                                                 
61 As discussed in Catteneo et al. (2006), this is an important public health issue as mud flooring can 
increase the spread of infectious diseases and result in poor hygiene conditions, especially following 
heavy rains as is common during the monsoon months in this region. 
62 The anganwadi center forms the nodal point for the provision of services under the Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS) program.  According to the design of the ICDS program, one anganwadi 
is established for every settlement of 1,000 people (roughly 200 families in rural areas) for the provision 
of nutrition, health and pre-school educational services (CIRCUS 2006).  In practice, however, the 
coverage and functioning of the ICDS program is uneven across the nation.  Villages with a majority 
SC/ST population are often found to lack well-functioning anganwadi centers (see, e.g., the box titled 
“India’s forgotten forest children” describing the lack of anganwadi facilities in Dongriguda, an 
extremely impoverished tribal settlement in Nabarangpur district, Orissa (CIRCUS 2006, p. 50).  
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involvement of the AWW with the village population, resulted in tribal mothers and 
children reporting that they were not comfortable in dealing with the AWW.  These 
findings mirror evidence from a recent survey of the Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS) program conducted in various Indian states (CIRCUS 2006).  For 
example, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, almost half of the surveyed anganwadis were 
rated to be functioning poorly or very poorly.  Caste differences were also found to 
result in discrimination in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan (ibid). 
 Inhabitants of the majority of sample villages reported that they visit the 
government primary health care (PHC) center in the gram panchayat headquarters 
during medical emergencies.  The average travel time was over 70 minutes by 
walking, which was the main mode of transport for the majority of villagers.  In some 
sample villages, the time taken by inhabitants to reach the nearest PHC was between 
3-6 hours, indicating the extreme level of difficulty in accessing medical facilities.   
Eight of the sample villages reported that the majority of villagers could not afford to 
pay for the medical facilities.   
 
Economy 
Agriculture was reported to be the main occupation in sample villages, followed by 
seasonal daily wage labor.  The main crops cultivated in this area are cereals including 
paddy rice and different varieties of millet.  Other crops include corn, oilseeds, pulses 
and vegetables (such as eggplant, potato, chillies and tomato).   
 
Village and grain bank indicators, by grain bank status 
An equal number of grain bank and non-grain bank villages were selected for the 
survey.  Care was taken so that the set of grain bank and non-grain bank villages 
selected were, on average, similar across various dimensions.   
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Using data from the village survey conducted as part of the first wave of the 
household survey and comparing the means between the two sets of villages along 
various indicators, we indeed find no statistically significant differences up to the 10 
percent level, with the exception of the variable denoting distance from the block 
headquarters. 
 
Table 3.2: Means of continuous variables, by village grain bank status 
Variable 
GBV 
(1) 
NGBV  
(2) 
GBV-NGBV 
(1)-(2) 
Village-related variables    
Distance from main road (km) 3.04 3.75 -0.71 
Distance from block headquarters (km) 17.07 25.57 -8.50*** 
Time taken to travel to block headquarters by 
main mode of transport (minutes) 
143.57 163.93 -20.36 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 
5.42 5.78 -0.36 
Distance from the closest weekly market (km) 8.86 7.61 1.25 
Distance from the closest post office (km) 3.14 3.64 -0.50 
Total number of households 40.36 51.62 -11.26 
Share of landless households 0.25 0.41 -0.16 
Share of ST households 0.92 0.79 0.12 
Share of households that have reported food 
inadequacy for at least 1 month in past year 
0.55 0.74 -0.19 
Grain bank-related variables (at inception)    
Grain bank household membership size  29.07 29.64 -0.57 
Share of grains contributed by villages 0.23 0.14 0.09 
Share of ST members in grain bank 0.86 0.83 0.03 
Number of grain bank committee members 5.57 6.29 -0.72 
Share of female grain bank committee members 0.47 0.43 0.04 
N 14 14 -- 
Notes: Means for village-related variables for 14 villages with functional grain banks (GBVs) in (1) 
and 11 villages with failed grain banks and 3 where grain banks were never established (NGBVs) in 
(2).  Means for grain bank-related variables for 14 villages with functional grain banks in (1) and for 
11 villages where grain banks failed in (2).  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; and *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
As shown in Table 3.2, we find no statistically significant differences between 
the means of grain bank villages (GBVs) and non-grain bank villages (NGBVs) in 
terms of the distance from the main road and number of households.  This is expected 
as we stratified the sample across these two dimensions.  In addition, there are no 
significant differences in terms of the time taken to travel to the seat of local 
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administrative offices, distance from the closest Agragamee field office, distance from 
the closest weekly market, share of landless households, share of tribal households and 
the share of households that have reported food inadequacy during the 12 months 
preceding the survey.  Although the difference in the average distance to the block 
headquarters is statistically significant, the time taken to reach it is not (reflecting 
differences in topography and varying ease of access). 
 
Table 3.3: Means of dichotomous variables, by village grain bank status 
Variable 
GBV 
(1) 
NGBV 
 (2) 
GBV-NGBV 
(1)-(2) 
Share of villages (in percent) having   
Functional primary school 42.86 71.43 -28.57 
Midday meals at school 35.71 64.29 -28.58 
Anganwadi center or sub-center 64.29 57.14 7.15 
Regular (daily/weekly) visits by Anganwadi worker 21.43 7.14 14.29 
Vaccination drive in last 5 years 42.86 21.43 21.43 
Electrical connection 7.14 0.00 7.14 
Tarred village road 14.29 7.14 7.15 
New road in last 5 years 57.14 28.57 28.57 
Walking as main mode of transport to block 
headquarters 
71.43 64.29 7.14 
Self-help groups 71.43 42.86 28.57 
Village-level meetings on a need-basis 35.71 21.43 14.28 
Ward member in last 5 years 64.29 64.29 0.00 
Watershed management program in last 10 years 42.86 0.00 42.86*** 
Food-for-work program in last 10 years 71.43 71.43 0.00 
Grain bank established prior to OHFSP 1 71.43 54.55 16.88 
N 14 14  
Notes: Shares reported for 14 villages with functional grain banks (GBVs) in (1) and 11 villages with 
failed grain banks and 3 where grain banks were never established (NGBVs) in (2). 1 Share in (2) 
does not reflect 3 villages where grain banks were never established. * Statistically significant at the 
10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
In Table 3.3, we find no statistically significant differences between the shares 
of grain bank and non-grain bank villages having a functional primary school, 
anganwadi center, tarred village roads, elected ward member in the 5 years preceding 
the survey, ‘self-help’ (credit) groups and almost all other important indicators of 
physical and social infrastructure.  
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Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the means for the same characteristics, but for the 
set of 3 villages where grain banks were never established (NEGBVs) and the 11 
villages where grain banks failed (FGBVs).  In these two sets of villages too, we find 
almost no difference between the means.  Thus, we find that the three sets of villages – 
where grain banks continue to be operational, where they failed and where they were 
never established – are alike, on average, across a range of important characteristics, 
including village size, distance from important geographical markers and physical and 
social infrastructure. 
 
Table 3.4: Means of continuous variables for non-grain bank villages, by whether 
grain bank failed or was never established 
Variable 
FGBV 
(1) 
NEGBV  
(2) 
FGBV-NEGBV 
(1)-(2) 
Village-related variables    
Distance from main road (km) 3.86 3.33 0.53 
Distance from block headquarters (km) 24.64 29 -4.36 
Time taken to travel to block headquarters by main 
mode of transport (minutes) 
165 160 5 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office (km) 6.59 2.83 3.76* 
Distance from the closest weekly market (km) 7.09 9.50 -2.41 
Distance from the closest post office (km) 4.18 1.67 2.51 
Total number of households 53.90 44.00 9.90 
Share of landless households 0.36 0.62 -0.26** 
Share of ST households 0.77 0.89 -0.13 
Share of households that have reported food 
inadequacy for at least 1 month in past year 
0.74 0.73 0.01 
N 11 3  
Notes: Means reported for 11 villages where grain banks failed (FGBVs) in (1) and 3 villages where 
grain banks were never established (NEGBVs) in (2).  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** at the 5 percent level; and *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
3.5 Empirical methodology 
The evaluation problem 
The central problem in evaluation arises because we cannot observe outcomes for the 
same observation in the counterfactual state (Heckman and Robb 1985).  For example, 
in this study, we can observe children in households that are grain bank participants 
(the treatment group) or children in households that are grain bank non-participants 
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(the comparison group), but we cannot observe outcomes for the same child in both 
states.   
 
Table 3.5: Means of dichotomous variables for non-grain bank villages, by whether 
grain bank failed or was never established 
Variable 
FGBV 
(1) 
NEGBV 
 (2) 
FGBV-NEGBV 
(1)-(2) 
Share of villages (in percent) having   
Functional primary school 72.73 66.67 6.06 
Midday meals at school 63.64 66.67 -3.03 
Anganwadi center or sub-center 54.55 66.67 -12.12 
Regular (daily/weekly) visits by Anganwadi worker 9.09 0.00 9.09 
Vaccination drive in last 5 years 18.18 33.33 -15.15 
Tarred village road 9.09 0.00 9.09 
New road in last 5 years 27.27 33.33 -6.06 
Walking as main mode of transport to block 
headquarters 
63.64 66.67 -3.03 
Self-help groups 54.55 0.00 54.55* 
Village-level meetings on a need-basis 18.18 33.33 -15.15 
Ward member in last 5 years 63.64 66.67 -3.03 
Food-for-work program in last 10 years 63.66 100.00 -36.34 
N 11 3  
Notes: Shares reported for 11 villages where grain banks failed (FGBVs) in (1) and 3 villages where 
grain banks were never established (NEGBVs) in (2). * Statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.  
 
The cleanest solution to this missing data problem is a social experiment where the 
comparison group is constructed from a random subset of the eligible population.  
However, since we do not have experimental data but rather observational data, we 
have to rely on non-experimental methods to estimate the impact of grain bank 
participation on children’s health outcomes.   
 
Matching compared with other non-experimental estimators 
In recent years, an estimator that has gained wide usage in evaluation using non-
experimental data is matching.63  Matching estimators are based on the premise that 
                                                 
63 For an evaluation of matching estimators, see, among others, Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002), 
Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a), Heckman et al. (1998), and Smith and Todd (2001, 2005a).  For an 
overview of different non-experimental estimators, see Blundell and Costa Dias (2002). 
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the most appropriate estimate of the counterfactual untreated outcome for a treated 
unit is the outcome of an untreated unit or units most similar to the treated unit from 
the identified comparison group, under the assumption that selection into program 
participation is based on observables.  While this is a strong assumption, it is also 
made by alternate non-experimental estimators such as linear regression.  Although 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation can address bias due to selection on 
unobservables, the validity of the estimates is sensitive to the choice of the IV (a 
variable which has to be correlated with the decision to participate, but uncorrelated 
with any unobserved factors that affect the outcome).  However, the difficulties of 
finding a valid IV are well-known.   
If we assume that selection is indeed based on observables (or that the 
variables observable to the researcher span almost all of those used by the agent in 
deciding whether or not to participate), matching estimators provide impact estimates 
that can approximate estimates provided by randomized experiments.  To do this, 
matching estimators first generate a propensity score.  The propensity score is simply 
a predicted probability, based on observed characteristics, that the individual (or 
household) will participate in the program.  This is used to match treated units with 
untreated units that are similar in every (observable) respect except in their treatment 
status.64  The difference in the outcome of interest between matched units can then be 
attributed to the program.   
Matching has some important advantages over regression.  The latter imposes 
a linear functional form to identify the counterfactual outcome.65  However, unlike 
                                                 
64 We discuss the matching algorithms used to match treated and untreated units in the latter half of this 
section.   
65 If we include a sufficient number of higher order terms, however, the linear model can approximate a 
given non-linear function of the set of conditioning variables X arbitrarily well.  In practice, however, 
including a large number of higher order terms for each variable, results in a degrees of freedom 
problem.  
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regression, matching methods are either semi-parametric or non-parametric, 
depending on the particular method used (Black and Smith 2004).  In matching, after 
units with comparable propensity scores are matched, the difference in the outcome 
between the units provides the impact estimate.  This is particularly important if 
participants and non-participants differ substantially in terms of their observed 
characteristics, as regression assumes the same functional form for both groups.   
In addition, matching only pairs untreated and treated units having similar 
propensity scores.  For a given untreated unit, if no comparable unit (i.e., having a 
similar propensity score) is available in the treated group, then it is discarded from the 
analysis.  This area of overlap between the propensity scores is known as the 
“common support” region (Smith and Todd 2005a).  However, in regression, all 
treated and untreated units are compared, regardless of whether they are comparable.  
While matching does not solve the support problem, it highlights it in a way that 
regression does not (Black and Smith 2004).  In other words, matching exposes the 
common support problem, i.e., whether or not comparable untreated units are available 
for each treated unit (Smith 2004).  After estimating the propensity scores for the 
treated and untreated groups, it is possible to compare the densities in order to 
examine the extent of the common support problem.   
In addition, matching weights observations differently than ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression in calculating the expected counterfactual for each treated 
observation.  In OLS regression, all untreated units play a role in determining the 
expected counterfactual for any given treated unit and receive equal weight.  In 
matching, however, only untreated units similar to each treated unit have a positive 
weight in determining the expected counterfactual, and these weights can vary 
depending on the distance in propensity scores between the matched units.   
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Performance of matching compared to experimental estimates 
A number of recent studies have compared the performance of matching by comparing 
experimental estimates with non-experimental estimates using matching, mostly using 
data from voluntary employment and job training programs in the United States.  
Comparing experimental estimates to matching estimates using non-experimental data 
from the Job Training Partnership Act (JPTA) program, Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a) 
and Heckman et al. (1998b) provide evidence that propensity score matching methods 
perform well relative to experimental estimators, provided the following conditions 
are met: (1) the presence of a rich set of conditioning variables; (2) use of the same 
survey instruments for participants and non-participants; and (3) participants and non-
participants face the same economic conditions.  Using data from mandatory welfare-
to-work training programs, Michalopoulos et al. (2004) come to a similar conclusion: 
matching estimators do not provide reliable estimates if the data for the comparison 
group come from a different geographic and labor market.  Using National Support 
Work (NSW) data, Smith and Todd (2005a) highlight the fact that the performance of 
matching estimators depends critically on the quality of the data – specifically, that the 
conditions established by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a) and Heckman et al. (1998b) 
are met.  A more recent paper by Diaz and Handa (2006) provides evidence on the 
performance of matching estimators using non-US data.  Comparing experimental and 
non-experimental estimates of the impact of Progresa, a voluntary anti-poverty 
program in Mexico, they find that matching estimators using the latter perform well 
when the outcomes of interest are measured comparably across treatment and 
comparison groups and a rich set of covariates is available.   
In our data, a number of conditioning variables that potentially identify 
program participation and outcomes are available; the same survey questionnaire is 
used in grain bank and non-grain bank villages as a result of which the outcomes of 
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interest are measured identically; and participants and non-participants are in the same 
geographical area, namely within the same administrative unit within Rayagada 
district in the state of Orissa, and face the same economic and ecological conditions.  
Therefore, we argue that matching estimates can provide reliable program impact 
estimates in our study.  In the next section, we discuss the conditions that need to hold 
for us to obtain reliable matching estimates. 
 
Matching methods 
Following Heckman et al. (1997) and Smith and Todd (2001, 2005a), let Y1 denote the 
outcome of interest for children in grain bank participant households (the treatment 
group), Y0 the corresponding outcome for children in non-grain bank households (the 
comparison group), and D an indicator variable denoting grain bank participation.  Let 
X denote the set of conditioning variables.  The parameter of interest – the average 
impact of the treatment on the treated (ATT) – is given by 
1 0
1 0
1 0
( 1, )
( 1, ) ( 1, )
( 1, ) ( 0, )
E Y Y D X
E Y D X E Y D X
E Y D X E Y D X
− =
= = − =
= = − =
 
Under the assumption of conditional independence (CIA), i.e., treatment status is 
independent of the outcome conditional on a set of observed covariates, we can 
estimate the parameter of interest (Imbens 2004).66   Thus, the first condition required 
for matching estimates to be valid is 0( )Y D X⊥ (Condition 1).  In other words, 
selection into the program is based only on observables.  Put differently, this assumes 
that the analyst can observe the complete set of variables used by the agent in making 
the decision to participate. 
                                                 
66 Smith and Todd (2005a) show that only a weaker assumption, 0 0( , 1) ( , 0)E Y X D E Y X D= = = (i.e., 
the conditional mean assumption), is needed to estimate the parameter of interest.   
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The second condition required for matching to be valid is 0 Pr( 1 ) 1D X< = <  
(Condition 2).  In other words, for all X  there is a positive probability of either 
participating ( 1D = ) or not participating ( 0D = ).   
Condition 1 runs contrary to those invoked by many economic models of self-
selection, and its validity depends crucially on how well the observed data capture all 
the variables that affect program participation and outcomes of interest.  The validity 
of matching estimates thus depends crucially on a thorough understanding of the 
selection process and the availability of a rich set of conditioning variables that affect 
participation and outcomes.   
However, as the number of conditioning variables increases, we have to 
contend with what is commonly referred to as matching’s version of the “curse of 
dimensionality” (Heckman et al. 1997).  In other words, as the number of conditioning 
variables increases, it is possible to have many cells without matches.  In this context, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if we can match on X, we can also match 
on ( ) Pr( 1 )P X D X= = , the conditional participation probability or the so-called 
propensity score. 
If the propensity score is estimated non-parametrically, we again have to 
contend with the problem of dimensionality (Heckman et al. 1998a).  If the propensity 
score is estimated using parametric (such as logit or probit regression) or semi-
parametric methods, however, then the dimensionality of the matching problem is 
reduced.  We can then match on the univariate propensity score.  Given Conditions 1 
and 2, we can then estimate the parameter of interest by  
1 0( 1, ( )) ( 0, ( ))E Y D P X E Y D P X= − = . 
In experimental data, Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied by random assignment to 
treatment.  For non-experimental data, there may or may not exist a set of variables 
X such that these conditions are satisfied.  Thus, it is important to be aware that our 
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estimates depend crucially on our assumptions, in particular, that we have a set of 
variables X such that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied.   
Smith and Todd (2005a) also draw attention to the important fact that matching 
estimates are only valid if the support of X overlaps for the 1D = and 0D = groups.  
In other words, the treatment effect should be redefined as the program impact on 
participants whose propensity scores lie within the common support region (Smith and 
Todd 2005a). 
 
 Practical issues in propensity score matching 
Assuming that Conditions 1 and 2 hold, estimation via matching entails a number of 
practical steps.  First, how to choose the propensity score model and which variables 
to use?  Second, which matching estimator to use?  Third, what criteria to use in 
implementing the common support restriction?  Fourth, which balancing test to use for 
implementing the propensity score method?  We examine these issues, as well as 
related ones (such as specifying the kernel and bandwidth for certain estimators) 
below. 
 
Choosing the propensity score model  
As discussed in Smith (1997), there is little guidance on the functional form to use in 
specifying the propensity score model.  In principle, any discrete choice model can be 
used.  In practice, for the binary treatment case, the binomial logit or probit models are 
used.  These are usually preferred to the linear probability model, due to the latter’s 
shortcomings, such as predictions which are outside the [0,1] range.  However, given 
that the purpose of the propensity score model is classification into treatment and 
comparison groups rather than the estimation of structural coefficients, model choice 
is not a critical issue (Smith 1997).  And since both the logit and probit models yield 
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similar results, both are commonly used in the empirical literature for predicting 
propensity scores.67  In our study, we estimate the propensity score model using a 
binomial probit. 
 
Choosing which covariates to include in the propensity score model 
The CIA assumption depends critically on including a set of covariates which captures 
the variables involved in selection into program participation.  Todd and Smith (2005) 
show that matching estimates are biased unless the set of covariates X that satisfies 
Conditions 1 and 2 is included in the propensity score model specification.  Thus, in 
order to obtain reliable matching estimates, one needs to capture all observable 
variables that potentially affect program participation as well as the outcome of 
interest.   Thus, the issue of choosing which covariates to include in the propensity 
score model is important.   
While theory provides some guidance on which variables are likely to affect 
both participation and outcomes, there is little guidance on how to correctly specify X 
in practice.  Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998b) show that there are 
larger biases if a ‘coarse’ set of conditioning variables is used relative to a ‘rich’ one.   
Rubin and Thomas (1996, p.253) argue in favor of including more covariates in the 
propensity score model specification, unless there is consensus that a variable is 
“unrelated to the outcome or not a proper covariate”.  However, including more 
covariates in X can also be a problem, as it comes at the cost of reducing the region of 
common support (Smith and Todd 2005a).  In fact, a model that predicts perfectly 
results in observations with propensity scores that do not have any common support.   
                                                 
67 Model choice is more important in the case of multiple treatments, but this issue is not relevant for 
our study (see Lechner 2001 for examples of the propensity score model in the case of multiple 
treatments). 
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Bryson et al. (2002, as cited in Millimet and Tchernis 2006) also argue that the 
inclusion of “irrelevant” variables can increase the variance of the treatment effect 
indicator.68  However, Millimet and Tchernis (2006) use Monte Carlo simulations to 
compare the performance of matching estimators when relevant higher order terms are 
excluded and irrelevant higher order terms are included in the specification of the 
propensity score model. They find that overspecification of the propensity score model 
does not result in less efficient estimates, using different propensity score matching 
estimators including kernel estimators.  Underspecification, on the other hand, results 
in worse estimates.  Their results are corroborated in an application testing the impact 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the environment as well as that of 
currency unions on international trade. 
In general, the choice of variables usually depends on economic theory and 
previous empirical findings.  However, Heckman et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1998b) 
and Black and Smith (2004) also suggest some formal tests for choosing X.  Heckman 
et al. (1997) suggest choosing the set of variables that maximizes the within-sample 
prediction rates using the hit-or-miss method.69  Heckman et al. (1998b) suggest a test 
of statistical significance.  They start with a parsimonious specification, and then add 
new variables iteratively.  If the new variable is statistically significant at conventional 
levels, then it is included in the final X; otherwise it is discarded.  Black and Smith 
(2004) suggest the ‘leave-one-out cross validation method’ to specify the propensity 
score model.  In this method, they begin the model selection procedure by starting 
with a minimally specified model, and then successively add blocks of variables, 
                                                 
68 These may be higher order terms of variables that are relevant (but only at a lower order) or variables 
that are wholly irrelevant.  
69 In this method, an observation is classified as ‘1’ if the estimated propensity score is greater than the 
sample proportion of persons who receive the treatment, and 0 otherwise.  This maximizes the overall 
classification rate, assuming that the costs for misclassification are the same for both treatment and 
control groups (Heckman et al. 1997).  
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comparing the resulting mean squared errors.  Essentially, this method involves 
examining the fit of the model.  However, in the case that this method suggests 
leaving out covariates that theory and previous empirical evidence suggest should be 
included, they advise giving more consideration to the latter.   
In our study, we include a number of child, mother, household and 
community-level variables that we believe affect both participation and outcomes.  We 
use the ‘leave-one-out cross-validation method’.   First, we specify a model with 
household-level variables only.  We then add blocks of mother, child and village 
variables in successive specifications and compare their fit. 
 
Choosing the matching estimator 
There exist a variety of matching estimators, which differ mainly in how they assign 
weights to each comparison group observation.  Asymptotically, they produce similar 
results, as in a large sample, they only compare exact matches (Black and Smith 
2004).  However, in finite samples, the estimates produced by different matching 
methods differ because of differences in the weighting function they use, as also how 
they address the common support problem (ibid).    
Following Smith and Todd (2005a), for simplicity of notation, we rewrite 
( )Pr 1P D X= = .  A typical matching estimator, Mαˆ , takes the form  
( )
1
M 1 0
1
1 ˆˆ E 1,
P
i i i i
i I S
Y Y D P
n
α
∈ ∩
 = − = ∑ , 
where 
( ) ( )
0
0 0Eˆ 1, ,i i i j
j I
Y D P W i j Y
∈
= =∑  
and 1I denotes the set of program participants, 0I the set of non-participants, PS the 
region of common support, 1n the number of persons who are in the set 1 PI S∩ .  Every 
participant 1 Pi I S∈ ∩  is matched with a weighted average over the outcomes of non-
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participants, where the weights ( , )W i j depend on the distance between iP and jP .  For 
each 1i I∈ , ( )iC P is defined to be a neighborhood.  Individuals matched to i are those 
people in set iA  such that { }0 | ( )j ij I P C P∈ ∈ .   
Matching estimators differ from one another mainly in how they construct the 
weights ( ),W i j  and define the neighborhood ( )iC P .  Broadly speaking, they can be 
classified into two main types – traditional pair or one-to-one matching estimators, 
and more recently developed non-parametric matching estimators which match most 
(or all) the control observations using a pre-defined weighting function.   
In one-to-one (or one-to-many) matching, outcomes are compared to the most 
observably similar untreated unit.  Untreated units that do not have sufficiently close 
propensity scores are discarded.  This reduces bias (due to better matches) but 
increases variance (due to fewer matches) (Smith and Todd 2005a).  A common 
example of traditional matching estimators include nearest neighbor matching.  In this 
method, the untreated unit j is matched to that treated unit i such that distance 
between them is the smallest. The neighborhood is defined as  
( ) mini i j
j
C P P P= − , 0j I∈ . 
Nearest neighbor matching, which is traditionally performed without replacement, 
constructs ( , ) 1W i j =  such that all matched units receive equal weight.  Nearest 
neighbor matching can also be performed with replacement, such that untreated units 
can be matched to more than one treated unit, with accompanying trade-offs between 
reduced bias and increased variance compared to matching without replacement.    
However, nearest neighbor matching is clearly inefficient.  More efficient 
alternatives to nearest neighbor matching include a family of non-parametric, kernel-
weighted matching estimators such as kernel matching and local linear matching 
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(Heckman et al. 1997, 1998a).70  Relative to pair-wise matching, these estimators 
reduce the asymptotic mean squared error (Smith and Todd 2005a).  In a study of 
finite sample properties of various matching estimators using Monte Carlo 
simulations, Fröhlich (2004) finds that the nearest neighbor estimator performs poorly 
relative to non-parametric kernel-weighted matching estimators.  The latter match a 
treated unit with the weighted average score of all untreated units within a certain 
distance, referred to as the bandwidth.  The weight given to the untreated unit is 
inversely proportionate to the distance between i  and j and depends on the weighting 
function that is used.  Relative to pair-wise matching, the use of more untreated units 
reduces the variance of the matching estimates; however, it increases the bias.   
The most commonly used kernel-weighted estimators include the kernel 
estimator and the local linear estimator.  Heckman et al. (1997) find that the local 
linear matching estimator has a slight advantage over the kernel matching estimator 
because of some desirable statistical properties; namely, it converges at a faster rate at 
boundary points and adapts better to different data densities.  Fan (1992) also shows 
that local linear matching is better able to adapt to survey design.  Therefore, one of 
the estimators used in this study is based on local linear matching.  In local linear 
matching, the weighting function is given by 
( )
( ) ( )( )
0 0
0 0 0
2
2
2
(( ) ( )
( , )
ij ik k i ij j i ik k ik I k I
ij ij k i ik k ij I k I k I
G G P P G P P G P P
W i j
G G P P G P P
∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈
  − − − −   =
− − −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
’ 
where ( )( )/ij j i nG G P P a= − , and G denotes the kernel function and an the parameter 
determining the kernel bandwidth. 
However, Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a) find that the local linear matching 
estimator does not perform well in small samples when there are regions of sparse data 
                                                 
70 We do not discuss the difference-in-differences matching estimator proposed by Heckman et al. 
(1997) and Heckman et al. (1998b) since it requires before-after data which is not available to us.  This 
estimator is preferred since it can control for time-invariant unobservables. 
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density.  A common solution is to implement a trimming procedure in regions where 
the density of the propensity in the comparison population is small.  However, 
Fröhlich (2004) points out that there is little practical guidance on the optimal level of 
trimming.  From the distribution of propensity scores in our estimations, we find that 
while there is a large region of overlap in the propensity scores of treated and control 
observations (i.e., the region of common support), the distribution of the propensity 
scores for the two groups in our data is quite different, and so there are regions of 
sparse density.  In addition, our sample size is small.  For this reason, we also estimate 
the kernel matching model to examine if the estimates from the local linear matching 
analysis are comparable.   
The weighting function for the kernel estimator is given by  
0
(( ) / ) / (( ) / )j i n k i nk IG P P a G P P a∈− −∑ . 
Following Heckman et al. (1997) and Smith and Todd (2005a), the kernel-weighted 
matching estimate of program impact takes the form 
0
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The main difference between local linear matching and kernel matching is that the 
former includes a linear term in iP in addition to the intercept.  According to Smith and 
Todd (2005a, p. 317), this is helpful when “comparison group observations are 
distributed asymmetrically around the participant observations, as would be the case at 
a boundary point of P or at any point where there are gaps in the distribution of P”.  
Thus, the local linear regression estimator is a more generalized version of the kernel 
estimator.   
For both the local linear and kernel matching estimators, the neighborhood 
( )iC P  depends on the choice of the kernel function.  Two commonly used kernels in 
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the empirical matching literature include the Epanechnikov and Gaussian kernel.  
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), in a study of the 
effects of college quality, Black and Smith (2004) find that the Epanechnikov kernel 
estimator performs slightly better than the Gaussian kernel estimator, independent of 
the size of the bandwidth.  They find that the former converges faster than the 
Gaussian kernel and implicitly imposes the support condition through the choice of the 
bandwidth.  Given this, we use the Epanechnikov kernel here with variable bandwidth.  
The latter, relative to a fixed bandwidth, has the advantage of varying the bandwidth 
depending on the data density at that point, i.e., it uses a small bandwidth in regions 
where the probability mass is dense and a large bandwidth when the probability mass 
is sparse (Ham et al. 2005). 
A related choice that has important implications for the tradeoff between 
variance and bias, especially for matching methods based on kernel regression, is the 
size of the bandwidth or smoothing parameter.  While a smaller bandwidth results in 
smaller bias but larger variance, a larger bandwidth results in smaller variance but 
larger bias (Galdo, Smith, and Black 2006).  Specifically, in the case of matching, a 
smaller bandwidth leads to the use of few untreated units for each treated unit while a 
larger bandwidth leads to the use of untreated units that may be rather different from 
each treated unit.  The standard approach in the matching literature to guide bandwidth 
choice is minimizing some quadratic loss function, such as the mean squared error 
(MSE) or integrated mean squared error (IMSE), as a measure of fit.  However, as 
discussed by Galdo et al.(2006), the bandwidth that minimizes the MSE for the 
regression function of the untreated outcome is not that which minimizes the MSE for 
the object of interest, which in our case is the average treatment effect.  In addition, if 
the distribution of the conditioning variables is not balanced for the treated and 
comparison observations, then the optimal bandwidth in the region of low propensity 
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scores (where most comparison units lie) will be different from the optimal bandwidth 
in the region of high propensity scores (where most treated units lie).  This results in 
biased estimates.   
In our study, we examine the MSE for varying bandwidths between 0.01 and 
0.1 (in 0.01 increments).  We present estimates for bandwidth size 0.06, which, while 
not having the minimum MSE in the range examined, enables us to include a more 
inclusive X vector of balanced covariates.  We also present estimates for different 
bandwidth sizes (specifically, 0.05 and 0.07) to examine the sensitivity of our impact 
estimates to the choice of bandwidth. 
 
Choosing the criteria to restrict matching to the common support region 
In order to obtain credible matching estimates, only those comparison and treatment 
observations whose propensity scores fall within the region of common support should 
be included.  This is particularly important for kernel-weighted matching since it uses 
all comparison observations to estimate the counterfactual outcome, unlike nearest 
neighbor matching.  Implementing the common support restriction can improve the 
quality of the matches used to estimate the ATT, although it comes at the cost of 
reduced sample size as observations at the boundaries of the common support are 
excluded.   
In practice, one of two methods is commonly implemented for ensuring 
common support.  The first involves the comparison of the minimum and maximum 
propensity scores of treatment and comparison observations.  All observations in the 
treatment (or comparison) group whose propensity score is smaller than the minimum 
and larger than the maximum of the propensity scores in the opposite group are 
discarded.   
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The second method for implementing the common support is a trimming 
procedure, as suggested by Smith and Todd (2005a).  They determine the common 
support region by  
ˆˆ { : ( | 1) 0PS P f P D= = >  and ˆ ( | 0) 0}f P D = > , 
where ˆ ( | )f P D d= , {0,1}d∈  are non-parametric density estimators given by  
ˆ ( | ) (( ) / )
d
k nk I
f P D d G P P a
∈
= = −∑ . 
They then define a trimming level q and require that densities are strictly positive and 
exceed zero by q.   They exclude observations with P for which the density is zero, 
and then an additional q percent of remaining P points for which the estimated density 
is low (although positive).  Thus, the set of eligible matches is given by 
1
ˆˆ ˆ{ : ( | 1)q P qS P I S f P D c= ∈ ∩ = >  and ˆ ( | 0) }qf P D c= > . 
In our study, we use the min-max method to implement the common support region as 
there are no guidelines on how to arrive at the optimal trimming level given the data 
(Fröhlich 2004).   
 
Choosing a balancing test for the set of covariates included in the propensity score 
model 
If the CIA assumption is valid, after we condition on P, additional conditioning on any 
of the X’s should not provide any new information about the treatment decision.  This 
implies that all the Xs should be “balanced” across the treatment and matched 
comparison groups.  Thus, in order to assess the quality of the matching estimates, we 
need to conduct a ‘balancing test’ of the characteristics of the matched samples.  There 
are a few formal tests that are commonly implemented in the literature, though there is 
no consensus on which one is definitive. 
 Proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), one balancing test is the 
examination of standardized differences (see, e.g., Sianesi 2004).  In words, the 
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standardized difference for a variable kX is the difference in means between the 
treatment and matched comparison group samples, as a percentage of the square root 
of the average of the sample variance in both groups.  Intuitively, this provides the size 
of the difference in means of a conditioning variable between the treatment and 
matched comparison group, scaled down by the average of the variances.71  In this 
method, for each of the conditioning variables, the standardized bias before matching 
is 
1 0
1 0
100 ,
var ( ) var ( )
2
before
X X
SB
X X
−
=
+
 
where
 
0X
 
, 0var ( )X , 1X , and )(var1 X  denote the means and variances in the 
treatment and comparison groups before matching, respectively.  The standardized 
bias after matching is
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where 0MX , 0var ( )M X , MX1 , and 1var ( )M X
 
denote the means and variances in the 
treatment and comparison groups after matching, respectively.  If the covariates are 
balanced, we expect a reduction in the standardized bias (although there is no formal 
criteria for how much reduction should occur).   
 A second balancing test proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) is to 
examine if there are significant differences in covariate means between the treatment 
and matched comparison groups, using two-sample t-tests (see, e.g., Ham et al. 2005).  
While we expect differences to exist before matching, there should be no significant 
differences after matching as the covariates should be balanced in both groups. 
                                                 
71 The shortcoming of this method is that there are no formal criteria for which the standardized bias is 
too large to pass the balancing test (Smith and Todd 2005b).  Smith and Todd (2005b) also point out 
that the standardized bias can be manipulated by the researcher by adding additional observations to the 
comparison group if these additional observations increase the second variance term in the 
denominator. 
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 A third test is a Hotelling T-squared test of the joint null of equal means of all 
the X’s between the treatment and the matched or reweighted comparison group (see, 
e.g., Smith and Todd 2005b). 
 A fourth test is comparing the pseudo-R-squared of the original model used to 
create propensity scores with a re-estimated model using only the matched 
observations (Sianesi 2004).  Since the pseudo-R-squared indicates how well the X’s 
predict the probability of participation, the second pseudo-R-squared value should be 
low since we do not expect systematic differences in the distribution of covariates 
between the treatment and matched comparison groups. 
 A fifth test proposed by Dehejia and Wahba’s (1999, 2002) is balancing the 
X’s within certain strata.  They first divide the treatment and comparison observations 
into an arbitrary number of strata based on their propensity scores, such that within 
each stratum, there is no statistically difference in the mean propensity scores between 
the groups.  Then, within each stratum, for each covariate, they use a series of t-tests 
to examine if there is any significant difference in the means between the two groups.  
If they find any significant difference, they add higher order and interaction terms in 
the specification of the propensity score until no differences appear. 
 A sixth test is based on a regression framework.  For example, Smith and Todd 
(2005b) first estimate the following regression: 
2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
kX P X P X P X P X
D DP X DP X DP X DP X
β β β β β
β β β β β η
= + + + +
+ + + + + +
 
The joint null is that that the coefficient on all the terms with the treatment dummy D 
equals zero.  In other words, after conditioning on the X’s, D should provide no 
information on Xk . 
 In our study, we examine two-sample t-tests for differences between means of 
the treatment and matched comparison observations.  We also compare the 
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standardized bias before and after matching, and examine the pseudo-R-squared of the 
propensity score model re-estimated after matching using reweighted observations on 
the common support only.  
 
Sensitivity analysis: Unobserved heterogeneity 
Given that the validity of the matching estimates hinges on whether the CIA 
assumption holds, an analysis of the sensitivity of our results to departures from this 
identifying assumption is crucial.  In this context, a bounding approach suggested by 
Rosenbaum (2002) is increasingly used in matching applications.  While the bounding 
approach cannot test the CIA assumption per se, it examines the extent to which the 
statistical significance the results hinges on this untestable assumption.  Suppose the 
probability of participation Pi is given by  
P( 1| ) ( ),i i i iD X F X Uβ γ= = +  
where iX are the observed characteristics for individual i , iU  are unobserved 
characteristics, and β and γ  are the impacts of iX  and iU  on the participation 
decision.  If there are no unobservable characteristics that affect participation, i.e., 
0,γ = then two individuals with the same set of observable characteristics X have the 
same probability of participation.  However, if 0,γ ≠ i.e., there are unobservable 
characteristics that affect participation, then two individuals with the same X have 
differing probabilities of participation.  Assuming, for simplicity, that F is the logistic 
distribution, the odds that two individuals i and j participate are given by 
P / (1 P )i i− and P / (1 P )j j− respectively. Then, the odds ratio can be written as   
P / (1 P ) exp( )
P (1 P ) / P (1 P ) .
P / (1 P ) exp( )
i i i i
i j j i
j j j j
X U
X U
β γ
β γ
− +
= − − =
− +
 
If i and j form a matched pair, then the X vector cancels out and the odds ratio can be 
simply written as exp[ ( )]i jU Uγ − .  If there are no differences in unobservables, i.e. 
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,i jU U=  or the unobservable factors do not affect the probability of participating, i.e. 
0,γ = the odds ratio equals 1, implying that the matching estimates do not suffer from 
unobserved selection bias.  However, if this is not the case, then the matching 
estimates are said to suffer from a “hidden bias”.  In this context, Rosenbaum (2002) 
shows that the following bounds can be placed on the odds ratio: 
P / (1 P )1
.
P / (1 P )
i i
j j
e
e
γ
γ
−
≤ ≤
−
 
As eγ increases, the bounds move apart reflecting uncertainty due to the presence of 
unobserved selection bias.  Thus, eγ is a measure of the extent to which the analysis 
suffers from this bias. 
 In our study, we follow Rosenbaum’s approach to test the sensitivity of the 
significance of our results, if any, to violations of the CIA assumption. 
 
3.6 Data and results 
In this section, we first discuss the data.  We then present mean haz- and whz-scores 
and proportions of stunting and wasting outcomes in the agricultural lean season for 
children in participant households in all grain bank villages (GBVs), children in 
participant households in long-lived grain bank villages (long-lived GBVs), and 
children in non-grain bank villages (NGBVs).  We then implement a matching-based 
analysis of the impact on children’s haz-scores and whz-scores in the agricultural lean 
season, as well as the change in height between the post-harvest and lean seasons, 
using local linear regression and kernel estimators. 
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3.6.1 Analysis sample 
Analysis of levels of haz-scores and whz-scores 
The data for the analysis of the levels of haz-scores and whz-scores come from the 
second wave of a small-scale household and grain bank survey implemented in 
Kashipur block in rural Rayagada, Orissa, corresponding with the agricultural lean 
season when food shortages are at their peak.72  Of the 499 households sampled in the 
second wave of data collection, 375 had 1 or more children below 6 years of age.  
They include 263 children in 167 households in participant households in GBVs and 
308 children in 208 non-participating households.  Of the latter, 23 children are from 
15 households in GBVs who were not grain bank members.  More than half of these 
children were in households that reported being excluded as they were either not 
creditworthy or because of caste-related discrimination, while the rest of the children 
were in households that reported not joining grain banks as they did not have food 
shortages.73  We drop these observations, restricting our analysis only to children in 
participating households in GBVs and children in households in NGBVs.74  Thus, the 
comparison group is confined to the 285 children in households in NGBVs only, 
bringing the total sample under consideration to 548 children. 
Of these, height data is missing in 35 cases, and weight (or both height and 
weight) in 42 cases.  The missing anthropometric data are split fairly evenly between 
the comparison and treatment groups, with height data missing for 16 children in 
                                                 
72 Details of the survey and sampling methodology are provided in a separate appendix. 
73 The first set of households (numbering 13) was distributed across 6 villages, with the majority from 
Dhobasil.  The second set of households was distributed fairly evenly across 4 villages. 
74 The share of households that do not participate in villages with operational grain banks is small (19 
out of 250 households, or 7.6 percent), and comprises two main categories: the majority that state that 
they did not or could not participate because they were not creditworthy or were objects of caste 
discrimination, and close to a third that reported not having food shortages.  These households represent 
the two tails of the distribution of households in terms of food-security – while the former is probably 
more food-insecure than the households that do participate, the latter are potentially better-off than 
those that selected into the program.  Therefore, we exclude the small number of observations of non-
participants in grain bank villages.  We argue that our estimates are valid for the vast majority of 
households that do participate and are representative of almost the entire distribution excluding the tails. 
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participant households and 19 children in NGBVs and weight data missing for 21 
children in participating households and 21 children in NGBVs.  Thus, the usable 
sample for the calculation of the standardized scores is 513 and 506 for haz-scores and 
whz-scores respectively.  Of these, 3 observations, whose absolute value of the haz-
scores was above 6, are discarded, bringing the effective sample for the analysis of 
haz-scores to 510.75 
Birthdates from anganwadi records and immunization cards are available in 
only about 30 percent of cases.  However, even when available, the reliability of this 
data is questionable.  In all other cases, it is based on the report by the mother of the 
child.76  For children below 2 years, recumbent length instead of height was measured.   
For the calculation of whz-scores, 16 observations, whose height fell below 77 
cm, the permissible floor for the calculation of these scores, are discarded. 77 While 
wlz-scores could be calculated for these observations, their height, not recumbent 
length, had been measured, as their age was reported to be above 24 months. This 
reduces the sample size for the calculation of whz-scores (and wlz-scores) to 490 
observations.  Two observations whose recumbent length was measured as slightly 
below 45 cm are also dropped, as is 1 observation whose measured height was above 
the permissible ceiling.  Finally, 2 observations for whom the absolute value of the 
standardized score was above 6 are dropped, bringing the effective sample of children 
with whz-scores to 485. 
 
                                                 
75 The Center for Disease Control (CDC)’s 2000 reference growth charts were used for deriving height-
for-age z-scores.  For children 2 years or less, length-for-age z-scores were estimated to take into 
account the fact that recumbent length, not height, was measured. 
76 A discussion of the quality of the age data is included in the appendix on survey notes. 
77 The CDC’s 2000 reference growth charts were used for deriving weight-for-height z-scores.  For 
children above years, weight-for-height z-scores were estimated, while for children 2 years or less, 
weight-for-length z-scores were estimated to take into account the fact that recumbent length, not 
height, was measured.  The permissible range for height was 77 to 121.5 cm.  The permissible range for 
length was 45 to 103.5 cm. 
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Analysis of change in height 
For the analysis of the change in height, data for children in households that were 
sampled in both waves of the household survey are used.  The total number of such 
children is 405.  Of these, 19 observations corresponding to children in non-participant 
households in GBVs are dropped.  In addition, height data is missing in 53 
observations in at least one of the waves (36 observations are missing from the first 
wave and 21 from the second wave, including 4 from both).  One additional 
observation is dropped since the change is height is found to be negative (-0.01 cm).  
As a result, the usable sample for the analysis of change in height is 332 children.  
Note that the effective sample sizes for the empirical estimation are smaller than the 
usable sample sizes discussed above, as the matching estimation is restricted to 
observations whose propensity score belongs to the intersection of the supports of the 
propensity scores of treatment and comparison units.  We discuss this feature, and 
other details of the empirical framework, in the next section.  The effective sample 
sizes are included at the bottom of the tables which present the average treatment 
effect on the treated as estimated by matching. 
 
3.6.2 Naïve results 
In this subsection, we present our estimates of the impact of grain bank participation 
on the short- and long-term health outcomes of children without the use of matching.  
The findings are presented largely to serve as a comparison to our main matching-
based estimates. 
Table 3.6 presents the mean haz-score and proportion of stunting.  The 
majority of children in participant households as well as households in NGBVs are 
found to be at least two standard deviations below the healthy reference for haz-
scores, indicating the high incidence of stunting in the population.  The mean haz- 
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score and share of stunted children is found to be very similar across children in 
participant households in all GBVs (including those in long-lived GBVs only) and 
children in NGBVs.  Further, as indicated by the 95 percent confidence intervals, the 
point estimates are not statistically significantly different from each other.  These 
results in themselves are not too surprising as grain banks are not designed to have a 
long-term impact on health and nutrition outcomes.   
 
Table 3.6: Mean haz-scores and share of stunted children in agricultural lean 
season 
Children in Mean Share 
participant households in all 
GBVs 
 -2.020 0.586 
 [-2.217, -1.823] [0.521, 0.651] 
participant households in long-
lived GBVs 
 -2.004 0.587 
 [-2.219, -1.788] [0.514, 0.632] 
households in NGBVs 
 -2.067 0.564 
 [-2.258, -1.875] [0.496, 0.632] 
Notes: Sampling weights used to adjust means and proportions.  95 percent confidence intervals 
in brackets.  
 
Table 3.7 presents the mean whz-score and share of wasting of children across 
participating households and households in NGBVs.   
 
Table 3.7: Mean whz-scores and share of wasted children in agricultural lean 
season 
Children in Mean Share 
participant households in all 
GBVs 
 -1.716 0.370 
 [-1.896, -1.536] [0.305, 0.436] 
participant households in long-
lived GBVs 
 -1.739 0.366 
 [-1.937, -1.542] [0.293, 0.440] 
households in NGBVs 
 -1.543 0.347 
 [-1.702, -1.384] [0.282, 0.413] 
Notes: Means and proportions are corrected for sampling weights.  95 percent confidence 
intervals in brackets.  
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Contrary to expectation, we find that the mean whz-score is lower and the share of 
wasted children higher in participant households in GBVs than in households in 
NGBVs during the agricultural lean season, though this difference is not statistically 
significant.  We obtain the same result when we compare children in participant 
households in long-lived GBVs with children in NGBVs.  Thus, even when we 
examine an indicator of short-term health, we find no difference between children in 
participant and non-participant households. 
Table 3.8 presents the average change in height of young children below 6 
years.  While children in participant households have a slightly higher rate of growth 
than children in NGBVs, we find no statistically discernible difference between them.  
We now turn to a matching-based analysis to see if our results change when we match 
on various individual, household and community level characteristics. 
 
Table 3.8: Average change in height between post-harvest and lean seasons  
Children in  Mean  
participant households in all GBVs 
 0.052  
 [0.041, 0.062]  
participant households in long-lived 
GBVs 
 0.050  
 [0.037, 0.062]  
households in NGBVs 
 0.044  
 [0.036, 0.052]  
Notes: Means and proportions are corrected for sampling weights.  95 percent confidence 
intervals in brackets.  
 
3.6.3. Matching-based results 
In this section, we examine the impact of grain bank participation on children’s health 
outcomes using propensity score matching methods.  Below, we discuss the steps 
involved. 
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Calculating propensity scores  
Using a binomial probit regression model, we first estimate propensity scores to match 
children in participant households in grain bank villages to children in households in 
non-grain bank villages.  We estimate the model for two different samples: one where 
the treatment group comprises of children in participant households in grain bank 
villages (Sample 1) and the other where the treatment group comprises of children in 
participant households in long-lived grain bank villages (Sample 2).  The comparison 
group in both samples is the same for both samples, namely children in households in 
non-grain bank villages.  We estimate the models separately for each outcome of 
interest as Sample 1 and 2 are slightly different in the case of whz-scores, haz-scores 
and change in height (depending on the availability of weight and height data).   
In specifying the propensity score model, we include a number of covariates 
which predict both the decision to participate as well as the outcome.  In choosing the 
set of covariates, we have to balance the benefit of improving the predictive ability of 
the model with the cost of reducing the region of common support.  In specification 1, 
we include a number of variables that capture different aspects of household wealth 
which we consider to be important determinants of the outcome variable.  In 
specification 2, we also include variables that capture relevant characteristics of the 
child’s mother.  In specification 3, we also include variables capturing relevant child 
characteristics.  In specification 4, we also include village-level variables which we 
consider to have an important effect on grain bank survival (thereby determining 
participation). 
 
Discussion of control variables 
The control variables chosen to estimate the propensity scores include various 
community, household and individual-level characteristics.  We do not include 
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village-level dummies in the estimation as the treatment and comparison observations 
belong to distinct villages.  Including village dummies would result in no matches 
being made, as no control-treatment matches are possible within the same village.  The 
control variables used in the different specifications can be roughly grouped as 
follows:  
1. household-level characteristics (e.g., whether or not the household is tribal, 
household size, number of children, number of adult females; size of 
landholdings by quality of the land, dwelling floor quality, number of 
agricultural tools and livestock owned, amount of gold owned;  
2. mother characteristics (e.g., height, age, years of education);  
3. child characteristics (e.g., age, sex); and  
4. village-level characteristics (e.g., distance from the market, distance from 
the closest Agragamee field office, an indicator for the frequency of 
village-level meetings). 
Quadratic terms of some of the continuous variables above are also included to 
improve the fit of the model. 
Tables 3.9-3.10, 3.11-3.12, and 3.13-3.14 present the model of participation 
used to create propensity scores for the matching algorithm for Sample 1 and Sample 
2 respectively, for each of the outcomes, namely, haz-score, whz-score and change in 
height.  In each table, column (1) presents the results for the estimation for 
specification 1, i.e., household variables only.  Column (2) presents the results for the 
estimation for specification 2, i.e., household and mother variables.  Column (3) 
presents the results for the estimation for specification 3, i.e., household mother, and 
child variables.  Column (4) presents the results for the estimation for specification 4, 
i.e., household, mother, child and community variables.  Across the different samples 
and outcomes under consideration, we find that specification 4 has the highest 
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likelihood ratio index (referred to as McFadden’s pseudo-R-squared in our tables).  
Therefore, we estimate the remaining results using specification 4.  Selected statistics 
of fit are presented at the bottom of the tables. 
 
Distribution of predicted propensity scores 
Figures 3.1-3.3 depict the distribution of the predicted propensity scores for children 
from participant households as well as children from households in non-grain bank 
villages for Sample 1 for each of the outcomes, namely, haz-score, whz-score and 
growth, respectively.  Figures 3.4-3.6 depict the distribution of the predicted 
propensity scores for children from participant households as well as children from 
households in non-grain bank villages for Sample 2 for each of the outcomes 
mentioned above.  We see that children in non-grain bank villages have a higher 
probability mass at lower levels of the propensity score compared to children in 
participant households for both Samples 1 and 2.  This indicates that based on the set 
of observable characteristics used to create the propensity scores, children in the 
treatment group differ from children in the comparison group.  Thus, there is a 
potential gain from using matching estimators compared to regression.   
 
Common support constraint and balancing tests 
After the propensity scores are generated, the common support restriction is 
implemented, so that the test of the balancing property is performed only on 
observations whose propensity score belongs to the intersection of the supports of the 
propensity score of treatment and comparison units.  To do this, treatment 
observations whose propensity score is higher that the maximum or less than the 
minimum propensity score of comparison observations are dropped.   
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Table 3.9: Determinants of grain bank participation estimated for creating propensity 
scores to examine impact on haz scores (Sample 1) 
Pseudo-MLE probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Grain bank participant (1 = yes) 
 Estimated coefficients  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Specification 
A 
Specification 
B 
Specification 
C  
Specification 
D 
Household characteristics     
Social group (1=tribal) 0.317 0.416 0.395 0.0692 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.31) (0.27) 
Household size 0.622** 0.576 0.557 0.353 
 (0.32) (0.36) (0.36) (0.34) 
Square of household size -0.0718*** -0.0719*** -0.0709*** -0.0515* 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Number of children (14 years or less) 0.128 0.203 0.209 0.183 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 0.0294 0.145 0.160 0.295 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.25) 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.309** 0.438*** 0.399** 0.648*** 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) 
Low-lying fertile land, squared -0.0776*** -0.0964*** -0.0880*** -0.132*** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.043) 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – 
cubic term -0.00255*** -0.00235** -0.00220** -0.00283*** 
 (0.00093) (0.00093) (0.00091) (0.00089) 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) -0.0167 -0.0409 -0.0300 0.134 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared -0.0314 -0.0243 -0.0255 -0.0557* 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) 
Gold holdings (gm) 0.0328 0.0410* 0.0410* 0.0602*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.171 0.0890 0.151 -0.175 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.31) (0.39) 
Number of ploughs owned 0.0536 0.116 0.0894 0.0215 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) 
Number of crowbars owned -0.0836 -0.0280 -0.0510 0.0682 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Number of spades owned 0.0861 0.0788 0.0892 0.121 
 (0.093) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Number of sickles owned 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.157** 
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.066) (0.072) 
Number of cows owned -0.148*** -0.180*** -0.176*** -0.264*** 
 (0.045) (0.058) (0.059) (0.061) 
Number of bullocks owned 0.195** 0.128 0.137 0.200 
 (0.099) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
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Table 3.9 (Continued)     
Number of goats owned -0.0343 -0.0396 -0.0427 -0.0370 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Number of buffaloes owned -0.366*** -0.517*** -0.506*** -0.484*** 
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Mother's characteristics     
Mother's education (years)  0.00374 0.00599 0.0868 
  (0.080) (0.079) (0.073) 
Mother's height (cm)  0.00410 0.00562 0.00478 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Mother's age (years)  -0.273*** -0.266*** -0.167* 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Square of mother's age  0.00429*** 0.00421*** 0.00273* 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Child characteristics     
Child’s age (months)   0.00137 0.0104 
   (0.013) (0.014) 
Child’s age, squared   -0.0000198 -0.000145 
   (0.00018) (0.00020) 
Child’s sex (1 = male)   0.281** 0.326** 
   (0.14) (0.15) 
Community characteristics     
Distance from market (km)    0.0501*** 
    (0.014) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km)    0.00624 
    (0.048) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km), squared    -0.00133 
    (0.0024) 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ 
as needed)    1.794*** 
    (0.20) 
Constant -2.866*** 0.318 -0.145 -2.799 
 (0.84) (2.29) (2.31) (2.49) 
N 510 430 430 430 
Wald χ2 86.06 76.82 81.17 194.97 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1441 0.1731 0.1803 0.3809 
Notes: Estimates are corrected for sampling weights.  Standard errors reported in parentheses.  
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 3.10: Determinants of grain bank participation estimated for creating propensity 
scores to examine impact on haz scores (Sample 2) 
Pseudo-MLE probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Grain bank participant (1 = yes) 
 Estimated coefficients 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Specification 
A 
Specification 
B 
Specification 
C  
Specification 
D 
Household characteristics     
Social group (1=tribal) 0.125 0.176 0.156 -0.230 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.33) (0.29) 
Household size 0.762** 0.836** 0.808* 0.498 
 (0.36) (0.42) (0.43) (0.40) 
Square of household size -0.0794*** -0.0920*** -0.0898*** -0.0584* 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
Number of children (14 years or less) 0.0363 0.121 0.128 0.0581 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) -0.0750 0.0331 0.0467 0.0761 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.26) 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.402*** 0.567*** 0.522*** 0.789*** 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) 
Low-lying fertile land, squared -0.0866*** -0.112*** -0.103*** -0.162*** 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.038) (0.048) 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – 
cubic term -0.00373** -0.00319*** -0.00295*** -0.00400*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.00099) 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) -0.0409 -0.115 -0.114 0.149 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared -0.0417 -0.0305 -0.0293 -0.0748* 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.039) 
Gold holdings (gm) 0.0421** 0.0479** 0.0486** 0.0670*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.161 0.0945 0.154 -0.0791 
 (0.27) (0.33) (0.33) (0.43) 
Number of ploughs owned -0.0744 0.0382 -0.00223 0.329** 
 (0.22) (0.26) (0.26) (0.16) 
Number of crowbars owned -0.316** -0.304* -0.330* -0.110 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Number of spades owned 0.154 0.212* 0.223* 0.253* 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Number of sickles owned 0.302*** 0.307*** 0.306*** 0.178** 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.074) (0.080) 
Number of cows owned -0.186*** -0.236*** -0.238*** -0.287*** 
 (0.050) (0.067) (0.069) (0.075) 
Number of bullocks owned 0.325*** 0.253* 0.271*  
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)  
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Table 3.10 (Continued)     
Number of goats owned -0.0342 -0.0500* -0.0526* -0.0424 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Number of buffaloes owned -0.415*** -0.569*** -0.555** -0.640*** 
 (0.16) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Mother's characteristics     
Mother's education (years)  -0.0119 -0.00931 0.100 
  (0.084) (0.083) (0.078) 
Mother's height (cm)  -0.00132 0.000470 0.00628 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
Mother's age (years)  -0.342*** -0.343*** -0.212* 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Square of mother's age  0.00536*** 0.00541*** 0.00343* 
  (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Child characteristics     
Child’s age (months)   0.00371 0.0165 
   (0.014) (0.015) 
Child’s age, squared   -0.0000274 -0.000222 
   (0.00019) (0.00021) 
Child’s sex (1 = male)   0.301* 0.342** 
   (0.15) (0.16) 
Community characteristics     
Distance from market (km)    0.0272* 
    (0.015) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km)    0.494** 
    (0.20) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km), squared    -0.0543*** 
    (0.020) 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ 
as needed)    1.453*** 
    (0.21) 
Constant -2.979*** 1.756 1.330 -2.700 
 (0.93) (2.55) (2.58) (2.90) 
N 454 382 382 382 
Wald χ2 94.67 99.3 103.1 214.27 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1894 0.2424 0.2504 0.4131 
Notes: Estimates are corrected for sampling weights.  Standard errors reported in parentheses. * 
Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.   
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Table 3.11: Determinants of grain bank participation estimated for creating propensity 
scores to examine impact on whz scores (Sample 1) 
Pseudo-MLE probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Grain bank participant (1 = yes) 
 Estimated coefficients 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Specification 
A 
Specification 
B 
Specification 
C  
Specification 
D 
Household characteristics     
Social group (1=tribal) 0.312 0.429 0.408 0.0957 
 (0.28) (0.31) (0.31) (0.27) 
Household size 0.472 0.496 0.474 0.321 
 (0.33) (0.37) (0.37) (0.35) 
Square of household size -0.0656*** -0.0709** -0.0699** -0.0531* 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Number of children (14 years or less) 0.218 0.285* 0.298* 0.260 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 0.115 0.232 0.255 0.401 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.25) 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.298** 0.410*** 0.370** 0.611*** 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) 
Low-lying fertile land, squared -0.0687*** -0.0859*** -0.0770** -0.118*** 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.041) 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – 
cubic term -0.00338** -0.00300** -0.00288** -0.00317*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) -0.0710 -0.105 -0.0987 0.0774 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared -0.0188 -0.0104 -0.0103 -0.0457* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Gold holdings (gm) 0.0103 0.0133 0.0115 0.0373 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.234 0.157 0.233 -0.129 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.31) (0.39) 
Number of ploughs owned 0.0404 0.0911 0.0736 -0.0360 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) 
Number of crowbars owned -0.0719 -0.0348 -0.0532  
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.15)  
Number of spades owned 0.0770 0.0634 0.0718 0.114 
 (0.093) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) 
Number of sickles owned 0.260*** 0.252*** 0.248*** 0.151** 
 (0.065) (0.068) (0.069) (0.075) 
Number of cows owned -0.134*** -0.165*** -0.166*** -0.250*** 
 (0.046) (0.060) (0.062) (0.063) 
Number of bullocks owned 0.238** 0.171 0.176 0.248* 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
  170
Table 3.11 (Continued)     
Number of goats owned -0.0349 -0.0397 -0.0416 -0.0382 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Number of buffaloes owned -0.372*** -0.449*** -0.438*** -0.410** 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Mother's characteristics     
Mother's education (years)  -0.00908 -0.00603 0.0683 
  (0.079) (0.079) (0.073) 
Mother's height (cm)  0.00526 0.00683 0.00646 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Mother's age (years)  -0.289*** -0.294*** -0.201* 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Square of mother's age  0.00454*** 0.00463*** 0.00323** 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Child characteristics     
Child’s age (months)   0.00327 0.00910 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Child’s age, squared   -0.0000242 -0.000105 
   (0.00019) (0.00020) 
Child’s sex (1 = male)   0.318** 0.348** 
   (0.14) (0.15) 
Community characteristics     
Distance from market (km)    0.0474*** 
    (0.014) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km)    -0.00791 
    (0.048) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km), squared    -0.000620 
    (0.0024) 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ 
as needed)    1.741*** 
    (0.20) 
Constant -2.592*** 0.570 0.205 -2.409 
 (0.86) (2.40) (2.40) (2.58) 
N 485 409 409 409 
Wald χ2 77.43 71.29 75.2 182.44 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1414 0.1637 0.1733 0.3656 
Notes: Dependant variable equals 1 if child is from a participant household in grain bank village and 0 
if child is from a household in a non-grain bank village.  Estimates are corrected for sampling weights.  
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 
percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 3.12: Determinants of grain bank participation estimated for creating propensity 
scores to examine impact on whz scores (Sample 2) 
Pseudo-MLE probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Grain bank participant (1 = yes) 
 Estimated coefficients 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Specification 
A 
Specification 
B 
Specification 
C  
Specification 
D 
Household characteristics     
Social group (1=tribal) 0.134 0.207 0.187 -0.0459 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.33) (0.27) 
Household size 0.613* 0.767* 0.728* 0.509 
 (0.37) (0.43) (0.44) (0.42) 
Square of household size -0.0761*** -0.0954*** -0.0930*** -0.0605* 
 (0.028) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Number of children (14 years or less) 0.142 0.237 0.260 0.0952 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 0.0233 0.153 0.182 0.142 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.376** 0.519*** 0.472*** 0.764*** 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) 
Low-lying fertile land, squared -0.0679** -0.0882*** -0.0785** -0.132*** 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.033) (0.049) 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – 
cubic term -0.00860*** -0.00740*** -0.00695*** -0.00900** 
 (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0038) 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) -0.109 -0.207 -0.218 0.0588 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared -0.0241 -0.00900 -0.00509 -0.0568 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.038) 
Gold holdings (gm) 0.0183 0.0170 0.0145 0.0467 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.293 0.240 0.314 -0.00876 
 (0.28) (0.34) (0.33) (0.43) 
Number of ploughs owned -0.0748 -0.00124 -0.0316  
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.27)  
Number of crowbars owned -0.303* -0.325* -0.351* -0.0958 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Number of spades owned 0.125 0.167 0.178 0.253* 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Number of sickles owned 0.322*** 0.319*** 0.313*** 0.163** 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Number of cows owned -0.170*** -0.217*** -0.224*** -0.222*** 
 (0.051) (0.072) (0.075) (0.074) 
Number of bullocks owned 0.380*** 0.325** 0.343**  
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.15)  
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Table 3.12 (Continued)     
Number of goats owned -0.0387 -0.0529* -0.0543* -0.0375 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Number of buffaloes owned -0.380*** -0.481** -0.463** -0.559*** 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) 
Mother's characteristics     
Mother's education (years)  -0.0281 -0.0251 0.0943 
  (0.084) (0.082) (0.077) 
Mother's height (cm)  -0.000255 0.00162 0.0120 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Mother's age (years)  -0.378*** -0.399*** -0.254** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Square of mother's age  0.00589*** 0.00623*** 0.00394** 
  (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Child characteristics     
Child’s age (months)   0.00759 0.0190 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
Child’s age, squared   -0.0000479 -0.000232 
   (0.00021) (0.00022) 
Child’s sex (1 = male)   0.345** 0.350** 
   (0.16) (0.16) 
Community characteristics     
Distance from market (km)    0.0152 
    (0.015) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km)    0.533*** 
    (0.19) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km), squared    -0.0612*** 
    (0.020) 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ 
as needed)    1.376*** 
    (0.21) 
Constant -2.699*** 2.314 2.065 -2.722 
 (0.97) (2.74) (2.77) (3.04) 
N 430 363 363 363 
Wald χ2 85.95 91.95 94.01 190.73 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1916 0.2412 0.2533 0.3926 
Notes: Dependant variable equals 1 if child is from a participant household in grain bank village and 0 
if child is from a household in a non-grain bank village.  Estimates are corrected for sampling weights.  
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 
percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 3.13: Determinants of grain bank participation estimated for creating propensity 
scores to examine impact on growth (Sample 1) 
Pseudo-MLE probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Grain bank participant (1 = yes) 
 Estimated coefficients 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Specification 
A 
Specification 
B 
Specification 
C  
Specification 
D 
Household characteristics     
Social group (1=tribal) 0.438 0.529 0.524 0.0284 
 (0.36) (0.50) (0.48) (0.47) 
Household size 0.258 0.461 0.330 0.295 
 (0.40) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) 
Square of household size -0.0548* -0.0845** -0.0743** -0.0824** 
 (0.030) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) 
Number of children (14 years or less) 0.322* 0.529** 0.550** 0.628** 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 0.0521 0.423 0.437 0.812** 
 (0.26) (0.30) (0.30) (0.33) 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.173 0.485** 0.401* 0.905*** 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) 
Low-lying fertile land, squared -0.0478 -0.0892** -0.0705* -0.138** 
 (0.031) (0.036) (0.037) (0.054) 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) 0.208* 0.168 0.189 0.253* 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned, squared -0.0448** -0.0449** -0.0444** -0.0561*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) -0.0649 0.0137 0.0394 0.416 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.20) (0.28) 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared -0.0467 -0.0606 -0.0564 -0.125* 
 (0.041) (0.050) (0.043) (0.064) 
Gold holdings (gm) 0.0165 0.0295 0.0239 0.0269 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.968*** 1.449*** 1.580*** 1.546** 
 (0.32) (0.46) (0.48) (0.64) 
Number of ploughs owned 0.486*** 0.374** 0.368**  
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.18)  
Number of crowbars owned 0.0759 0.220 0.148 0.294 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) 
Number of spades owned -0.0289 -0.207 -0.179 -0.203 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) 
Number of sickles owned 0.370*** 0.378*** 0.398*** 0.350*** 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.087) (0.098) 
Number of cows owned -0.0927 -0.162* -0.170** -0.228** 
 (0.064) (0.083) (0.085) (0.093) 
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Table 3.13 (Continued)     
Number of goats owned -0.134** -0.172** -0.188** -0.172* 
 (0.064) (0.085) (0.086) (0.096) 
Number of buffaloes owned -0.566** -1.096*** -1.130*** -1.088*** 
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.25) (0.26) 
Mother's characteristics     
Mother's education (years)  -0.0857 -0.0399 0.00254 
  (0.097) (0.096) (0.085) 
Mother's height (cm)  0.0287* 0.0305* 0.0454*** 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Mother's age (years)  -0.431*** -0.373*** -0.389*** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
Square of mother's age  0.00670*** 0.00584*** 0.00602*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
Child characteristics     
Child’s age (months)   0.0195 0.0163 
   (0.022) (0.024) 
Child’s age, squared   -0.000292 -0.000261 
   (0.00027) (0.00030) 
Child’s sex (1 = male)   0.483** 0.408* 
   (0.19) (0.22) 
Community characteristics     
Distance from market (km)    0.0715*** 
    (0.020) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km)    0.0177 
    (0.070) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km), squared    -0.00213 
    (0.0037) 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ 
as needed)    1.882*** 
    (0.30) 
Constant -2.537** -1.416 -2.834 -6.619** 
 (1.05) (2.98) (2.97) (3.27) 
N 332 279 279 279 
Wald χ2 78.71 74.78 86.9 120.28 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.2018 0.266 0.2891 0.4532 
Notes: Dependant variable equals 1 if child is from a participant household in grain bank village and 0 
if child is from a household in a non-grain bank village.  Estimates are corrected for sampling weights.  
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 
percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 3.14: Determinants of grain bank participation estimated for creating propensity 
scores to examine impact on growth (Sample 2) 
Pseudo-MLE probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Grain bank participant (1 = yes) 
 Estimated coefficients 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Specification 
A 
Specification 
B 
Specification 
C  
Specification 
D 
Household characteristics     
Social group (1=tribal) 0.198 0.224 0.216 -0.0247 
 (0.37) (0.52) (0.50) (0.53) 
Household size 0.378 0.802 0.709 0.453 
 (0.43) (0.51) (0.52) (0.54) 
Square of household size -0.0693** -0.122*** -0.113*** -0.0858* 
 (0.034) (0.042) (0.042) (0.049) 
Number of children (14 years or less) 0.352* 0.618** 0.621** 0.501* 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 0.0662 0.440 0.444 0.577 
 (0.29) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.268 0.648*** 0.577** 1.012*** 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.25) (0.29) 
Low-lying fertile land, squared -0.0535 -0.108** -0.0920** -0.163** 
 (0.034) (0.043) (0.044) (0.064) 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) 0.261 0.276 0.319 0.345 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.25) (0.23) 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned, squared -0.0698 -0.0812* -0.0868 -0.0932* 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.056) (0.049) 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) -0.0257 -0.0000605 0.00864 0.355 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.23) (0.29) 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared -0.0715 -0.0711 -0.0579 -0.102 
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.053) (0.064) 
Gold holdings (gm) 0.0131 0.0303 0.0254 0.0418 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.978*** 1.479*** 1.584***  
 (0.33) (0.44) (0.46)  
Number of ploughs owned 0.617*** 0.554*** 0.543**  
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.21)  
Number of crowbars owned -0.0993 0.100 0.0609 0.185 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) 
Number of spades owned 0.0655 -0.0829 -0.0704 0.109 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) 
Number of sickles owned 0.415*** 0.445*** 0.468*** 0.309*** 
 (0.094) (0.093) (0.095) (0.11) 
Number of cows owned -0.128* -0.243*** -0.249*** -0.274*** 
 (0.070) (0.092) (0.093) (0.10) 
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Table 3.14 (Continued)     
Number of goats owned -0.160** -0.232** -0.264*** -0.249** 
 (0.071) (0.10) (0.099) (0.10) 
Number of buffaloes owned -0.547** -1.117*** -1.153*** -1.116*** 
 (0.24) (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) 
Mother's characteristics     
Mother's education (years)  -0.0763 -0.0258 0.177* 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.100) 
Mother's height (cm)  0.0255 0.0286 0.0539*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Mother's age (years)  -0.496*** -0.441*** -0.267 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
Square of mother's age  0.00776*** 0.00699*** 0.00402 
  (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0027) 
Child characteristics     
Child’s age (months)   0.0188 0.0250 
   (0.025) (0.027) 
Child’s age, squared   -0.000297 -0.000397 
   (0.00031) (0.00033) 
Child’s sex (1 = male)   0.490** 0.441* 
   (0.22) (0.23) 
Community characteristics     
Distance from market (km)    0.0573*** 
    (0.018) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km)    0.397* 
    (0.22) 
Distance from closest Agragamee field 
office (km), squared    -0.0491** 
    (0.023) 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ 
as needed)    1.652*** 
    (0.31) 
Constant -2.952*** -1.263 -2.922 -10.48*** 
 (1.14) (3.37) (3.44) (3.73) 
N 297 251 251 251 
Wald χ2 71.75 79.31 87.85 131.45 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.2357 0.3271 0.3499 0.4692 
Notes: Dependant variable equals 1 if child is from a participant household in grain bank village and 0 
if child is from a household in a non-grain bank village.  Estimates are corrected for sampling weights.  
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 
percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of predicted propensity scores (Sample 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of predicted propensity scores (Sample 1) 
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of predicted propensity scores (Sample 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Distribution of predicted propensity scores (Sample 2) 
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of predicted propensity scores (Sample 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Distribution of predicted propensity scores (Sample 2) 
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 The balancing property of the different specifications is examined using three 
difference tests: (1) t-tests for difference in covariate means between the matched 
treatment and comparison samples; (2) standardized bias before and after matching; 
and (3) pseudo-R-squared of the propensity score model after matching, using 
observations in the common support region only as well as weights generated from the 
matching algorithm.   
 Results of balanced covariates using t-tests are presented in Tables 3.A1-3.A12 
in the appendix.  Examining the t-test results, we only include those variables in the 
final specification that have no statistically significant difference in means. 
The results using measures of pseudo R-squared and standardized bias are 
presented in Tables 3.A13-3.A15 in the appendix.  Examining the pseudo R-squared 
by re-estimating the propensity score model after matching, we find that in all cases, 
the pseudo R-squared generated is much lower than the pseudo R-squared generated 
prior to matching.  In addition, the joint significance of the covariates in the model is 
always rejected.  Prior to matching, the joint significance of the covariates in the 
model was never rejected.  Finally, examining the median standardized bias before 
and after matching, we find that that it is always lower after matching, and never 
above a value of 8, which is an acceptable value (Smith and Todd 2005b).  
 
Average impact of grain bank participation 
Table 3.15 presents local linear regression matching estimates of the average impact of 
participation in grain banks on individual children’s haz-scores.  Column (1) presents 
the matching results for Sample 1, where the treatment sample is composed of 
children from participant households from all grain bank villages.  Column (2) 
presents the matching results for Sample 2, where the treatment sample is confined to 
children from participant households from long-lived grain bank villages.  In both 
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cases, we find that, on average, children in participant households have a slightly 
higher haz-score.  However, this difference is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 3.15: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on children’s haz-scores 
Local linear regression matching estimates using propensity scores 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
 Average outcome, participants -1.963 -1.930 
 Average outcome, non-participants -2.050 -1.998 
 Difference in average outcomes (ATT) 0.087 0.0968 
 (0.228) (0.232) 
  Off support On support Off support On support 
 No. of treated units 16 176 15 130 
 No. of comparison units 0 236 0 236 
Notes: Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Estimates generated using bandwidth size=0.06 for 
matched sample having common support only.  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 3.16 presents local linear regression matching estimates of the average 
impact of participation in grain banks on individual children’s whz-scores.  These 
estimates reflect the pattern observed from the naïve estimates of wasting in the 
agricultural lean season.  Estimates for both Sample 1 and Sample 2 indicate that 
children in participant households have a slightly lower whz-score, although this result 
is also not statistically significant.  The inconsistency in the signs of the ATT 
estimates for haz-scores and whz-scores is puzzling, however. 
Finally, in Table 3.17, examining the impact on the change in height between 
the post-harvest and agricultural lean season, we see that, on average, children in 
participant households have a slightly faster rate of growth than children in the 
matched comparison sample.  However, the estimates for neither Sample 1 not Sample 
2 are statistically significant. 
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Table 3.16: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on children’s whz-scores 
Local linear regression matching estimates using propensity scores 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
 Average outcome, participants -1.712 -1.710 
 Average outcome, non-participants -1.577 -1.612 
 Difference in average outcomes (ATT) -0.135 -0.099 
 (0.189) (0.188) 
  Off support On support Off support On support 
 No. of treated units 11 172 14 123 
 No. of comparison units 0 226 0 226 
Notes: Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Estimates generated using bandwidth size=0.06 for 
matched sample having common support only.  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 3.17: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on growth  
Local linear regression matching estimates using propensity scores 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
 Average outcome, participants 0.052 0.053 
 Average outcome, non-participants 0.045 0.043 
 Difference in average outcomes (ATT) 0.007 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
  Off support On support Off support On support 
 No. of treated units 39 74 33 52 
 No. of comparison units 0 166 0 166 
Notes: Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Estimates generated using bandwidth size=0.06 for 
matched sample having common support only. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
Robustness to alternative specifications 
Estimates of the average impact of participation in grain banks on children’s haz-
score, whz-score and growth using kernel matching estimation are presented in Tables 
3.18-3.20 respectively.  We find that these results are similar to those using local 
linear matching, indicating that the estimates are robust across the two specifications. 
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Table 3.18: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on children’s haz-scores 
Kernel matching estimates using propensity scores 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
 Average outcome, participants -1.963 -1.930 
 Average outcome, non-participants -2.049 -2.034 
 Difference in average outcomes (ATT) 0.086 0.104 
 (0.220) (0.226) 
  Off support On support Off support On support 
 No. of treated units 16 176 15 130 
 No. of comparison units 0 236 0 236 
Notes: Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Estimates generated using bandwidth size=0.06 for 
matched sample having common support only. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 3.19: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on children’s whz-scores 
Kernel matching estimates using propensity scores 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
 Average outcome, participants -1.712 -1.710 
 Average outcome, non-participants -1.582 -1.606 
 Difference in average outcomes (ATT) -0.130 -0.104 
 (0.188) (0.185) 
  Off support On support Off support On support 
 No. of treated units 11 172 11 172 
 No. of comparison units 0 226 0 226 
Notes: Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Estimates generated using bandwidth size=0.06 for 
matched sample having common support only. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
Sensitivity to choice of bandwidth 
The results in Tables 3.15-3.20 were estimated using a bandwidth size of 0.06.  We re-
estimate the local linear regression and kernel matching models with varying 
bandwidth size (0.05 and 0.07).  The results are presented in Tables 3.A16-3.A18 in 
the appendix.  We find that there is some fluctuation in the magnitude of the estimates.  
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However, the results continue to be statistically insignificant, regardless of the 
bandwidth size.   
 
 
Table 3.20: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on growth  
Kernel matching estimates using propensity scores 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
 Average outcome, participants 0.051 0.049 
 Average outcome, non-participants 0.040 0.040 
 Difference in average outcomes (ATT) 0.011 0.008 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
  Off support On support Off support On support 
 No. of treated units 30 83 23 62 
 No. of comparison units 0 166 0 166 
Notes: Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Estimates generated using bandwidth size=0.06 for 
matched sample having common support only. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In the past two decades, grain banks have been enthusiastically adopted by tribal 
development NGOs promoting food security in rural Orissa.  However, to date, no 
quantitative analysis of the impact of grain banks on food security outcomes exist.  In 
this chapter, we attempt to fill this gap in knowledge by measuring the impact on 
individual children’s short- and long-term health outcomes, using local linear 
regression and kernel propensity score matching.  Specifically, we examine three 
outcomes, namely, children’s haz-scores and whz-scores in the agricultural lean season 
as well as the change in height between the post-harvest and lean seasons. 
Our matching estimates indicate that while the average haz-score is slightly 
higher for children in participant households, the estimate is statistically insignificant.  
We obtain a similar result when we use matching methods to examine children’s 
growth in height.  In addition, examining the average whz-scores for children in 
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participant households and children in non-grain bank villages, we find that the 
matching-based estimate is slightly lower for the former.  While the inconsistency in 
the signs of the ATT estimates for haz-scores and whz-scores is puzzling, neither set of 
estimates is statistically significant.  We also do not obtain any statistically significant 
results when we compare children in participant households in villages where grain 
banks have survived for a longer duration compared to children in non-grain bank 
villages.   
Given that a large number of our observations have missing height or weight 
information and that the age data are of somewhat poor quality, we are hesitant about 
making any firm conclusions based on our analysis.  On the one hand, height or 
weight data do not appear to be missing systematically across treatment and 
comparison samples and the age data may be no poorer than similar data from 
comparable settings.  In this case, our estimates may well be valid and reflect the fact 
that grain banks do not, indeed, have a quantifiable impact on children’s health 
outcomes.  However, it is also quite possible that the average treatment effect on the 
treated is heterogeneous across the treated units.  Thus, our results, which are based on 
the entire distribution of households, may simply be disguising the fact that the 
average treatment effect varies over the distribution.  Unfortunately, we are not able to 
estimate the treatment effect at different points or sections of the distribution due to 
sample size limitations.  Alternately, parents may be acting as a buffer against 
volatility in consumption of their children in non-grain bank villages, thereby masking 
any effect that grain banks may have in reducing volatility in consumption and health 
outcomes of children. 
Given that the Indian government proposes to expand the grain bank initiative 
across tribal villages in different Indian states, we suggest three projects for future 
research which we hope can provide more conclusive information.  First, 
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implementing a baseline survey before establishing grain banks in target villages will 
permit difference-in-difference propensity score matching estimation of program 
impact.  This methodology is superior to cross-sectional analysis as it can help to 
correct for selection bias based on time-invariant unobservable factors.  In addition, 
data on a sufficiently large number of observations will permit estimation of the 
average treatment effect for different points or sections of the distribution.  Second, 
survey data collection from target villages as part of a phased implementation of grain 
banks can act as a source of experimental data which will provide the most reliable 
estimates of program impact.  Third, data which enables the researcher to compare the 
cost-effectiveness and impact of grain banks compared to other food security 
interventions can provide critical information to a policymaker on how best to allocate 
scarce resources.
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 3.A1: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (1) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on local linear regression 
propensity score matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on children’s haz-score 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.97 0.99 -0.02 -1.2 
Household size 5.50 5.48 0.02 0.11 
Square of household size 32.22 32.35 -0.13 -0.07 
Number of children (14 years or less) 2.94 2.89 0.05 0.41 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.34 1.33 0.01 0.1 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.62 0.65 -0.03 -0.31 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 1.25 1.08 0.17 0.53 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – cubic 
term 14.16 21.86 -7.70 -0.9 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.45 1.52 -0.07 -0.56 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 3.38 3.76 -0.38 -0.67 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.75 2.90 -0.15 -0.37 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.08 0.10 -0.02 -0.52 
Number of ploughs owned 0.82 0.80 0.01 0.26 
Number of crowbars owned 1.18 1.10 0.08 1.52 
Number of spades owned 2.15 2.11 0.04 0.53 
Number of sickles owned 2.87 2.92 -0.05 -0.39 
Number of cows owned 0.79 0.63 0.16 1.39 
Number of bullocks owned 1.45 1.53 -0.07 -0.61 
Number of goats owned 0.84 0.90 -0.06 -0.23 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.48 
Mother's education (years) 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.19 
Mother's height (cm) 148.71 148.03 0.68 1.11 
Mother's age (years) 28.36 27.49 0.88 1.39 
Square of mother's age 842.48 786.96 55.52 1.45 
Child’s age (months) 35.84 34.13 1.70 0.74 
Child’s age, squared 1722.90 1641.50 81.40 0.5 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.56 0.55 0.00 0.08 
Distance from market (km) 8.66 8.67 -0.01 -0.01 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.78 4.46 0.32 1.14 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 31.17 25.52 5.65 1.43 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.89 0.87 0.02 0.71 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A2: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (1) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on kernel propensity score 
matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on children’s haz-score 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.97 0.99 -0.02 -1.19 
Household size 5.50 5.51 -0.01 -0.09 
Square of household size 32.22 32.69 -0.48 -0.26 
Number of children (14 years or less) 2.94 2.90 0.04 0.29 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.34 1.35 -0.01 -0.14 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.62 0.63 -0.02 -0.18 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 1.25 1.06 0.19 0.61 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – cubic 
term 14.16 21.54 -7.38 -0.86 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.45 1.47 -0.02 -0.18 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 3.38 3.54 -0.16 -0.29 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.75 2.86 -0.11 -0.27 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.08 0.11 -0.03 -0.84 
Number of ploughs owned 0.82 0.80 0.02 0.40 
Number of crowbars owned 1.18 1.11 0.07 1.33 
Number of spades owned 2.15 2.11 0.04 0.54 
Number of sickles owned 2.87 2.92 -0.05 -0.39 
Number of cows owned 0.79 0.64 0.15 1.30 
Number of bullocks owned 1.45 1.50 -0.05 -0.39 
Number of goats owned 0.84 0.89 -0.05 -0.18 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.45 
Mother's education (years) 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.14 
Mother's height (cm) 148.71 148.08 0.63 1.03 
Mother's age (years) 28.36 27.53 0.83 1.31 
Square of mother's age 842.48 790.75 51.73 1.34 
Child’s age (months) 35.84 34.23 1.61 0.70 
Child’s age, squared 1722.90 1657.90 65.00 0.40 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.56 0.53 0.03 0.55 
Distance from market (km) 8.66 9.00 -0.34 -0.44 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.78 4.43 0.36 1.26 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 31.17 25.38 5.79 1.42 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.89 0.86 0.03 0.82 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A3: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (2) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on local linear regression 
propensity score matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on children’s haz-score 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.97 0.99 -0.02 -1.2 
Household size 5.50 5.48 0.02 0.11 
Square of household size 32.22 32.35 -0.13 -0.07 
Number of children (14 years or less) 2.94 2.89 0.05 0.41 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.34 1.33 0.01 0.1 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.62 0.65 -0.03 -0.31 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 1.25 1.08 0.17 0.53 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – cubic 
term 14.16 21.86 -7.70 -0.9 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.45 1.52 -0.07 -0.56 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 3.38 3.76 -0.38 -0.67 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.75 2.90 -0.15 -0.37 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.08 0.10 -0.02 -0.52 
Number of ploughs owned 0.82 0.80 0.01 0.26 
Number of crowbars owned 1.18 1.10 0.08 1.52 
Number of spades owned 2.15 2.11 0.04 0.53 
Number of sickles owned 2.87 2.92 -0.05 -0.39 
Number of cows owned 0.79 0.63 0.16 1.39 
Number of bullocks owned 1.45 1.53 -0.07 -0.61 
Number of goats owned 0.84 0.90 -0.06 -0.23 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.48 
Mother's education (years) 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.19 
Mother's height (cm) 148.71 148.03 0.68 1.11 
Mother's age (years) 28.36 27.49 0.88 1.39 
Square of mother's age 842.48 786.96 55.52 1.45 
Child’s age (months) 35.84 34.13 1.70 0.74 
Child’s age, squared 1722.90 1641.50 81.40 0.5 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.56 0.55 0.00 0.08 
Distance from market (km) 8.66 8.67 -0.01 -0.01 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.78 4.46 0.32 1.14 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 31.17 25.52 5.65 1.43 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.89 0.87 0.02 0.71 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A4: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (2) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on kernel propensity score 
matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on children’s haz-score 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.95 0.98 -0.02 -0.93 
Household size 5.44 5.31 0.13 0.71 
Square of household size 31.56 30.39 1.17 0.57 
Number of children (14 years or less) 2.82 2.72 0.10 0.69 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.36 1.33 0.03 0.46 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.70 0.69 0.01 0.07 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 1.53 1.26 0.28 0.62 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – cubic 
term 12.39 15.92 -3.53 -0.50 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.33 1.37 -0.04 -0.29 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 2.83 3.11 -0.28 -0.54 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.93 2.96 -0.03 -0.06 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.09 0.14 -0.05 -1.15 
Number of ploughs owned 0.89 0.75 0.14 1.94 
Number of crowbars owned 1.12 1.12 0.01 0.13 
Number of spades owned 2.20 2.13 0.07 0.76 
Number of sickles owned 2.96 2.95 0.01 0.09 
Number of cows owned 0.79 0.62 0.17 1.21 
Number of goats owned 0.89 0.65 0.24 0.72 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.06 0.07 -0.01 -0.19 
Mother's education (years) 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.41 
Mother's height (cm) 148.28 148.31 -0.03 -0.05 
Mother's age (years) 27.63 26.99 0.64 0.84 
Square of mother's age 802.11 763.97 38.14 0.84 
Child’s age (months) 36.66 35.54 1.12 0.41 
Child’s age, squared 1793.50 1750.30 43.20 0.22 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.58 0.54 0.03 0.56 
Distance from market (km) 8.65 8.96 -0.31 -0.34 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.48 4.22 0.26 1.01 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 24.42 21.88 2.54 0.99 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.85 0.83 0.02 0.42 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A5: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (1) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on local linear regression 
propensity score matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on children’s whz-score 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.97 0.98 -0.02 -1.14 
Household size 5.48 5.47 0.01 0.06 
Square of household size 32.03 32.16 -0.13 -0.07 
Number of children (14 years or less) 2.94 2.89 0.05 0.39 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.33 1.34 -0.01 -0.09 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.63 0.63 -0.01 -0.09 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 1.27 1.09 0.18 0.55 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – cubic 
term 12.12 19.91 -7.79 -0.99 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.42 1.47 -0.05 -0.39 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 3.32 3.56 -0.24 -0.43 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.57 2.38 0.19 0.55 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.08 0.11 -0.03 -0.9 
Number of ploughs owned 0.81 0.80 0.01 0.18 
Number of spades owned 2.15 2.11 0.04 0.49 
Number of sickles owned 2.88 2.91 -0.04 -0.28 
Number of cows owned 0.78 0.64 0.14 1.16 
Number of bullocks owned 1.45 1.47 -0.01 -0.11 
Number of goats owned 0.80 0.93 -0.14 -0.51 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.29 
Mother's education (years) 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.11 
Mother's height (cm) 148.81 148.18 0.63 1.04 
Mother's age (years) 28.40 27.46 0.95 1.48 
Square of mother's age 845.53 784.70 60.83 1.57 
Child’s age (months) 36.36 33.50 2.86 1.22 
Child’s age, squared 1765.20 1619.30 145.90 0.89 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.57 0.53 0.04 0.66 
Distance from market (km) 8.54 9.41 -0.87 -1.1 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.74 4.32 0.42 1.47 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 30.59 24.37 6.22 1.53 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.89 0.88 0.01 0.35 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A6: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (1) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on kernel propensity score 
matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on children’s whz-score 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.97 0.98 -0.02 -1.15 
Household size 5.48 5.53 -0.05 -0.32 
Square of household size 32.03 32.90 -0.87 -0.47 
Number of children (14 years or less) 2.94 2.92 0.02 0.14 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.33 1.35 -0.02 -0.28 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.63 0.65 -0.02 -0.22 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 1.27 1.10 0.17 0.53 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – cubic 
term 12.12 19.50 -7.38 -1.02 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.42 1.47 -0.05 -0.41 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 3.32 3.53 -0.21 -0.37 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.57 2.43 0.14 0.40 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.08 0.12 -0.03 -1.05 
Number of ploughs owned 0.81 0.79 0.02 0.33 
Number of crowbars owned 1.18 1.11 0.07 1.39 
Number of spades owned 2.15 2.11 0.04 0.55 
Number of sickles owned 2.88 2.93 -0.05 -0.36 
Number of cows owned 0.78 0.64 0.14 1.16 
Number of bullocks owned 1.45 1.48 -0.03 -0.22 
Number of goats owned 0.80 0.92 -0.12 -0.45 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.38 
Mother's education (years) 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.05 
Mother's height (cm) 148.81 148.15 0.66 1.09 
Mother's age (years) 28.40 27.60 0.81 1.24 
Square of mother's age 845.53 794.23 51.30 1.31 
Child’s age (months) 36.36 33.77 2.59 1.11 
Child’s age, squared 1765.20 1632.60 132.60 0.81 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.57 0.53 0.04 0.83 
Distance from market (km) 8.54 9.14 -0.60 -0.76 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.74 4.34 0.40 1.41 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 30.59 24.73 5.86 1.41 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.89 0.88 0.01 0.35 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A7: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (2) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on local linear regression 
propensity score matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on children’s whz-score 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.94 0.97 -0.03 -1.22 
Household size 5.39 5.42 -0.03 -0.16 
Square of household size 31.07 31.43 -0.37 -0.18 
Number of children (14 years or less) 2.80 2.85 -0.05 -0.32 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.33 1.31 0.01 0.19 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.66 0.60 0.05 0.45 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 1.36 1.11 0.24 0.58 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – cubic 
term 9.63 10.38 -0.75 -0.24 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.31 1.38 -0.06 -0.45 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 2.83 3.09 -0.26 -0.5 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.67 2.58 0.09 0.18 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.09 0.14 -0.05 -1.14 
Number of spades owned 1.12 1.08 0.04 0.64 
Number of sickles owned 2.15 2.15 0.01 0.07 
Number of cows owned 2.90 2.88 0.02 0.15 
Number of bullocks owned 0.72 0.60 0.12 0.9 
Number of goats owned 0.86 0.72 0.14 0.41 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.07 0.08 -0.02 -0.35 
Mother's education (years) 0.14 0.15 -0.01 -0.12 
Mother's height (cm) 148.42 148.33 0.09 0.14 
Mother's age (years) 27.72 27.74 -0.01 -0.02 
Square of mother's age 808.15 809.25 -1.10 -0.02 
Child’s age (months) 37.41 34.64 2.77 1 
Child’s age, squared 1847.80 1687.60 160.20 0.82 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.58 0.56 0.02 0.33 
Distance from market (km) 8.83 8.89 -0.06 -0.06 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.40 4.24 0.16 0.63 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 23.89 21.68 2.21 0.94 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.85 0.83 0.01 0.27 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A8: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (2) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on kernel propensity score 
matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on children’s whz-score 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.94 0.97 -0.03 -1.16 
Household size 5.39 5.41 -0.02 -0.09 
Square of household size 31.07 31.27 -0.21 -0.1 
Number of children (14 years or less) 2.80 2.85 -0.04 -0.28 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.33 1.31 0.02 0.22 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.66 0.59 0.06 0.54 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 1.36 1.07 0.29 0.7 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) – cubic 
term 9.63 10.74 -1.11 -0.27 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.31 1.39 -0.08 -0.58 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 2.83 3.13 -0.30 -0.57 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.67 2.68 -0.01 -0.02 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.09 0.12 -0.03 -0.78 
Number of crowbars owned 1.12 1.08 0.04 0.67 
Number of spades owned 2.15 2.14 0.01 0.12 
Number of sickles owned 2.90 2.85 0.05 0.31 
Number of cows owned 0.72 0.60 0.12 0.88 
Number of goats owned 0.86 0.72 0.14 0.4 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.07 0.08 -0.01 -0.29 
Mother's education (years) 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.04 
Mother's height (cm) 148.42 148.34 0.08 0.13 
Mother's age (years) 27.72 27.72 0.00 0 
Square of mother's age 808.15 808.56 -0.41 -0.01 
Child’s age (months) 37.41 35.13 2.28 0.83 
Child’s age, squared 1847.80 1713.00 134.80 0.69 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.58 0.56 0.02 0.29 
Distance from market (km) 8.83 8.71 0.12 0.12 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.40 4.25 0.15 0.56 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 23.89 21.94 1.96 0.8 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.85 0.83 0.02 0.4 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A9: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (1) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on local linear regression 
propensity score matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on child growth 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.99 0.98 0.00 0.09 
Household size 5.73 5.70 0.03 0.1 
Square of household size 34.97 34.42 0.55 0.18 
Number of children (14 years or less) 3.07 3.08 -0.01 -0.07 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.42 1.38 0.04 0.35 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.58 0.58 0.00 0.01 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 1.07 1.19 -0.12 -0.22 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) 1.45 1.54 -0.09 -0.4 
Semi-fertile (goda) upland owned, squared) 3.53 4.62 -1.09 -0.69 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.47 1.55 -0.07 -0.4 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 3.23 3.36 -0.13 -0.18 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.64 3.04 -0.39 -0.58 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.12 
Number of crowbars owned 1.12 1.08 0.04 0.54 
Number of spades owned 2.04 2.08 -0.04 -0.36 
Number of sickles owned 2.86 2.82 0.04 0.21 
Number of cows owned 0.80 0.86 -0.06 -0.29 
Number of goats owned 0.74 0.78 -0.04 -0.16 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.69 
Mother's education (years) 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.53 
Mother's height (cm) 148.89 148.64 0.25 0.22 
Mother's age (years) 29.89 29.82 0.07 0.06 
Square of mother's age 932.35 929.28 3.07 0.04 
Child’s age (months) 39.85 41.27 -1.42 -0.44 
Child’s age, squared 1906.40 2050.80 -144.40 -0.57 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.54 0.53 0.01 0.12 
Distance from market (km) 8.74 7.89 0.86 0.78 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 5.00 4.69 0.31 0.64 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 33.57 27.98 5.59 0.81 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.84 0.75 0.09 1.22 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A10: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (1) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on kernel propensity score 
matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on child growth 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.99 0.99 0.00 -0.1 
Household size 5.69 5.77 -0.08 -0.4 
Square of household size 34.22 35.04 -0.83 -0.33 
Number of children (14 years or less) 3.07 3.26 -0.18 -1.0 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.39 1.27 0.12 1.5 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.49 0.62 -0.12 -1.02 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 0.88 0.92 -0.05 -0.12 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) 1.52 1.38 0.14 0.66 
Semi-fertile (goda) upland owned, squared) 3.92 3.76 0.16 0.11 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.46 1.50 -0.04 -0.26 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 3.17 3.18 0.00 -0.01 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.58 2.12 0.46 0.87 
Floor quality (1 = pucca) 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.46 
Number of ploughs owned 0.80 0.80 0.00 -0.01 
Number of spades owned 2.13 2.23 -0.09 -0.87 
Number of sickles owned 2.80 3.06 -0.26 -1.51 
Number of cows owned 0.75 0.60 0.15 0.87 
Number of goats owned 0.61 0.61 0.00 0 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.38 
Mother's education (years) 0.14 0.02 0.13 1.16 
Mother's height (cm) 149.23 149.01 0.22 0.23 
Mother's age (years) 29.63 28.63 0.99 1.06 
Square of mother's age 919.22 850.36 68.86 1.18 
Child’s age (months) 40.87 44.60 -3.73 -1.32 
Child’s age, squared 1989.30 2317.90 -328.60 -1.44 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.57 0.48 0.08 1.05 
Distance from market (km) 8.39 8.24 0.14 0.15 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.83 5.31 -0.48 -1.15 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 31.53 33.97 -2.44 -0.4 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.87 0.84 0.03 0.51 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A11: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (2) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on local linear regression 
propensity score matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on child growth 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.98 0.99 -0.01 -0.34 
Household size 5.58 5.71 -0.13 -0.45 
Square of household size 33.31 34.60 -1.29 -0.38 
Number of children (14 years or less) 2.87 3.03 -0.17 -0.67 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.42 1.38 0.04 0.37 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.54 0.49 0.05 0.3 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 0.97 0.95 0.02 0.03 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) 1.44 1.44 0.00 0.02 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned, squared 3.51 3.70 -0.19 -0.18 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.43 1.40 0.04 0.17 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 3.01 3.01 0.00 0 
Gold holdings (gm) 2.79 3.94 -1.15 -1.23 
Number of crowbars owned 1.08 1.07 0.01 0.1 
Number of spades owned 2.12 2.10 0.01 0.09 
Number of sickles owned 2.83 2.77 0.06 0.24 
Number of cows owned 0.65 0.79 -0.13 -0.65 
Number of goats owned 0.62 0.72 -0.10 -0.45 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.04 0.06 -0.03 -0.41 
Mother's education (years) 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.54 
Mother's height (cm) 148.63 147.77 0.86 0.71 
Mother's age (years) 28.27 28.64 -0.37 -0.29 
Square of mother's age 833.31 865.12 -31.81 -0.42 
Child’s age (months) 39.19 38.33 0.86 0.24 
Child’s age, squared 1859.40 1803.40 56.00 0.2 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.52 0.53 -0.01 -0.08 
Distance from market (km) 7.79 9.52 -1.73 -1.24 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.42 4.54 -0.11 -0.26 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 25.08 24.42 0.66 0.16 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.79 0.73 0.06 0.69 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.A12: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (2) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on kernel propensity score 
matching 
Outcome variable: Impact on child growth 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Social group (1=tribal) 0.98 0.99 0.00 -0.22 
Household size 5.61 5.66 -0.05 -0.21 
Square of household size 33.42 33.70 -0.28 -0.1 
Number of children (14 years or less) 2.94 3.16 -0.22 -1.01 
Number of adult females (15 years or more) 1.40 1.28 0.12 1.14 
Low-lying fertile (bila) land owned (acres) 0.68 0.66 0.02 0.11 
Low-lying fertile land, squared 1.43 1.14 0.29 0.51 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned (acres) 1.48 1.42 0.05 0.25 
Semi-fertile (goda) land owned, squared 3.50 3.48 0.01 0.01 
Infertile (dongar) upland owned (acres) 1.48 1.56 -0.09 -0.47 
Infertile (dongar) upland, squared 3.06 3.63 -0.57 -0.77 
Gold holdings (gm) 3.02 3.13 -0.11 -0.14 
Floor quality (1 =  pucca) 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.3 
Number of crowbars owned 1.06 1.03 0.04 0.55 
Number of spades owned 2.26 2.23 0.02 0.17 
Number of sickles owned 2.84 2.88 -0.04 -0.17 
Number of cows owned 0.90 0.62 0.28 1.28 
Number of goats owned 0.55 0.59 -0.04 -0.21 
Number of buffaloes owned 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.26 
Mother's education (years) 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.77 
Mother's height (cm) 148.50 149.55 -1.05 -1.01 
Mother's age (years) 28.24 28.00 0.25 0.23 
Square of mother's age 835.47 815.98 19.49 0.3 
Child’s age (months) 39.69 43.25 -3.56 -1.08 
Child’s age, squared 1889.10 2218.00 -328.90 -1.24 
Child’s sex (1 = male) 0.56 0.55 0.01 0.12 
Distance from market (km) 8.56 8.76 -0.20 -0.17 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km) 4.45 4.70 -0.25 -0.6 
Distance from closest Agragamee field office 
(km), squared 24.77 27.15 -2.37 -0.53 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 0.82 0.74 0.09 1.14 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
 199 
Table 3.A13: Balancing tests using measure of pseudo-R-squared and standardized 
bias 
Outcome variable: Impact on children’s haz-score 
 
Pseudo-R2  
(after matching) 
Wald test 
p-value 
Standardized bias 
Before matching After matching 
Local linear regression matching      
 Sample (1) 0.05 0.788 13.13 4.80 
Sample (2) 0.052 0.948 16.95 5.21 
Kernel matching     
Sample (1) 0.047 0.853 13.13 4.25 
Sample (2) 0.043 0.988 16.95 5.31 
Notes: Tests conducted on observations in matched sample having common support. 
 
Table 3.A14: Balancing tests using measure of pseudo-R-squared and standardized 
bias 
Outcome variable: Impact on children’s whz-score 
 
Pseudo-R2  
(after matching) 
Wald test 
p-value 
Standardized bias 
Before matching After matching 
Local linear regression matching      
 Sample (1) 0.045 0.877 12.59 4.18 
Sample (2) 0.031 0.999 18.95 3.49 
Kernel matching     
Sample (1) 0.053 0.765 12.47 4.38 
Sample (2) 0.025 1.000 18.95 3.62 
Notes: Tests conducted on observations in matched sample having common support. 
 
Table 3.A15: Balancing tests using measure of pseudo-R-squared and standardized 
bias 
Outcome variable: Impact on growth  
 
Pseudo-R2  
(after matching) 
Wald test 
p-value 
Standardized bias 
Before matching After matching 
Local linear regression matching      
 Sample (1) 0.073 0.995 21.00 4.50 
Sample (2) 0.064 1.000 23.73 4.50 
Kernel matching     
Sample (1) 0.079 0.954 21.00 7.13 
Sample (2) 0.090 0.987 26.28 4.65 
Notes: Tests conducted on observations in matched sample having common support. 
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Table 3.A16: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on children’s haz-scores 
Sensitivity to choice of bandwidth 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
Local linear regression matching estimates  
Bandwidth = 0.05 0.094 0.085 
 (0.234) (0.233) 
Bandwidth = 0.07 0.086 0.056 
 (0.224) (0.231) 
   
Kernel matching estimates   
Bandwidth = 0.05 0.084 0.079 
 (0.222) (0.214) 
Bandwidth = 0.07 0.090 0.081 
 (0.218) (0.211) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates for matched sample having common support.  * 
Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level 
 
 
Table 3.A17: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on children’s whz-scores 
Sensitivity to choice of bandwidth 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
Local linear regression matching estimates  
Bandwidth = 0.05 -0.175 -0.113 
 (0.203) (0.193) 
Bandwidth = 0.07 -0.116 -0.093 
 (0.189) (0.187) 
   
Kernel matching estimates   
Bandwidth = 0.05 -0.137 -0.104 
 (0.188) (0.187) 
Bandwidth = 0.07 -0.131 -0.102 
 (0.184) (0.184) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates for matched sample having common support.  * 
Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level 
 201 
Table 3.A18: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on growth 
Sensitivity to choice of bandwidth 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
Local linear regression matching estimates  
Bandwidth = 0.05 0.009 0.000 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
Bandwidth = 0.07 0.007 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
   
Kernel matching estimates   
Bandwidth = 0.05 0.009 0.008 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Bandwidth = 0.07 0.011 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates for matched sample having common support.  * 
Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level 
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CHAPTER 4 
DO GRAIN BANKS DISPLACE LOCAL MONEYLENDERS? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine the impact of household participation in grain banks on 
the incidence of borrowing from informal, private moneylenders using propensity 
score matching.  We also examine how this impact varies by the lifespan of the grain 
bank, specifically by examining the impact in long-lived grain bank villages.   Grain 
banks are a community level institution which provides grain loans to participant 
households to meet their food consumption needs typically during the agricultural lean 
season.  The data we use are non-experimental and come from a village and household 
sample survey conducted in the lean season in rural Rayagada, Orissa, India.  This is a 
small region where grain banks were established en masse over the 1990s by 
Agragamee, one of the more prominent tribal development NGOs in Orissa. 
The study makes two main contributions.  First, grain banks have been 
increasingly promoted by rural development NGOs as well as the Indian government – 
via its national and state tribal development programs – based almost entirely on 
anecdotal evidence on their effectiveness in enhancing household food security and 
reducing dependence on local moneylenders.  These moneylenders are often viewed as 
offering credit under exploitative terms and conditions.  To date, however, the impact 
of grain bank participation on either mentioned outcome has not been carefully 
quantified.  While we examined the impact of grain bank participation on young 
children’s health and nutrition in Chapter 3, in this chapter, we hope to provide more 
reliable estimates of the impact of grain bank participation on household borrowing 
from moneylenders.  Given the current and envisaged increase in the extent of grain 
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bank development activity in India, this evidence should be of interest to government 
as well as NGOs.   
Second, and more broadly, this study contributes to the economics literature on 
the impact of competition in rural financial markets.78  While some recent empirical 
studies have examined the impact of competition between microfinance providers in 
rural areas, few have examined the impact of competition on existing credit providers 
such as local, informal moneylenders.79  The displacement of households’ reliance on 
moneylenders by grain banks – the latter providing loans at more favorable terms – 
can potentially be welfare-improving for participant households.  The welfare effects 
for the wider population in the areas affected by increased credit market competition 
are however unclear. 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows.  In the next 
section, Section 4.2, we review the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the 
features of rural financial markets and the effects of (increased) competition in 
financial markets.  We then provide some background information on the credit 
market in rural Rayagada and on the design and operation of the grain banks 
introduced by Agragamee.  In Section 4.3, we present our empirical methodology.  We 
first discuss the potential advantages of matching compared to other non-experimental 
estimators, as well as the existing evidence on the performance of matching compared 
to experimental estimators.  We then discuss the key assumptions underlying 
matching, followed by a description of different matching estimators commonly used 
in the economics literature.  In this section, we also justify the use of matching given 
our data, explain our selection of matching estimators from the available set of 
                                                 
78 Given evidence from other contexts that competition among lenders alters the characteristic of rural 
financial markets, we would have also liked to examine how grain banks have affected local 
moneylender operations.  Due to data limitations, however, we are unable to examine this rigorously. 
79 A notable exception is Kaboski and Townsend (2005), who examine this issue in rural Thailand.  
This study is discussed in the background and literature review section (Section 4.2). 
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options, and discuss our implementation steps and sensitivity analysis methodology.  
In Section 4.4, we present our findings on the impact of grain bank participation on 
borrowing from local moneylenders.  In presenting our impact results, we first present 
naïve impact estimates where participant households are compared to households in 
non-grain bank villages without the use of matching.  We then present our matching-
based results, where we use local linear and kernel matching.  We end the section by 
presenting our sensitivity analysis findings.  Section 4.5 summarizes our main results 
and concludes. 
 
4.2 Background and literature review 
Features of rural financial markets 
In a financially isolated rural community as in rural Rayagada, credit markets are 
subject to some of the same problems that plague rural credit markets in other 
developing countries.80  An influential body of theoretical literature illustrates the 
potential causes behind these deficiencies in financial markets.  Seminal studies by 
Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz (1974) have shown how informational asymmetries 
between borrowers and lenders can lead to thin or missing markets.  In another 
seminal contribution, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show how informational asymmetries 
can result in a backward-bending supply curve and credit rationing in equilibrium, 
whereby even potential borrowers who are willing to pay a high price cannot obtain 
credit as it is not profitable for financial institutions to set market-clearing interest 
rates.  In addition, due to the absence of well-defined property rights and well-
functioning judicial courts, mechanisms for contract enforcement are costly or non-
                                                 
80 For examples of recent theoretical and empirical research on rural financial markets in developing 
countries, see Besley (1994), Stiglitz (1994), Morduch (1995), Meyer and Nagarajan (2000), Banerjee 
(2003) and relevant book chapters in Basu (1997) and Ray (1998).  For a recent survey of rural financial 
markets in developing countries, see Conning and Udry (2005). 
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existent.  In the absence of credible sanctions, problems of limited commitment can 
arise causing individuals to renege on contracts (Ligon et al. 2002).  In a theoretical 
model of agrarian credit markets in developing economies, Carter (1988) shows how 
adverse incentives and selection problems, in addition to ‘statistical’ discrimination by 
lenders against small farms (whereby lenders use farm size as an indicator of farm 
“quality”) can lead to credit rationing of small farmers by profit-maximizing, 
competitive lenders. 
A few empirical studies also provide evidence on the extent of asymmetric 
information and enforcement problems and/or how they affect financial market 
characteristics.  For example, using data from a randomized credit market intervention 
in South Africa, Karlan and Zinman (2007) find that between 7-16 percent of loan 
defaults can be attributed to moral hazard or adverse selection.  In another example, 
using data from a fishing village in southern India, Gine and Klonner (2005) find that 
informational asymmetries regarding borrower type result in binding credit 
constraints, as a result of which individuals below a certain wealth threshold cannot 
adopt a profitable but costly technological innovation.  Using data from rural Pakistan, 
Aleem (1990) finds that asymmetric information and enforcement problems contribute 
to the high costs of operation by informal market moneylenders, which contribute, in 
turn, to the high interest rates charged by them.  He also finds that informational 
problems lead to product differentiation, resulting in widely ranging interest rates.   
Using household survey data on credit applications, another set of empirical 
studies provide evidence on the presence of credit rationing.  For example, Zeller 
(1994) finds using data from rural Madagascar that about one in four individuals face 
credit (quantity) constraints, whereby they either did not apply for formal credit 
because they felt that they had no chance of receiving it or their credit applications 
were subject to rationing or complete rejection.  Diagne (1999) and Zeller et al. (1998) 
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arrive at similar findings using data from Malawi.  Barham et al. (1996), Boucher and 
Guirkinger (2005), and Boucher et al. (2005) find using data from Guatemala, Peru, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua that informational asymmetries (together with the riskiness 
of agricultural production) leads to credit risk rationing (especially of less wealthy 
farmers), in addition to conventional price and quantity rationing.  In risk rationing, 
lenders shift so much of the contractual risk to borrowers that the latter voluntarily 
withdraw from the credit market even when they have the collateral wealth to 
participate in a credit contract.   
 
Impact of competition on rural financial markets 
To date, there are few empirical studies of how group-based lending institutions affect 
traditional credit sources, such as moneylenders.  One exception is Kaboski and 
Townsend (2005), who use data from Thailand to study the impact of four different 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) – namely, production credit groups, women’s groups, 
buffalo banks and rice banks (which are identical to grain banks) – on reliance on 
informal moneylenders, among other welfare outcomes.  They use the presence of 
various kinds of MFI within a village as an identifying instrument, arguing that these 
institutions are promoted by different agencies and ministries and have large variations 
in lending, borrowing and membership policies. They find that the presence of any 
MFI reduces the probability of becoming a customer of a moneylender by 8 
percentage points.  When they examine the differential impact of each of the 4 MFIs 
on moneylender reliance, however, they find that their results are statistically 
significant only for women’s groups. 
A few recent theoretical studies look at the broader issue of how certain types 
of unregulated competition between potential financial providers can, contrary to 
initial expectations, reduce borrower welfare.  While competition can induce 
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innovation, it can also alter market structures such that there is a loss of scale 
economies among incumbent suppliers.  Given information asymmetries, this can 
translate into a shrinking market, higher prices and lower welfare for all borrowers, 
especially poorer borrowers.  For example, Hoff and Stiglitz (1997) predict how the 
introduction of subsidized credit into a monopolistically-competitive market with high 
enforcement costs can lead to the exit of incumbent lenders and higher prices for 
borrowers.  McIntosh and Wydick (2005) show how competition among microfinance 
lenders reduces cross-subsidization among clients of each institution and increase 
asymmetric information problems, resulting in less favorable contracts for all 
borrowers.   
In addition, there are a few empirical studies which examine the impact of 
competition on lending relationships.  For example, Petersen and Rajan (1995) show 
how creditors are less likely to provide loans to credit-constrained firms in more 
competitive markets.  Using data from small-business lending in the United States, 
they find that loan sizes are larger in areas where there is less competition as financial 
institutions are able to enter into long-term lending relationships with firms when there 
are fewer competitors who take away their more successful clients.  Navajas et al. 
(2003) use data from Bolivia to test their theoretical predictions that in the presence of 
information asymmetries, unregulated competition among MFIs can lead to adverse 
effects on borrowers.  They find that as a result of competition, poorer borrowers are 
worst affected as they cannot avail of credit as creditors wish to serve only the most 
profitable clients.  Using data from the Foundation for International Community 
Assistance (FINCA), the largest incumbent MFI in Uganda, McIntosh et al. (2005) 
show how the entry of competing lenders induces a decline in the repayment rate and 
the savings deposited with the incumbent.  They find that increased competition does 
not lead to an increase in the dropout rate or client enrollment rate, but suggest that 
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this might indicate that the market is not fully saturated and the more adverse impacts 
of competition predicted by theory are yet to be observed.  Kranton and Swamy (1999) 
show how a positive institutional change affected the structure of credit markets, 
which, in turn, had an adverse impact on borrower welfare.  Using data from 
agricultural credit markets in the Bombay Deccan in colonial India, they find that the 
introduction of civil courts increased competition among lenders, thereby reducing 
their incentives to subsidize farmers’ investments in bad periods and making them 
more vulnerable during crises.  These studies indicate the importance of examining the 
impact of introducing competition into rural credit markets.   
 
Features of credit markets in Rayagada 
While our household survey data do not permit the examination of the causes behind 
thin or missing financial markets in rural Rayagada, we find that a majority of 
households are unable to smooth consumption in the face of shocks, suggesting 
potential credit rationing and/or missing credit and insurance markets.  Table 4.1 
provides the share of households that use different risk-coping strategies in order to 
manage up to the 3 recent-most shocks faced in the 5 years preceding the survey.  301 
out of 499 households surveyed (or 60 percent) reported facing one or more shocks.  
57 percent of these households reported that they reduced consumption to cope with 
the shock.  The second-most important coping strategy was reported to be borrowing 
from local, private informal moneylenders (23 percent), followed by transfers from 
friends and family (10 percent), and sale of productive assets (7 percent) . 
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Table 4.1: Coping strategies used to manage shocks experienced by households 
Coping strategies 
Share of households  
(in percent) 
Reduce consumption 56.9 
Borrow from local moneylender  22.6 
Transfers from friends and family 10.0 
Sale of assets (agricultural tools, livestock, land, other)   7.0 
Other (increase labor supply, transfers from govt. and NGO, 
etc.) 
  3.5 
Notes: Shares reflect reports of coping strategies ever used for up to the 3 most recent shocks, 
conditional on experiencing a shock in the 5 years preceding the survey.  Out of the 301 households 
who reported facing shocks, 41 percent report using more than 1 risk-coping mechanism while 7 
percent report using 3 risk-coping mechanisms.  Estimates are corrected for sampling weights.   
 
Who are the moneylenders in this region and what is their modus operandi? 
81
 
Moneylenders in this region are typically local shopkeepers or traders.  They provide 
loans in the form of cash as well as in-kind (mostly in the form of grains).  Due to the 
nature of their relationships with borrowers, which normally involve repeated 
interactions over long periods of time, contract enforcement is reported not to be a 
problem.  Informal interviews with villagers in Kashipur revealed that, after harvest 
time, moneylenders often collect loans in the form of cash crops by visiting the homes 
of their borrowers.  In fact, the vast majority of loans were reportedly returned in-kind, 
regardless of whether the loans were originally made in the form or cash or in-kind.  In 
the event that a borrowing household is unable to return a loan, moneylenders employ 
them as unpaid agricultural labor (such as for grazing animals) or domestic labor.  
This indicates the presence of tied labor-credit contracts in the area, often with 
onerous labor requirements.  Such tied labor-credit contracts are commonly observed 
across rural economies in the developing world (Hoff et al. 1993). 
 
                                                 
81 This brief description is based on group interviews conducted in a number of villages in Kashipur, 
separate from the grain bank village and household surveys.  The villages, which include both grain 
bank and non-grain bank villages, are Paraja Sila, Telengiri, Similiguda, Ranjuguda, Patamanda and 
Bajansil. 
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What are the loan sizes and interest rates offered by the moneylenders?   
There appears to be a considerable variation in both the loan amounts offered and the 
interest rates charged by moneylenders.  The loan amounts ranged between 50 rupees 
(slightly over US$1, at the current exchange rate) and 7,000 rupees (about US$175).  
The average loan size was 1,112 rupees (about US$29), with a standard deviation of 
1,185 rupees (about US$30).   The mean annual interest rate charged by moneylenders 
on outstanding cash loans (which formed 98 percent of outstanding loans) was 
reported to be close to 50 percent, with a standard deviation of 30 percent and a range 
of 5 percent to 250 percent.82  Due to the high level of occupational homogeneity in 
our data – virtually all household heads are employed in small-scale farming – we are 
unable to examine if there is credit market fragmentation by occupation (i.e., different 
interest rates for different occupations), as, for example, Meyer et al. (1997) do for 
rural informal credit markets in the Philippines. 
 
What are the main reasons that households borrow from moneylenders? 
Table 4.2 shows that the vast majority of loans from the moneylender were 
consumption loans. Seventy-two percent of households cited that the reason for 
borrowing was to meet food and household expenses.  Another 12 percent of 
households cited expenses related to medical treatment or wedding expenses as the 
reason for borrowing.  Clearly, borrowing for consumption purposes, especially to 
meet food expenses, is by far the most common reason for borrowing from 
moneylenders. 
                                                 
82 Given the flexibility and unwritten nature of these credit contracts, the interest rate figures reported 
above are unlikely to accurately take into account the value of in-kind payments (including unpaid 
household or farm labor in lieu of credit payments, pointing to interlinked labor-credit contracts), and 
are likely to be biased downwards.     
 216 
 
Table 4.2: Reason for loan from moneylender 
Reason Share of loans (percent) 
Food/ household expenses  72.2 
Agricultural expenses    9.0 
Home repairs    6.8 
Medical treatment    6.0 
Other (Trade, Wedding expenses, etc.)    6.0 
Total 100.0 
Notes: Shares are conditional on reporting an outstanding loan from the moneylender at the time of 
the survey. 
 
Community grain banks 
Given this context, grain banks are perceived as a welcome alternative source of credit 
for consumption smoothing purposes by households in the study area.   Agragamee 
first introduced grain banks in Kashipur in 1981 and later expanded the initiative to all 
villages in Kashipur during the 1990s as part of the Orissa Household Food Security 
Project (OHFSP).83   
What are grain banks?  Grain banks provide loans in the form of grains, 
typically during the lean season when food shortages are at a peak, to be returned with 
interest (also in the form of grains), typically during the harvest season.  They are 
community-based institutions: they are village-level (or hamlet-level, in the case that 
there is more than one hamlet in a village).  They are member-owned and member-
managed: after an initial external grant, grain bank operations are managed by an 
elected committee, comprising of grain bank members themselves, and operational 
decisions (such as setting interest rates) are usually made in open meetings comprising 
all grain bank members.   
Though they are not group-based, grain banks employ some of the same 
mechanisms used by group-based credit institutions to mitigate informational and 
enforcement problems.  Given that tribal, agrarian societies are bound by close ties of 
                                                 
83 For more details on the grain bank initiative in Kashipur, see Chapter 2. 
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clan and kinship, individuals typically possess a rich set of information regarding 
fellow members.  Thus, peer monitoring can be an effective and low-cost instrument 
for attenuating informational asymmetries and enabling contract enforcement.  This 
has been shown both theoretically and empirically in the case of German credit 
cooperatives by Banerjee et al. (1994).   
Community-based institutions such as grain banks can also take advantage of 
the role of the community in enforcing non-opportunistic behavior through the threat 
of social sanctions.  Besley et al. (1993) and Besley and Coate (1995) show that the 
threat of social sanctions can help maintain high repayment rates and also help 
overcome free rider problems in activities with a public good character, such as peer 
monitoring and auditing.  This has been shown empirically by Miguel and Gugerty 
(2004) in the provision of public goods in Kenya.84   
Even in the absence of group-based lending, dynamic incentives have been 
shown to reduce default risk.  For example, Morduch (1999) and Alexander (2006) 
show that when a borrower has continual credit needs, access to future loans can 
provide a strong reason to avoid default on a current loan.  This situation is also true of 
grain bank borrowers: food shortages occur year after year, and the threat of losing 
access to future loans may be sufficient to prevent opportunistic default.  Moreover, 
since members of a small, traditional rural community typically interact with the same 
individuals on a repeated basis over long periods of time, informal contracts can 
become self-enforcing as the short-term benefits from reneging are much smaller than 
the long-term costs (Posner 1980, Coate and Ravallion 1993).  As a result, even in the 
                                                 
84 Mude (2006) however shows how the informational advantages provided by close kinship ties in 
small communities are diminished if incentives for patronage and favor-peddling are present, providing 
a cautionary note on the limitations of peer monitoring in small, traditional communities.  In addition, 
the personal nature of community-based arrangements (together with the absence of checks and 
balances in isolated rural communities) can also make them more vulnerable to capture by local elites 
or non-traditional leaders, as members of the community may be afraid of retribution or unwilling to act 
as whistle-blowers (see, e.g., Mansuri and Rao 2004 or Conning and Kevane 2002).  
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absence of formal legal courts, informal contracts such as in grain banks can be self-
enforcing and address informational and enforcement problems (Platteau 2000). 
The recent establishment of grain banks in rural Rayagada has introduced an 
element of competition into the credit market where none existed earlier.  However, 
given that grain banks provide a very limited loan variety (consumption credit, in the 
form of grains), it is unclear how their presence affect private, informal moneylenders, 
the most common source of credit in these areas. In addition, since not all households 
become members of grain banks, it would be important to examine how grain bank 
establishment affects the ability of, not only members, but also non-members to obtain 
credit from moneylenders.   
While grain banks have been designed to address food security concerns, they 
are likely to have an impact on the structure of the credit market.  Clearly, grain banks 
offer a more attractive alternative by setting lower interest rates (which, at 20-25 
percent, are lower than standard moneylender interest rates).  Anecdotal evidence from 
grain bank members indicates that grain banks have indeed reduced dependence on 
moneylenders, the incumbent lender in these markets.  Yet, it is unclear if this impact 
is restricted to grain bank members or also extends to non-members.  Economic theory 
would predict that a price-discriminating moneylender would charge higher interest 
rates to grain bank non-members in order to compensate for the loss in client base.  
However, informal interviews indicate that there have been no changes in interest rates 
charged to non-grain bank members in either grain bank villages or non-grain bank 
villages.  While our data do not permit a rigorous analysis of the impact of grain banks 
on interest rates charged by moneylenders, we present naïve estimates in our empirical 
results section (Section 4.4). 
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4.3 Empirical methodology
85 
The evaluation problem 
The central problem in evaluation arises because we cannot observe outcomes for the 
same observation in the counterfactual state (Heckman and Robb 1985).  For example, 
in this study, we can observe households that are grain bank participants (the treatment 
group) or households that are grain bank non-participants (the comparison group), but 
we cannot observe outcomes for the same household in both states.  The cleanest 
solution to this missing data problem is a social experiment where the comparison 
group is constructed from a random subset of the eligible population.  However, since 
we do not have experimental data but rather observational data, we have to rely on 
non-experimental methods to estimate the impact of grain bank participation on 
borrowing from local moneylenders.   
 
Matching compared with other non-experimental estimators 
In recent years, an estimator that has gained wide usage in evaluation using non-
experimental data is matching.86  Matching estimators are based on the premise that 
the most appropriate estimate of the counterfactual untreated outcome for a treated 
unit is the outcome of an untreated unit or units most similar to the treated unit from 
the identified comparison group, under the assumption that selection into program 
participation is based on observables.  While this is a strong assumption, it is also 
made by alternate non-experimental estimators such as linear regression.  Although 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation can address bias due to selection on 
unobservables, the validity of the estimates is sensitive to the choice of the IV (a 
                                                 
85 This section largely borrows from the corresponding section in Chapter 3. 
86 For an evaluation of matching estimators, see, among others, Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002), 
Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a), Heckman et al. (1998), and Smith and Todd (2001, 2005a).  For an 
overview of different non-experimental estimators, see Blundell and Costa Dias (2002). 
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variable which has to be correlated with the decision to participate, but uncorrelated 
with any unobserved factors that affect the outcome).  However, the difficulties of 
finding a valid IV are well-known.   
If we assume that selection is indeed based on observables (or that the 
variables observable to the researcher span almost all of those used by the agent in 
deciding whether or not to participate), matching estimators provide impact estimates 
that can approximate estimates provided by randomized experiments.  To do this, 
matching estimators first generate a propensity score.  The propensity score is simply 
a predicted probability, based on observed characteristics, that the individual (or 
household) will participate in the program.  This is used to match treated units with 
untreated units that are similar in every (observable) respect except in their treatment 
status.87  The difference in the outcome of interest between matched units can then be 
attributed to the program.   
Matching has some important advantages over regression.  The latter imposes 
a linear functional form to identify the counterfactual outcome.88  However, unlike 
regression, matching methods are either semi-parametric or non-parametric, 
depending on the particular method used (Black and Smith 2004).  In matching, after 
units with comparable propensity scores are matched, the difference in the outcome 
between the units provides the impact estimate.  This is particularly important if 
participants and non-participants differ substantially in terms of their observed 
characteristics, as regression assumes the same functional form for both groups.   
                                                 
87 We discuss the matching algorithms used to match treated and untreated units in the latter half of this 
section.   
88 If we include a sufficient number of higher order terms, however, the linear model can approximate a 
given non-linear function of the set of conditioning variables X arbitrarily well.  In practice, however, 
including a large number of higher order terms for each variable, results in a degrees of freedom 
problem.  
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In addition, matching only pairs control and treatment units having similar 
propensity scores.  For a given control unit, if no comparable unit (i.e., having a 
similar propensity score) is available in the treatment group, then it is discarded from 
the analysis.  This area of overlap between the propensity scores is known as the 
“common support” region (Smith and Todd 2005a).  However, in regression, all 
treatment and control units are compared, regardless of whether they are comparable.  
While matching does not solve the support problem, it highlights it in a way that 
regression does not (Black and Smith 2004).  In other words, matching exposes the 
common support problem, i.e., whether or not comparable untreated units are available 
for each treated unit (Smith 2004).  After estimating the propensity scores for the 
treatment and comparison groups, it is possible to compare the densities in order to 
examine the extent of the common support problem.   
In addition, matching weights observations differently than ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression in calculating the expected counterfactual for each treated 
observation.  In OLS regression, all untreated units play a role in determining the 
expected counterfactual for any given treated unit and receive equal weight.  In 
matching, however, only untreated units similar to each treated unit have a positive 
weight in determining the expected counterfactual, and these weights can vary 
depending on the distance in propensity scores between the matched units.   
 
Performance of matching compared to experimental estimates 
A number of recent studies have compared the performance of matching by comparing 
experimental estimates with non-experimental estimates using matching, mostly using 
data from voluntary employment and job training programs in the United States.  
Comparing experimental estimates to matching estimates using non-experimental data 
from the Job Training Partnership Act (JPTA) program, Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a) 
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and Heckman et al. (1998b) provide evidence that propensity score matching methods 
perform well relative to experimental estimators, provided the following set of 
conditions are met: (1) the presence of a rich set of conditioning variables; (2) use of 
the same survey instruments for participants and non-participants; and (3) participants 
and non-participants face the same economic conditions.  Using data from mandatory 
welfare-to-work training programs, Michalopoulos et al. (2004) come to a similar 
conclusion: matching estimators do not provide reliable estimates if the data for the 
comparison group come from a different geographic and labor market.  Using National 
Support Work (NSW) data, Smith and Todd (2005a) highlight the fact that the 
performance of matching estimators depends critically on the quality of the data – 
specifically, that the conditions established by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a), and 
Heckman et al. (1998b), are met.  A more recent paper by Diaz and Handa (2006) 
provides evidence on the performance of matching estimators using non-US data.  
Comparing experimental and non-experimental estimates of the impact of Progresa, a 
voluntary anti-poverty program in Mexico, they find that matching estimators using 
the latter perform well when the outcomes of interest are measured comparably across 
treated and untreated groups and a rich set of covariates is available.   
In our data, a number of conditioning variables that potentially identify 
program participation and outcomes are available; the same survey questionnaire is 
used in grain bank and non-grain bank villages as a result of which the outcomes of 
interest are measured identically; and participants and non-participants are in the same 
geographical area, namely within the same administrative unit within Rayagada 
district in the state of Orissa, and face the same economic and ecological conditions.  
Therefore, we argue that matching estimates can provide reliable program impact 
estimates in our study.  In the next section, we discuss the conditions that need to hold 
to obtain valid matching estimates. 
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Matching methods 
Following Heckman et al. (1997) and Smith and Todd (2001, 2005a), let 1Y  denote the 
outcome of interest for grain bank participant households (the treatment group), 0Y the 
corresponding outcome for non-grain bank households (the comparison group), and 
{ }0,1D∈ an indicator variable denoting grain bank participation.  Let X denote the set 
of conditioning variables.  The parameter of interest – the average impact of the 
treatment on the treated (ATT) – is given by 
1 0
1 0
1 0
( 1, )
( 1, ) ( 1, )
( 1, ) ( 0, )
E Y Y D X
E Y D X E Y D X
E Y D X E Y D X
− =
= = − =
= = − =
 
Under the assumption of conditional independence (CIA), i.e., treatment status is 
independent of the outcome conditional on a set of observed covariates, we can 
estimate the parameter of interest (Imbens 2004).89   Thus, the first condition required 
for matching estimates to be valid is 0( )Y D X⊥ (Condition 1).  In other words, 
selection into the program is based only on observables.  Put differently, this assumes 
that the analyst can observe the complete set of variables used by the agent in making 
the decision to participate. 
The second condition required for matching to be valid is 0 Pr( 1 ) 1D X< = <  
(Condition 2).  In other words, for all X  there is a positive probability of either 
participating ( 1D = ) or not participating ( 0D = ).   
Condition 1 runs contrary to those invoked by many economic models of self-
selection, and its validity depends crucially on how well the observed data capture all 
the variables that affect program participation and outcomes of interest.  The validity 
of matching estimates thus depends crucially on a thorough understanding of the 
                                                 
89 Smith and Todd (2005a) show that only a weaker assumption, 0 0( , 1) ( , 0)E Y X D E Y X D= = = (i.e., 
the conditional mean assumption), is needed to estimate the parameter of interest.   
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selection process and the availability of a rich set of conditioning variables that affect 
participation and outcomes.   
However, as the number of conditioning variables increases, we have to 
contend with what is commonly referred to as matching’s version of the “curse of 
dimensionality” (Heckman et al. 1997).  In other words, as the number of conditioning 
variables increases, it is possible to have many cells without matches.  In this context, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if we can match on X, we can also match 
on ( ) Pr( 1 )P X D X= = , the conditional participation probability or the so-called 
propensity score. 
If the propensity score is estimated non-parametrically, we again have to 
contend with the problem of dimensionality (Heckman et al. 1998a).  If the propensity 
score is estimated using parametric (such as logit or probit regression) or semi-
parametric methods, however, then the dimensionality of the matching problem is 
reduced.  We can then match on the univariate propensity score.  Given Conditions 1 
and 2, we can then estimate the parameter of interest by  
1 0( 1, ( )) ( 0, ( ))E Y D P X E Y D P X= − = . 
In experimental data, Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied by random assignment to 
treatment.  For non-experimental data, there may or may not exist a set of variables 
X such that these conditions are satisfied.  Thus, it is important to be aware that our 
estimates depend crucially on our assumptions, in particular, that we have a set of 
variables X such that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied.   
Smith and Todd (2005a) also draw attention to the important fact that matching 
estimates are only valid if the support of X overlaps for the 1D = and 0D = groups.  
In other words, the treatment effect should be redefined as the program impact on 
participants whose propensity scores lie within the common support region (Smith and 
Todd 2005a). 
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 Practical issues in propensity score matching 
Assuming that Conditions 1 and 2 hold, there are a number of practical steps involved 
in estimation using matching methods.  First, how to choose the propensity score 
model and which variables to use?  Second, which matching estimator to use?   Third, 
what criteria to use in implementing the common support restriction?  Fourth, which 
balancing test to use for implementing the propensity score method?   We examine 
these issues, as well as related ones (such as specifying the kernel and bandwidth for 
certain estimators) below.   
 
Choosing the propensity score model  
As discussed in Smith (1997), there is little guidance on the functional form to use in 
specifying the propensity score model.  In principle, any discrete choice model can be 
used.  In practice, for the binary treatment case, the binomial logit or probit models are 
used.  These are usually preferred to the linear probability model, due to the latter’s 
shortcomings, such as predictions which are outside the [0,1] range.  However, given 
that the purpose of the propensity score model is classification into treatment and 
comparison groups rather than the estimation of structural coefficients, model choice 
is not a critical issue (Smith 1997).  And since both the logit and probit models yield 
similar results, both are commonly used in the empirical literature for predicting 
propensity scores.90   In our study, we estimate the propensity score model using a 
binomial probit. 
 
                                                 
90 Model choice is more important in the case of multiple treatments, but this issue is not relevant for 
our study (see Lechner 2001 for examples of the propensity score model in the case of multiple 
treatments). 
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Choosing which covariates to include in the propensity score model 
The CIA assumption depends critically on including a set of covariates which captures 
the variables involved in selection into program participation.  Todd and Smith (2005) 
show that matching estimates are biased unless the set of covariates X that satisfies 
Conditions 1 and 2 is included in the propensity score model specification.  Thus, in 
order to obtain reliable matching estimates, one needs to capture all observable 
variables that potentially affect program participation as well as the outcome of 
interest.   Thus, the issue of choosing which covariates to include in the propensity 
score model is important.   
While theory provides some guidance on which variables are likely to affect 
both participation and outcomes, there is little guidance on how to correctly specify X 
in practice.  Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998b) show that there are 
larger biases if a ‘coarse’ set of conditioning variables is used relative to a ‘rich’ one.   
Rubin and Thomas (1996, p.253) argue in favor of including more covariates in the 
propensity score model specification, unless there is consensus that a variable is 
“unrelated to the outcome or not a proper covariate.”  However, including more 
covariates in X can also be a problem, as it comes at the cost of reducing the region of 
common support (Smith and Todd 2005a).  In fact, a model that predicts perfectly 
results in observations with propensity scores that do not have any common support.   
Bryson et al. (2002, as cited in Millimet and Tchernis 2006) also argue that the 
inclusion of “irrelevant” variables can increase the variance of the treatment effect 
indicator.91  However, Millimet and Tchernis (2006) use Monte Carlo simulations to 
compare the performance of matching estimators when relevant higher order terms are 
excluded and irrelevant higher order terms are included in the specification of the 
                                                 
91 These may be higher order terms of variables that are relevant (but only at a lower order) or variables 
that are wholly irrelevant.  
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propensity score model. They find that overspecification of the propensity score model 
does not result in less efficient estimates, using different propensity score matching 
estimators including kernel estimators.  Underspecification, on the other hand, results 
in worse estimates.  Their results are corroborated in an application testing the impact 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the environment as well as that of 
currency unions on international trade. 
In general, the choice of variables usually depends on economic theory and 
previous empirical findings.  However, Heckman et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1998b) 
and Black and Smith (2004) also suggest some formal tests for choosing X.  Heckman 
et al. (1997) suggest choosing the set of variables that maximizes the within-sample 
prediction rates using the hit-or-miss method.92  Heckman et al. (1998b) suggest a test 
of statistical significance.  They start with a parsimonious specification, and then add 
new variables iteratively.  If the new variable is statistically significant at conventional 
levels, then it is included in the final X; otherwise it is discarded.  Black and Smith 
(2004) suggest the ‘leave-one-out cross validation method’ to specify the propensity 
score model.  In this method, they begin the model selection procedure by starting 
with a minimally specified model, and then successively add blocks of variables, 
comparing the resulting mean squared errors.  Essentially, this method involves 
examining the fit of the model.  However, in the case that this method suggests leaving 
out covariates that theory and previous empirical evidence suggest should be included, 
they advise giving more consideration to the latter.   
In our study, we include a number of household and community-level variables 
that we believe affect both participation and outcomes.  We use the ‘leave-one-out 
                                                 
92 In this method, an observation is classified as ‘1’ if the estimated propensity score is greater than the 
sample proportion of persons who receive the treatment, and 0 otherwise.  This maximizes the overall 
classification rate, assuming that the costs for misclassification are the same for both treatment and 
control groups (Heckman et al. 1997).  
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cross-validation method’.   First, we specify a model with household-level variables 
only.  We then add village-level variables and compare the fit of the models. 
 
Choosing the matching estimator 
There exist a variety of matching estimators, which differ mainly in how they assign 
weights to each comparison group observation.  Asymptotically, they produce similar 
results, as in a large sample, they only compare exact matches (Black and Smith 
2004).  However, in finite samples, the estimates produced by different matching 
methods differ because of differences in the weighting function they use, as also how 
they address the common support problem (ibid).    
Following Smith and Todd (2005a), for simplicity of notation, we rewrite 
( )Pr 1P D X= = .  A typical matching estimator, Mαˆ , takes the form  
( )
1
M 1 0
1
1 ˆˆ E 1,
P
i i i i
i I S
Y Y D P
n
α
∈ ∩
 = − = ∑ , 
where 
( ) ( )
0
0 0Eˆ 1, ,i i i j
j I
Y D P W i j Y
∈
= =∑  
and 1I denotes the set of program participants, 0I the set of non-participants, PS the 
region of common support, 1n the number of persons who are in the set 1 PI S∩ .  Every 
participant 1 Pi I S∈ ∩  is matched with a weighted average over the outcomes of non-
participants, where the weights ( , )W i j depend on the distance between iP and jP .  For 
each 1i I∈ , ( )iC P is defined to be a neighborhood.  Individuals matched to i are those 
people in set iA  such that { }0 | ( )j ij I P C P∈ ∈ .   
Matching estimators differ from one another mainly in how they construct the 
weights ( ),W i j  and define the neighborhood ( )iC P .  Broadly speaking, they can be 
classified into two main types – traditional pair or one-to-one matching estimators, and 
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more recently developed non-parametric matching estimators which match most (or 
all) the control observations using a pre-defined weighting function.   
In one-to-one (or one-to-many) matching, outcomes are compared to the most 
observably similar untreated unit.  Untreated units that do not have sufficiently close 
propensity scores are discarded.  This reduces bias (due to better matches) but 
increases variance (due to fewer matches) (Smith and Todd 2005a).  A common 
example of traditional matching estimators include nearest neighbor matching.  In this 
method, the untreated unit j is matched to that treated unit i such that distance 
between them is the smallest.  The neighborhood is defined as  
( ) mini i j
j
C P P P= −  , 0j I∈ . 
Nearest neighbor matching, which is traditionally performed without replacement, 
constructs ( , ) 1W i j =  such that all matched units receive equal weight.  Nearest 
neighbor matching can also be performed with replacement, such that untreated units 
can be matched to more than one treated unit, with accompanying trade-offs between 
reduced bias and increased variance compared to matching without replacement.    
However, nearest neighbor matching is clearly inefficient.  More efficient 
alternatives to nearest neighbor matching include a family of non-parametric, kernel-
weighted matching estimators such as kernel matching and local linear matching 
(Heckman et al. 1997, 1998a).93  Relative to pair-wise matching, these estimators 
reduce the asymptotic mean squared error (Smith and Todd 2005a).  In a study of 
finite sample properties of various matching estimators using Monte Carlo 
simulations, Fröhlich (2004) finds that the nearest neighbor estimator performs poorly 
relative to non-parametric kernel-weighted matching estimators.  The latter match a 
treated unit with the weighted average score of all untreated units within a certain 
                                                 
93 We do not discuss the difference-in-differences matching estimator proposed by Heckman et al. 
(1997) and Heckman et al. (1998b) since it requires before-after data which is not available to us.  This 
estimator is preferred since it can control for time-invariant unobservables. 
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distance, referred to as the bandwidth.  The weight given to the untreated unit is 
inversely proportionate to the distance between i  and j and depends on the weighting 
function that is used.  Relative to pair-wise matching, the use of more untreated units 
reduces the variance of the matching estimates; however, it increases the bias.   
The most commonly used kernel-weighted estimators include the kernel 
estimator and the local linear estimator.  Heckman et al. (1997) find that the local 
linear matching estimator has a slight advantage over the kernel matching estimator 
because of some desirable statistical properties; namely, it converges at a faster rate at 
boundary points and adapts better to different data densities.  Fan (1992) also shows 
that local linear matching is better able to adapt to survey design.  Therefore, one of 
the estimators used in this study is based on local linear matching.  In local linear 
matching, the weighting function is given by 
( )
( ) ( )( )
0 0
0 0 0
2
2
2
(( ) ( )
( , )
ij ik k i ij j i ik k ik I k I
ij ij k i ik k ij I k I k I
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∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
’ 
where ( )( )/ij j i nG G P P a= − , and G denotes the kernel function and an the parameter 
determining the kernel bandwidth. 
However, Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a) find that the local linear matching 
estimator does not perform well in small samples when there are regions of sparse data 
density.  A common solution is to implement a trimming procedure in regions where 
the density of the propensity in the untreated population is small.  However, Fröhlich 
(2004) points out that there is little practical guidance on the optimal level of 
trimming.  From the distribution of propensity scores in our estimations, we find that 
while there is a large region of overlap in the propensity scores of treated and 
untreated observations (i.e., the region of common support), the distribution of the 
propensity scores for the two groups in our data is quite different, and so there are 
regions of sparse density.  In addition, our sample size is small.  For this reason, we 
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also estimate the kernel matching model to examine if the estimates from the local 
linear matching analysis are comparable.   
The weighting function for the kernel estimator is given by  
0
(( ) / ) / (( ) / )j i n k i nk IG P P a G P P a∈− −∑ . 
Following Heckman et al. (1997) and Smith and Todd (2005a), the kernel-weighted 
matching estimate of program impact takes the form 
0
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The main difference between local linear matching and kernel matching is that the 
former includes a linear term in iP in addition to the intercept.  According to Smith and 
Todd (2005a, p. 317), this is helpful when “comparison group observations are 
distributed asymmetrically around the participant observations, as would be the case at 
a boundary point of P or at any point where there are gaps in the distribution of P.  
Thus, the local linear regression estimator is a more generalized version of the kernel 
estimator.   
For both the local linear and kernel matching estimators, the neighborhood 
( )iC P  depends on the choice of the kernel function.  Two commonly used kernels in 
the empirical matching literature include the Epanechnikov and Gaussian kernel.  
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), in a study of the 
effects of college quality, Black and Smith (2004) find that the Epanechnikov kernel 
estimator performs slightly better than the Gaussian kernel estimator, independent of 
the size of the bandwidth.  They find that the former converges faster than the 
Gaussian kernel and implicitly imposes the support condition through the choice of the 
bandwidth.  Given this, we use the Epanechnikov kernel here with variable bandwidth.  
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The latter, relative to a fixed bandwidth, has the advantage of varying the bandwidth 
depending on the data density at that point, i.e., it uses a small bandwidth in regions 
where the probability mass is dense and a large bandwidth when the probability mass 
is sparse (Ham et al. 2005). 
A related choice that has important implications for the tradeoff between 
variance and bias, especially for matching methods based on kernel regression, is the 
size of the bandwidth or smoothing parameter.  While a smaller bandwidth results in 
smaller bias but larger variance, a larger bandwidth results in smaller variance but 
larger bias (Galdo, Smith, and Black 2006).  Specifically, in the case of matching, a 
smaller bandwidth leads to the use of few untreated units for each treated unit while a 
larger bandwidth leads to the use of untreated units that may be rather different from 
each treated unit.  The standard approach in the matching literature to guide bandwidth 
choice is minimization of some quadratic loss functions, such as the mean squared 
error (MSE) or integrated mean squared error (IMSE), as a measure of fit.   However, 
as discussed by Galdo, Smith and Black (2006), the bandwidth that minimizes the 
MSE for the regression function of the untreated outcome is not that which minimizes 
the MSE for the object of interest, which in our case is the ATT.  In addition, if the 
distribution of the conditioning variables is not balanced for the treated and untreated 
observations, then the optimal bandwidth in the region of low propensity scores 
(where most untreated units lie) will be different from the optimal bandwidth in the 
region of high propensity scores (where most treated units lie).  This results in biased 
estimates.   
In our study, we examine the MSE for varying bandwidths between 0.01 and 
0.1 (in 0.01 increments).  We present estimates for bandwidth size 0.06, which, while 
not having the minimum MSE in the range examined, enables us to include a more 
inclusive X vector of balanced covariates.  We also present estimates for different 
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bandwidth sizes (specifically, 0.05 and 0.07) to examine the sensitivity of our impact 
estimates to the choice of bandwidth. 
 
Choosing the criteria to restrict matching to the common support region 
In order to obtain credible matching estimates, only those comparison and treatment 
observations whose propensity scores fall within the region of common support should 
be included.  This is particularly important for kernel-weighted matching since it uses 
all comparison observations to estimate the counterfactual outcome, unlike nearest 
neighbor matching.  Implementing the common support restriction can improve the 
quality of the matches used to estimate the ATT, although it comes at the cost of 
reduced sample size as observations at the boundaries of the common support are 
excluded.   
In practice, one of two methods is commonly implemented for ensuring 
common support.  The first involves the comparison of the minimum and maximum 
propensity scores of treatment and comparison observations.  All observations in the 
treatment (or comparison) group whose propensity score is smaller than the minimum 
and larger than the maximum of the propensity scores in the opposite group are 
discarded.   
The second method for implementing the common support is a trimming 
procedure, as suggested by Smith and Todd (2005a).  They determine the common 
support region by  
ˆˆ { : ( | 1) 0PS P f P D= = >  and ˆ ( | 0) 0}f P D = > , 
where ˆ ( | )f P D d= , {0,1}d∈  are non-parametric density estimators given by  
ˆ ( | ) (( ) / )
d
k nk I
f P D d G P P a
∈
= = −∑ . 
They then define a trimming level q and require that densities are strictly positive and 
exceed zero by q.   They exclude observations with P for which the density is zero, 
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and then an additional q percent of remaining P points for which the estimated density 
is low (although positive).  Thus, the set of eligible matches is given by 
1
ˆˆ ˆ{ : ( | 1)q P qS P I S f P D c= ∈ ∩ = >  and ˆ ( | 0) }qf P D c= > . 
In our study, we use the min-max method to implement the common support region as 
there are no guidelines on how to arrive at the optimal trimming level given the data 
(Fröhlich 2004).   
 
Choosing a balancing test for the set of covariates included in the propensity score 
model 
If the CIA assumption is valid, after we condition on P, additional conditioning on any 
of the X’s should not provide any new information about the treatment decision.  This 
implies that all the Xs should be “balanced” across the treated and matched untreated 
groups.  Thus, in order to assess the quality of the matching estimates, we need to 
conduct a ‘balancing test’ of the characteristics of the matched samples.  There are a 
few formal tests that are commonly implemented in the literature, though there is no 
consensus on which one is definitive. 
 Proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), one balancing test is the 
examination of standardized differences (see, e.g., Sianesi 2004).  In words, the 
standardized difference for a variable kX is the difference in means between the 
treated and matched untreated group samples, as a percentage of the square root of the 
average of the sample variance in both groups.  Intuitively, this provides the size of the 
difference in means of a conditioning variable between the treated and matched 
untreated group, scaled down by the average of the variances.94  In this method, for 
each of the conditioning variables, the standardized bias before matching is 
                                                 
94 The shortcoming of this method is that there are no formal criteria for which the standardized bias is 
too large to pass the balancing test (Smith and Todd 2005b).  Smith and Todd (2005b) also point out 
that the standardized bias can be manipulated by the researcher by adding additional observations to the 
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where 0MX , 0var ( )M X , MX1 , and 1var ( )M X
 
denote the means and variances in the 
treated and untreated groups after matching, respectively.  If the covariates are 
balanced, we expect a reduction in the standardized bias (although there is no formal 
criteria for how much reduction should occur).   
 A second balancing test proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) is to 
examine if there are significant differences in covariate means between the treated and 
matched untreated groups, using two-sample t-tests (see, e.g., Ham et al. 2005).  While 
we expect differences to exist before matching, there should be no significant 
differences after matching as the covariates should be balanced in both groups. 
 A third test is a Hotelling T-squared test of the joint null of equal means of all 
the X’s between the treated and the matched or reweighted untreated group (see, e.g., 
Smith and Todd 2005b). 
 A fourth test is comparing the pseudo-R-squared of the original model used to 
create propensity scores with a re-estimated model using only the matched 
observations (Sianesi 2004).  Since the pseudo-R-squared indicates how well the X’s 
predict the probability of participation, the second pseudo-R-squared value should be 
                                                                                                                                            
comparison group if these additional observations increase the second variance term in the 
denominator. 
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low since we do not expect systematic differences in the distribution of covariates 
between the treated and matched untreated groups. 
 A fifth test proposed by Dehejia and Wahba’s (1999, 2002) is balancing the 
X’s within certain strata.  They first divide the treated and untreated observations into 
an arbitrary number of strata based on their propensity scores, such that within each 
stratum, there is no statistically difference in the mean propensity scores between the 
groups.  Then, within each stratum, for each covariate, they use a series of t-tests to 
examine if there is any significant difference in the means between the two groups.  If 
they find any significant difference, they add higher order and interaction terms in the 
specification of the propensity score until no differences appear. 
 A sixth test is based on a regression framework.  For example, Smith and Todd 
(2005b) first estimate the following regression: 
2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
kX P X P X P X P X
D DP X DP X DP X DP X
β β β β β
β β β β β η
= + + + +
+ + + + + +
 
The joint null is that that the coefficient on all the terms with the treatment dummy D 
equals zero.  In other words, after conditioning on the X’s, D should provide no 
information on Xk . 
 In our study, we examine two-sample t-tests for differences between means of 
the treated and matched untreated observations.  We also compare the standardized 
bias before and after matching, and examine the pseudo-R-squared of the propensity 
score model re-estimated after matching, using reweighted observations on the 
common support only.  
 
Sensitivity analysis: Unobserved heterogeneity 
Given that the validity of the matching estimates hinges on whether the CIA 
assumption holds, an analysis of the sensitivity of our results to departures from this 
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identifying assumption is crucial.  In this context, a bounding approach suggested by 
Rosenbaum (2002) is increasingly used in matching applications.  While the bounding 
approach cannot test the CIA assumption per se, it examines the extent to which the 
statistical significance the results hinges on this untestable assumption.  Suppose the 
probability of participation Pi is given by  
P( 1| ) ( ),i i i iD X F X Uβ γ= = +  
where iX are the observed characteristics for individual i , iU  are unobserved 
characteristics, and β and γ  are the impacts of iX  and iU  on the participation 
decision.  If there are no unobservable characteristics that affect participation, i.e., 
0,γ = then two individuals with the same set of observable characteristics X have the 
same probability of participation.  However, if 0,γ ≠ i.e., there are unobservable 
characteristics that affect participation, then two individuals with the same X have 
differing probabilities of participation.  Assuming, for simplicity, that F is the logistic 
distribution, the odds that two individuals i and j participate are given by 
P / (1 P )i i− and P / (1 P )j j− respectively. Then, the odds ratio can be written as   
P / (1 P ) exp( )
P (1 P ) / P (1 P ) .
P / (1 P ) exp( )
i i i i
i j j i
j j j j
X U
X U
β γ
β γ
− +
= − − =
− +
 
If i and j form a matched pair, then the X vector cancels out and the odds ratio can be 
simply 
written as exp[ ( )]i jU Uγ − .  If there are no differences in unobservables, i.e. ,i jU U=  
or the unobservable factors do not affect the probability of participating, i.e. 0,γ = the 
odds ratio equals 1, implying that the matching estimates do not suffer from 
unobserved selection bias.  However, if this is not the case, then the matching 
estimates are said to suffer from a “hidden bias”.  In this context, Rosenbaum (2002) 
shows that the following bounds can be placed on the odds ratio: 
P / (1 P )1
.
P / (1 P )
i i
j j
e
e
γ
γ
−
≤ ≤
−
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As eγ increases, the bounds move apart reflecting uncertainty due to the presence of 
unobserved selection bias.  Thus, eγ is a measure of the extent to which the analysis 
suffers from this bias. 
 In our study, we follow Rosenbaum’s approach to test the sensitivity of the 
significance of our results, if any, to violations of the CIA assumption.  For binary 
outcomes as in our study, Aakvik (2001) suggests using the Mantel and Haneszel 
(MH) test statistic.  The treatment effect on outcome Y is said to be significant if it 
crosses some test statistics ( , ),t D Y where D is a dummy variable denoting program 
participation.  Let 1n and 0n be the numbers of treated and non-treated units, where 
1 0n n n= + .  Let 1y and 0y  be the numbers of treated and untreated units where the 
binary outcome variable takes value 1, and where 1 0y y y= + .   The test statistic 
,MHQ which asymptotically follows the normal distribution, is given by  
1
1
1 1
1 1 0
2
0.5
( ) 0.5
( ) ( )
( 1)
MH
n y
y
y E y n
Q
Var y n n y n y
n n
− −
− −
= =
−
−
. 
Rosenbaum (2002) shows that MHQ can be bounded by two known distributions.  If 
1,eγ = the bounds are the same as the base scenario (i.e. no bias due to unobservables).  
However, as eγ increases, the bounds move apart.  Let MHQ
+ be the test statistic in the 
case that we have overestimated the treatment effect and MHQ
−  if we have 
underestimated the treatment effect.  The two bounds are then given by: 
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where Eɶ and ( )Var Eɶ are approximations of the expectation and variance of the 
number of treated units where the outcome variable takes value 1 in the population for 
given values of .γ  
 
4.4 Data, sample, and findings 
4.4.1 Data and sample 
The data come from the second wave of a small-scale household and grain bank 
survey implemented in Kashipur block in rural Rayagada, Orissa.95  The second wave 
was conducted towards the end of the “hungry” season, when the need for 
consumption credit is likely to be at its peak.  499 households across a total of 26 
villages were sampled during this wave.  The villages included 13 villages with 
operational grain banks at the time of the survey (referred to as grain bank villages) 
and 13 where grain banks were non-operational at the time of the survey (referred to 
as non-grain bank villages). 
In grain bank villages, grain banks have been continuous operation for an 
average duration of 16.6 years; with a range of 8 to 23 years.  Among these villages, 
10 had grain banks that had been in continuous operation for over 10 years, which we 
refer to as “long-lived” grain bank villages.  The non-grain bank villages include 10 
villages where grain banks had failed at least 5 years prior to the survey, and 3 villages 
where grain banks were never established.  The average operational duration of the 
failed grain banks was 4.5 years, with a maximum duration of 8 years.  Table 4.3 
provides descriptive statistics for our grain bank sample. 
Of the total sample of 499 households in our survey, 250 households were in 
grain bank villages and 249 households in non-grain bank villages.  Of the 250 
                                                 
95 Details of the survey and sampling methodology are provided in a separate appendix. 
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households in grain bank villages, 194 households were in long-lived grain bank 
villages. 
 
Table 4.3: Duration of grain bank survival (in years)  
Grain bank status N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Operational grain banks 13 16.6 4.7   8 23 
Long-lived operational grain banks  10 18.8 2.9 13 23 
Non-operational grain banks 10   4.5 2.4   0   8 
 
 
Of the total sample of households, 224 households reported having at least one 
currently outstanding loan, with 9 of these households having two loans, bringing the 
total number of outstanding loans to 233.  Table 4.4 presents the distribution of loans 
by source.  Fifty-seven percent of outstanding loans were provided by private 
moneylenders, making them the most commonly used source of credit.  This finding 
applies equally for both grain bank and non-grain bank villages – no statistically 
significant difference is observed in the distribution of credit by source between the 
two types of villages. 
 
Table 4.4: Source of loan by grain bank status 
Source  All loans  
Loans in 
GBVs 
 
Loans in 
NGBVs 
 
 Share of loans (in percent) 
Local moneylender    57.1    53.0    60.2 
Government scheme     40.3    43.0    38.3 
Other (including self-help group, friend/family, 
etc.)      2.6     4.0     1.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: Statistics are conditional on households having one or more outstanding loans at the time of 
the survey. GBV and NGBV denote grain bank and non-grain bank village, respectively. 
 
4.4.2 Naïve results 
In this subsection, we present our estimates of the impact of grain bank participation 
on the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders without the use of matching.  The 
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findings are presented largely to serve as a comparison to our main matching-based 
estimates.   
We implement two related unconditional analyses.  First, we compare the 
incidence of borrowing from moneylenders between participant households in all 
grain bank villages with households in non-grain bank villages.  Second, we compare 
the incidence of borrowing between participant households in long-lived grain bank 
villages to households in non-grain bank villages.  Our hypothesis is that the estimate 
of the difference in the incidence from the second analysis should be quantitatively 
larger, since we expect a more pronounced impact on borrowing from moneylenders 
in villages where grain banks have been in continuous operation for a longer duration. 
Table 4.5 presents the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders by grain 
bank availability and participation status for all villages.  Twenty-one percent of 
households in grain bank villages report having an outstanding loan from the local 
moneylender at the time of the survey, whereas 22 percent of households in non-grain 
bank villages do the same.  We find that the two shares do not appear to be statistically 
different from each other. 
This result is virtually unchanged when we eliminate households in grain bank 
villages that are non-participants (19 observations).  We do so because we believe that 
the moneylender can potentially price discriminate between households within the 
same village (and indeed, as presented in Section 4.2, moneylenders are observed to 
charge a wide range of interest rates to households within the same region). 
Therefore, although we do not have the data to examine our claim rigorously, 
we believe that the impact of grain bank establishment on non-participants may be 
different than for participants within grain bank villages.  We find that roughly 16 
percent of non-participant households have outstanding moneylender loans.  This 
 242 
share does not appear to be statistically different from the share of participant 
households with moneylender loans.   
 
Table 4.5: Incidence of borrowing by households from local moneylenders, by grain 
bank availability and participation status 
Village type 
Share of households  
(percent) 
Households in grain bank villages (1) 20.97 
Participant households in grain bank villages (2) 21.29 
Households in non-grain bank villages (3) 22.18 
Participant households in long-lived grain bank villages (4) 17.70 
H0: Share (1) – Share (3) = 0. HA: Share (1) – Share (3) < 0.   
t-statistic = 0.57; p-value = 0.2956. 
 
H0: Share (2) – Share (3) = 0. HA: Share (2) – Share (3) < 0.   
t-statistic = 0.38; p-value = 0.3516. 
 
H0: Share (4) – Share (3) = 0. HA: Share (4) – Share (3) < 0.  
t-statistic = 1.95; p-value = 0.0259. 
Notes: Estimates are corrected for sampling weights.  Two households in non-grain banks villages 
reported having 2 outstanding loans from moneylenders, at the time of survey.   
 
Table 4.5 also presents the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders 
separately for participant households in grain bank villages and households in non-
grain bank villages.  We find that 21 percent of participant households have 
outstanding moneylender loans.  Once again, we find that the share does not appear to 
be statistically different from the corresponding share for households in non-grain 
bank villages. 
Finally, Table 4.5 also presents the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders 
for households in non-grain bank villages.  Of the 194 households in long-lived grain 
bank villages, 18 are grain bank non-participants.  Thus, the sample size of participant 
households is 176.  We find that 18 percent of participant households in long-lived 
grain bank villages have outstanding moneylender loans.  As expected, this share is 
smaller than the corresponding share for participant households from all grain banks 
villages.  Furthermore, we find that the difference in the shares between participant 
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households in long-lived grain bank villages and households in non-grain bank 
villages is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.   
The question that follows is how grain banks affect the terms of moneylender 
loan contracts offered to borrower households.  Due to the small sample size, we are 
unable to implement a rigorous analysis of the terms of the contracts offered by 
moneylenders.  However, in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, we present selected summary 
statistics on loan amounts and interest rates on moneylender loans.  We present these 
statistics for three groups of borrower households: participant households, non-
participant households in grain bank villages and households in non-grain bank 
villages.   
In Table 4.6, we present descriptive statistics for the amounts borrowed from 
moneylenders.  While we do not find a significant difference between the average loan 
size from participant and non-participant households in grain bank villages, we find 
that the average loan size for participant households is statistically significantly lower 
than that for households in non-grain bank villages at the 1 percent level, using a one-
sided t-test of difference in means.  
 
Table 4.6: Loan amounts from moneylenders, by grain bank availability and 
participation status 
Participation status N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Participant households in grain bank villages (1) 53 763.87 637.94 100.00 3000.00 
Non-participant households in grain bank 
villages (2) 3 878.92 294.92 400.00 1000.00 
Households in non-grain bank villages (3) 76 1329.74 1323.86 50.00 7000.00 
H0: Mean (1) – Mean (2) = 0.  HA: Mean (1) – Mean (2) < 0.  
t-statistic =  0.33; p-value = 0.3697. 
 
H0: Mean (1) – Mean (3) = 0. HA: Mean (1) – Mean (3) < 0.  
t-statistic = 3.92; p-value = 0.0001. 
Notes: Statistics are conditional on having an outstanding loan at the time of survey.  Estimates are 
corrected using sampling weights.  Loan amounts are in Indian rupees.  Loans were provided in 
cases, except in 2 cases in non-grain bank villages where loans were provided in the form of millet 
grain. 
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As a point of comparison, we calculate the cash value of current grain stocks in grain 
banks.  The prices used for this exercise are taken from the post-harvest season.  
Dividing the total cash value by the number of grain bank member households, we 
find it to be about 330 Indian rupees per household.  This can be interpreted as the 
base amount by which grain bank loans can displace moneylender loans, as the 
displacement amount is potentially larger as the price of grains is higher in the lean 
season.   
In Table 4.7, we present descriptive statistics for the annual interest rate 
charged by moneylenders.  We find that the mean interest rates charged by 
moneylenders to grain bank participants and non-participants (whether in grain bank 
villages or in non-grain bank villages) are not statistically different.  However, our 
sample sizes are too small, especially for non-participants in grain bank villages, to 
draw any firm conclusions regarding the impact of grain bank presence and 
participation on the terms of contracts offered by moneylenders. 
 
 
Table 4.7: Interest rates charged on moneylender loans, by grain bank availability 
and participation status 
Participation status N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Participant households in grain bank villages (1) 45 50.51 29.02 10.00 150.00 
Non-participant households in grain bank 
villages (2)   3 51.26  3.07 50.00   56.25 
Households in non-grain bank villages (3) 62 46.45 27.68   5.00 250.00 
H0: Mean (1) – Mean (2) = 0.  HA: Mean (1) – Mean (2) < 0.  
t-statistic =  0.09; p-value = 0.4629. 
 
H0: Mean (1) – Mean (3) = 0. HA: Mean (1) – Mean (3) < 0.  
t-statistic = -0.90; p-value = 0.8154. 
Notes: Statistics are conditional on having an outstanding loan at the time of survey.  Estimates are 
corrected using sampling weights.  Annual interest rates calculated using data on loan amounts, 
interest payments and loan duration, as reported by borrower households, conditional on data 
availability on interest payments.  Such data were missing for 8 loans borrowed by participant 
households and 14 loans borrowed by households in non-grain bank villages.   
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Again, as a point of comparison, using data from member households, we find that the 
interest paid on consumption loans taken from grain banks during the lean season is 
about half the interest rate that they would pay to moneylenders for the same loans.   
To summarize, our naïve estimates indicate that grain bank participation 
reduces dependence on borrowing from moneylenders.  The effect is however only 
statistically significant for participant households from long-lived grain bank villages.  
We find that the average loan amount is significantly smaller for participant 
households compared to households in non-grain bank villages.  However, we do not 
find any statistical difference when we compare the average interest rates for 
participant and non-participant households. 
 
4.4.3 Matching-based results 
In this section, we examine the impact of grain bank participation on the incidence of 
borrowing from moneylenders using propensity score matching methods.  Below, we 
discuss the steps involved. 
 
Calculating propensity scores 
Using a binomial probit regression model, we first estimate propensity scores to match 
participant households in grain bank villages to households in non-grain bank villages.  
We estimate the model for two different samples: one where the treatment group 
comprises of participant households in grain bank villages (Sample 1) and the other 
where the treatment group comprises of participant households in long-lived grain 
bank villages (Sample 2).  The comparison group is the same for both samples, 
namely households in non-grain bank villages.   
In specifying the propensity score model, we include a number of covariates 
which predict both the decision to participate as well as the outcome.  In choosing the 
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set of covariates, we have to balance the benefit of improving the predictive ability of 
the model with the cost of reducing the region of common support.  In specification 1, 
we include a number of variables that capture different aspects of household wealth 
which we consider to be important determinants of the outcome variable, i.e., 
borrowing from the moneylender.  
Household asset variables have the potential to predict grain bank participation 
in grain bank villages, as nonparticipants in grain bank villages report that their main 
reasons for not participating are either that they did not face food shortages, or that 
they were not creditworthy.  However, since we eliminate non-participant households 
in grain bank villages from our estimation, household assets cannot explain 
participation for the remaining households.   Village-level and grain bank-level 
variables which explain grain bank survival, are more important for predicting 
participation.  However, three of the sample non-grain bank villages never had grain 
banks and therefore all households from these villages have missing information for 
grain bank-level variables.  In addition, data on other grain bank features (e.g., share 
of women in the grain bank management committee at inception) are missing for 7 out 
of the 11 sample non-grain bank villages.  Therefore, including grain bank variables 
would reduce the sample of control observations considerably and so we choose not to 
include them.  In addition, from Chapter 2, we find that grain bank level variables, for 
the most part, do not have a significant impact on the likelihood of grain bank 
survival.  We do, however, include village-level variables that may be important 
predictors of grain bank participation in a separate specification.  We refer to this as 
specification 2.  Below, we discuss the covariates that are included in the estimation of 
propensity scores. 
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Discussion of control variables 
The control variables chosen to estimate the propensity scores include a number of 
variables indicating different aspects of household wealth, including human capital 
and physical assets, as well as village-level variables.  Since our interest here is not 
statistical inference but rather the predictive accuracy of the probit model, we are not 
concerned about the potential presence of multicollinearity from say including 
different measures of household wealth in additive fashion in the same specification.  
The control variables included can be grouped as follows: 
1. Human capital assets, such as household size, number of adult males (aged 15 
years or more), number of adult females (age 15 years or more), the age of the 
head of the household, the highest level of formal education of any member 
within the household (in years), whether the household belongs to a Scheduled 
Tribe or not; and 
2. Physical assets, such as the household’s holdings of agricultural land of 
different qualities (infertile dongar land, moderately fertile goda land and 
fertile bila land), share of the agricultural land that is irrigated, amount of gold 
holdings, the number of rooms in the household’s dwelling, flooring quality 
(whether pucca (cemented) or not), number of ploughs owned, number of 
spades owned, number of axes owned, number of cows owned, number of 
goats owned, number of bullocks owned. 
3. Village-level variables, such as the level of isolation of the village, as 
measured by the time taken to travel to the seat of local government (i.e., the 
block headquarters); distance of the village from the closest Agragamee field 
office; whether any member of the village had been elected as a political 
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representative in the gram panchayat system (namely, as a Ward member) in 
the 5 years preceding the survey; and whether village-level meetings are held 
on a frequent/as needed basis or not.96   
 
Since this is an agricultural society, some of the most important assets are 
landholdings and agricultural tools.  The latter are simple hand tools.  For this reason, 
we also include the number of adults as an important human capital asset.  We include 
the number of adult males and females separately as they perform different 
agricultural activities.  Two other important indicators of wealth which we include are 
livestock holdings as well as gold holdings (typically, in the form of jewelry).  We 
also include a variable for flooring quality, which is a binary indicator variable for 
whether the floor was cemented (pucca) or made of mud/earth.  
Based on findings from Chapter 2 that an increase in the share of women on 
the grain bank committee increases the probability of grain bank survival, we also 
hypothesize that the number of adult females in the household may impact the 
participation decision.  We also hypothesize that the different village-level variables 
affect grain bank survival (which determines the participation decision in our case).  
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present the model of participation used to create propensity 
scores for the matching algorithm for samples 1 and 2 respectively.  In each table, 
column (1) presents the results for the estimation for specification 1, i.e., household 
asset variables only.  Column (2) presents the results for the estimation for 
specification 2, i.e., household asset and village-level variables.  From the fit statistics 
presented at the bottom of the tables, we see that in both cases, the likelihood-ratio 
                                                 
96 We do not include village-level variables in the final specification which do not satisfy the property 
of balanced means for the matched control and treatment samples.  These include variables such as the 
total number of households, share of households that do not own any deeded land, distance from the 
closest weekly market, and the quality of the village road. 
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index (or McFadden’s pseudo-R2) is higher for specification 2.  This implies that the 
model is a better fit when village-level variables are included.  Therefore, we estimate 
the remaining results using specification 2. 
 
Distribution of predicted propensity scores 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depict the distribution of the propensity scores for participant 
households as well as households in non-grain bank villages for Samples 1 and 2, 
respectively.  We see that participant households have a higher probability mass at 
higher levels of the propensity score, while households in non-grain bank villages 
have a higher probability mass at lower levels of the propensity score.  This indicates 
that based on the set of observable characteristics used to create the propensity scores, 
households in the treatment group differ from households in the comparison group.  
Thus, there is a potential gain from using matching estimators compared to ordinary 
least squares. 
 
Common support constraint and balancing tests 
After the propensity scores are generated, the common support restriction is 
implemented, so that the test of the balancing property is performed only on 
observations whose propensity score belongs to the intersection of the supports of the 
propensity score of treatment and comparison units.  To do this, treatment 
observations whose propensity score is higher that the maximum or less than the 
minimum propensity score of comparison observations are dropped.   
The balancing property of the different specifications is examined using three 
difference tests: (1) t-tests for difference in covariate means between the matched 
treatment and comparison samples; (2) standardized bias before and after matching; 
and (3) pseudo-R-squared of the propensity score model after matching, using.   
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Table 4.8: Determinants of grain bank participation estimated for propensity score 
matching (Sample 1) 
Pseudo-MLE probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Grain bank participant (1 = yes) 
 Coefficients 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 
Household human capital assets   
Household size    0.417**    0.369** 
 (0.20) (0.19) 
Square of household size     -0.0395**    -0.0366** 
 (0.018) (0.017) 
Number of adult females (15 years or older) -0.151 -0.0440 
 (0.12) (0.11) 
Number of adult males (15 years or older) -0.0947 -0.125 
 (0.12) (0.11) 
Age of head of household -0.0406 0.000417 
 (0.044) (0.0081) 
Square of age of head of household 0.000538  
 (0.00057)  
Highest level of education of any household member (years) 0.0966 0.0235 
 (0.062) (0.023) 
Square of highest level of education of any household member 
(years) -0.00584  
 (0.0067)  
Social group (1 = tribal)     0.588** 0.325 
 (0.30) (0.26) 
Household physical assets   
Amount of fertile (bila) agricultural land (acres)    0.341** 0.0803 
 (0.15) (0.083) 
Square of amount of bila agricultural land owned     -0.0861***  
 (0.030)  
Amount of moderately fertile (goda) agricultural land (acres) -0.115      -0.116*** 
 (0.080) (0.045) 
Square of amount of goda agricultural land owned 0.00203  
 (0.010)  
Amount of infertile (dongar) agricultural land (acres) -0.113   -0.111* 
 (0.13) (0.058) 
Square of amount of dongar agricultural land owned -0.00226  
 (0.030)  
Amount of gold holdings (gm) 0.0144   0.0359* 
 (0.020) (0.019) 
Number of rooms in dwelling -0.0655   -0.149* 
 (0.090) (0.090) 
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Table  4.8 (Continued)   
Flooring quality (1 = pucca) 0.373 0.328 
 (0.25) (0.25) 
Number of ploughs owned 0.0747 -0.0389 
 (0.15) (0.16) 
Number of spades owned   0.151*    0.150* 
 (0.084) (0.085) 
Number of axes owned 0.0344 0.0433 
 (0.075) (0.079) 
Number of cows owned    -0.144***    -0.158*** 
 (0.044) (0.046) 
Number of goats owned -0.000595 -0.00129 
 (0.026) (0.024) 
Number of bullocks owned    0.221***       0.225*** 
 (0.081) (0.085) 
Village-level variables   
Time taken to travel to seat of local government (minutes)     -0.00365*** 
  (0.00075) 
Distance to closest Agragamee field office (km)  -0.0221 
  (0.017) 
Village member elected as local political representative  
(1 = yes)  0.144 
  (0.15) 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/as needed)     -0.593*** 
  (0.12) 
   
Constant -1.142 0.335 
 (0.96) (0.69) 
Wald χ2 56.75 122.54 
p-value 0.0002 0.0000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.0976 0.1983 
N 425 
Notes: Outcome variable is an indicator of borrowing from the private local moneylender. Estimates are 
corrected for sampling weights.  Standard errors reported in parentheses. * Statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.   
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Table 4.9: Determinants of grain bank participation estimated for propensity score 
matching (Sample 2) 
Pseudo-MLE probit regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Grain bank participant (1 = yes) 
 Coefficients 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 
Household human capital assets   
Household size      0.512**    0.418* 
 (0.23) (0.24) 
Square of household size     -0.0482**   -0.0422* 
 (0.020) (0.022) 
Number of adult females (15 years or older) -0.153 0.0423 
 (0.12) (0.13) 
Number of adult males (15 years or older) -0.0917 -0.0908 
 (0.13) (0.14) 
Age of head of household -0.0508 -0.00213 
 (0.048) (0.0093) 
Square of age of head of household 0.000657  
 (0.00061)  
Highest level of education of any household member (years) 0.0959   0.0448* 
 (0.067) (0.026) 
Square of highest level of education of any household 
member (years) -0.00425  
 (0.0072)  
Social group (1 = tribal)   0.534* -0.211 
 (0.30) (0.32) 
Household physical assets   
Amount of fertile (bila) agricultural land (acres)   0.341** 0.194** 
 (0.16) (0.092) 
Square of amount of bila agricultural land owned    -0.0783**  
 (0.032)  
Amount of moderately fertile (goda) agricultural land (acres)    -0.230***    -0.236*** 
 (0.081) (0.061) 
Square of amount of goda agricultural land owned 0.00934  
 (0.0089)  
Amount of infertile (dongar) agricultural land (acres) -0.174   -0.171** 
 (0.14) (0.082) 
Square of amount of dongar agricultural land owned 0.00283  
 (0.035)  
Amount of gold holdings (gm) 0.0148    0.0459** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Number of rooms in dwelling 0.0589 -0.0503 
 (0.098) (0.10) 
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Table 4.9 (Continued)   
Flooring quality (1 = pucca) 0.281 0.0823 
 (0.26) (0.27) 
Number of ploughs owned 0.0796 -0.143 
 (0.17) (0.19) 
Number of spades owned 0.157* 0.197* 
 (0.090) (0.10) 
Number of axes owned 0.0115 -0.0656 
 (0.083) (0.093) 
Number of cows owned     -0.157***     -0.202*** 
 (0.049) (0.061) 
Number of goats owned 0.00379 0.0196 
 (0.025) (0.024) 
Number of bullocks owned      0.246***     0.312*** 
 (0.090) (0.10) 
Village-level variables   
Time taken to travel to seat of local government (minutes)     -0.0116*** 
  (0.0015) 
Distance to closest Agragamee field office (km)      -0.107*** 
  (0.030) 
Village member elected as local political representative  
(1 = yes)  0.0886 
  (0.16) 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/as needed)       -0.563*** 
  (0.13) 
   
Constant -1.386   1.714** 
 (1.02) (0.84) 
Wald χ2 58.88 162.88 
p-value 0.0001 0.0000 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1199 0.3523 
N 480 
Notes: Outcome variable is an indicator of borrowing from the private local moneylender. Estimates 
are corrected for sampling weights.  Standard errors reported in parentheses. * Statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.   
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of predicted propensity scores (Sample 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of predicted propensity scores (Sample 2) 
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observations in the common support region only as well as weights generated from the 
matching algorithm  
Results of balanced covariates using t-tests are presented in Tables 4.A1-4.A4.  
Examining the t-test results, we only include those variables in the final specification 
that have no statistically significant difference in means. 
The results using measures of pseudo R-squared and standardized bias are 
presented in Table 4.A5.  Examining the pseudo R-squared by re-estimating the 
propensity score model after matching, we find that in all cases, the pseudo R-squared 
generated is much lower than the pseudo R-squared generated prior to matching.  In 
addition, the joint significance of the covariates in the model is always rejected.  Prior 
to matching, the joint significance of the covariates in the model was never rejected.  
Finally, examining the median standardized bias before and after matching, we find 
that that it is always lower after matching, and never above a value of 8, which is an 
acceptable value (Smith and Todd 2005b). 
 
Average impact of grain bank participation 
Table 4.10 presents local linear regression matching estimates of the average impact of 
participation in grain banks on the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders.  
Column (1) presents the matching results for Sample 1, where the treatment sample is 
composed of participant households from all grain bank villages.  We find that, on 
average, the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders among participant households 
is 10 percentage points lower than among households in non-grain bank villages, with 
this difference statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  Translating this absolute 
difference into relative terms, the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders is about 
30 percent lower for participant households. 
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Table 4.10: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders 
Local linear regression matching estimates using propensity scores 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
 Average outcome, participants 0.238 0.198 
 Average outcome, non-participants 0.338 0.388 
 Difference in average outcomes (ATT) -0.100*     -0.190*** 
 (0.055) (0.060) 
  Off support On support Off support On support 
 No. of treated units 8 223 9 167 
 No. of comparison units 0 249 0 249 
Notes: Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Estimates are for matched sample having common 
support only. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 
percent level. 
 
Comparing the estimates in Column (1) with the difference in the mean 
incidences of borrowing that are presented in Table 4.5, we find that the estimate for 
the incidence of borrowing by non-participant households in much larger after 
matching.  We find that very few observations are off the common support, indicating 
that it is not the support restriction that results in the larger estimate.  This implies that 
the ATT estimate generated by the matching algorithm is driven by the reweighting 
process involved in kernel-weighted matching.  Thus, a simple comparison of means 
between participant and non-participant households would not have revealed the 
program impact revealed when similar households are compared (or rather, 
households are weighted in proportion to how closely they “match” one another). 
Column (2) presents the matching results for Sample 2, where the treatment 
sample is confined to participant households from long-lived grain bank villages.  We 
find that, on average, the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders is 19 percentage 
points lower, and that this effect is highly statistically significant.  In relative terms, 
the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders is about 49 percent lower for 
participant households in long-lived grain bank villages.  This finding confirms our 
hypothesis that the negative effect on the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders 
 257 
should be quantitatively larger when we examine participants in villages where grain 
banks have been continuously operational for a longer duration.   
Again, we find that the program impact estimated in Column (2) is much larger 
than the difference in the mean incidences of borrowing that are presented in Table 5.  
We find, once again, that very few observations are off the common support, which 
implies that the large program impact that is estimated is driven by the reweighting of 
households during the matching process. 
 
Robustness to alternative specifications 
Estimates of the average impact of participation in grain banks on the incidence of 
borrowing from moneylenders using kernel matching estimation are presented in 
Table 4.11.  We find that these results are similar to those in Table 4.10 using local 
linear matching. 
 
Table 4.11: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders 
Kernel matching estimates using propensity scores 
 
(1) 
Sample 1 
(2) 
Sample 2 
 Average outcome, participants 0.238 0.198 
 Average outcome, non-participants 0.344 0.382 
 Difference in average outcomes (ATT)     -0.106**      -0.184*** 
 (0.050) (0.058) 
  Off support On support Off support On support 
 No. of treated units 8 223 9 167 
 No. of comparison units 0 249 0 249 
Notes: Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Estimates are for matched sample having common 
support only. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 
percent level. 
 
Sensitivity to choice of bandwidth 
The results in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 were estimated using a bandwidth size of 0.06.  
We re-estimate the local linear regression and kernel matching models with varying 
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bandwidth size of the kernel (0.05 and 0.07).  The results are presented in Table 4.A6.  
We find that neither the magnitude nor the statistical significance of the results is 
sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth size in the range examined. 
 
Sensitivity to unobserved heterogeneity 
Table 4.A7 presents results of a sensitivity analysis of the matching estimates to 
unobserved heterogeneity using Rosenbaum bounds.  We examine the cases for 
1 5≤ Γ ≤ (in increments of 0.5), where 1Γ > is a measure of the extent of unobserved 
selection bias.  The MHQ
+ statistic adjusts the MH statistic downward for positive 
(unobserved) selection (i.e., villages where grain banks are likely to survive are also 
those where households are less likely to rely on borrowing from moneylenders, 
regardless of grain bank presence – therefore leading to an overestimation of the 
treatment effect).  The MHQ
− statistic adjusts the MH statistic upward for negative 
(unobserved) selection (i.e., villages where grain banks are likely to survive are also 
those where households are more likely to rely on borrowing from moneylenders, 
regardless of grain bank presence – therefore leading to an underestimation of the 
treatment effect).  At 1Γ = (i.e., no hidden bias), we find that our estimate is 
statistically significant (for both Samples 1 and 2).  Since what is of concern to us is 
whether we have (incorrectly) overestimated the treatment effect, we examine the 
MHQ
+ statistic as Γ increases.  We find that it continues to be significant, leading us to 
conclude that our treatment effect estimates are not sensitive to unobserved 
heterogeneity across the range of Γ  values examined.  However, given the asymptotic 
properties of the test and the small sample size on which our analysis is based, we 
recognize that it does not rule out the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.   
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4.5 Conclusion 
In the past two decades, grain banks have been adopted by rural and tribal 
development NGOs in Orissa, and more recently, by the Indian government’s Ministry 
of Tribal Welfare, with the stated objective of combating short-term, seasonal food 
shortages.  However, widespread anecdotal evidence regarding the benefits of grain 
banks in displacing private, informal moneylenders suggests that they may also have 
an additional, if unintended, positive effect.  To date, there has been no quantitative 
evaluation of the displacement effects of grain banks on alternative sources of credit.  
In this chapter, we attempt to fill this gap in knowledge by measuring the average 
treatment effect of grain banks on the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders, 
traditionally the main source of credit, using propensity score matching estimators.   
Our matching-based results indicate that grain banks indeed have large 
displacement effects on private, informal moneylenders.  Local linear matching 
estimates indicate that on average the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders 
among participants in grain bank villages relative to our matched sample of 
households in non-grain bank villages was 10 percentage points (30 percent) lower.  
Further, we find a larger impact among participant households in long-lived grain 
bank villages (those in which grain bank were in operation for 10 years or more): 
specifically, local linear matching estimates indicate that, on average, the incidence of 
borrowing is 19 percentage points (49 percent) lower.  These estimates are much 
larger than the mean differences in the incidence of borrowing between participant 
households and households in non-grain bank villages.  Thus, the reweighting process 
by which similar households are matched is revealing the impact of grain banks in a 
way that a simple difference in means does not. Our matching-based results are robust 
to the use of an alternative matching estimator (kernel matching), the choice of 
bandwidth size, and the potential presence of unobserved heterogeneity that affects 
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both program participation and the outcome of interest.  Interpreted in the context of 
the difference in the average borrowing levels from moneylenders between participant 
households and households in non-grain bank villages, which we find to be 
statistically significant, we conclude that grain banks do indeed displace borrowing 
from moneylenders.   
Given the importance of short-term consumption loans and the evidence that 
grain banks offer these loans at lower interest rates, grain banks can indeed provide an 
attractive alternative to private, informal moneylenders.  However, important caveats 
remain.  First, grain banks are designed in order to provide consumption credit in the 
form of grains.  As a result, they cannot act as a broad-based credit alternative which 
would resolve a potential problem of thin or missing credit markets in the region.  
Second, the data in this study do not permit the analysis of how grain banks affect the 
terms of contracts offered by moneylenders to non-participants residing in either grain 
bank villages or non-grain bank villages.  Given the theoretical and empirical evidence 
from previous studies on the differential welfare impacts on different groups following 
the introduction of competition into previously monopolistic credit markets, future 
studies of how grain banks affect access to credit for both participants as well as non-
participants can provide relevant policy information.  Third, our data enable us to 
examine the difference in borrowing incidence between participants and non-
participants residing in neighboring villages.  As a result, a likely hazard affecting our 
estimates is contamination in the control group due to potential spillover effects.  Our 
data do not enable us to draw conclusions about the extent of the problem.  To enable 
a cleaner analysis of impact on moneylender reliance, there is need for data from non-
grain bank villages having similar characteristics to grain bank villages but 
geographically isolated from them, so as to reduce the concern of spillover effects.   
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More broadly, there is a pressing need for data examining the structure of rural 
credit markets in tribal Orissa, which would permit analysis of the causes behind 
missing and thin financial markets in rural Rayagada (and tribal Orissa in general), as 
policy prescriptions hinge crucially on understanding why these deficiencies occur.  If 
they are a function of low levels of development, as theorized by a large literature on 
credit and growth, financial innovation and intermediaries may emerge spontaneously, 
as needed.97  If, however, as theorized by the literature on poverty traps, non-
convexities in the technologies associated with institutional innovation exist, such that 
the market is too small or there is insufficient local capital, then there exists a 
continuing need for effective outside intervention in credit markets.98  In the latter 
case, the grain bank intervention may indeed be a valuable policy intervention.   
                                                 
97 See, e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). 
98 See Azariadis and Stachurs ki (2004) for a recent review of the literature on poverty traps. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 4.A1: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (1) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on local linear regression 
propensity score matching 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Household size 5.09 5.09 0.00 -0.03 
Square of household size 28.36 28.62 -0.26 -0.16 
Number of adult females (15 years or older) 1.42 1.41 0.01 0.17 
Number of adult males (15 years or older) 1.36 1.37 -0.01 -0.13 
Age of head of household 35.57 35.83 -0.26 -0.32 
Highest level of education of any household 
member (years) 2.81 2.86 -0.04 -0.15 
Social group (1 = tribal) 0.97 0.98 -0.01 -0.71 
Amount of fertile (bila) agricultural land (acres) 0.53 0.58 -0.05 -0.47 
Amount of moderately fertile (goda) agricultural 
land (acres) 1.52 1.76 -0.25 -1.59 
Amount of infertile (dongar) agricultural land 
(acres) 1.35 1.50 -0.14 -1.33 
Amount of gold holdings (gm) 2.85 3.22 -0.37 -0.96 
Number of rooms in dwelling 2.44 2.56 -0.12 -1.44 
Flooring quality (1 = pucca) 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.72 
Number of ploughs owned 0.89 0.87 0.02 0.31 
Number of spades owned 2.30 2.31 -0.02 -0.20 
Number of axes owned 2.09 2.11 -0.03 -0.30 
Number of cows owned 0.81 0.84 -0.03 -0.18 
Number of goats owned 0.96 1.02 -0.05 -0.24 
Number of bullocks owned 1.53 1.55 -0.02 -0.17 
Time taken to travel to seat of local government 
(minutes) 126.19 116.10 10.09 1.45 
Distance to closest Agragamee field office (km) 4.41 4.80 -0.39 -1.16 
Village member elected as local political 
representative (1 = yes) 0.65 0.72 -0.07 -1.56 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 1.54 1.52 0.02 0.43 
     
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level.  
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Table 4.A2: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (2) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on local linear regression 
propensity score matching 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Household size 5.10 4.91 0.19 1.09 
Square of household size 28.41 26.67 1.74 0.96 
Number of adult females (15 years or older) 1.43 1.37 0.06 0.87 
Number of adult males (15 years or older) 1.37 1.36 0.01 0.1 
Age of head of household 35.49 35.37 0.12 0.13 
Highest level of education of any household 
member (years) 3.12 2.70 0.41 1.22 
Social group (1 = tribal) 0.96 0.97 -0.01 -0.66 
Amount of fertile (bila) agricultural land (acres) 0.52 0.58 -0.06 -0.59 
Amount of moderately fertile (goda) agricultural 
land (acres) 1.34 1.56 -0.21 -1.21 
Amount of infertile (dongar) agricultural land 
(acres) 1.25 1.38 -0.13 -1.01 
Amount of gold holdings (gm) 2.74 2.49 0.25 0.59 
Number of rooms in dwelling 2.56 2.58 -0.02 -0.23 
Flooring quality (1 = pucca) 0.14 0.08 0.06 1.66 
Number of ploughs owned 0.89 0.92 -0.04 -0.55 
Number of s pades owned 2.29 2.25 0.04 0.37 
Number of axes owned 2.06 2.07 -0.01 -0.13 
Number of cows owned 0.77 0.92 -0.15 -0.86 
Number of goats owned 0.98 1.19 -0.21 -0.72 
Number of bullocks owned 1.52 1.51 0.00 0.01 
Time taken to travel to seat of local government 
(minutes) 93.23 86.57 6.66 1.55 
Distance to closest Agragamee field office (km) 3.99 3.72 0.27 1.21 
Village member elected as local political 
representative (1 = yes) 0.63 0.68 -0.05 -1.01 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 1.48 1.42 0.06 1 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 4.A3: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (1) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on kernel propensity score 
matching 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
     
Household size 5.09 5.08 0.01 0.04 
Square of household size 28.36 28.49 -0.13 -0.08 
Number of adult females (15 years or older) 1.42 1.40 0.02 0.4 
Number of adult males (15 years or older) 1.36 1.38 -0.03 -0.39 
Age of head of household 35.57 35.61 -0.04 -0.05 
Highest level of education of any household 
member (years) 2.81 2.68 0.13 0.44 
Social group (1 = tribal) 0.97 0.98 -0.01 -0.64 
Amount of fertile (bila) agricultural land (acres) 0.53 0.61 -0.07 -0.76 
Amount of moderately fertile (goda) agricultural 
land (acres) 1.52 1.74 -0.23 -1.43 
Amount of infertile (dongar) agricultural land 
(acres) 1.35 1.46 -0.10 -0.93 
Amount of gold holdings (gm) 2.85 2.91 -0.07 -0.18 
Number of rooms in dwelling 2.44 2.54 -0.10 -1.23 
Flooring quality (1 = pucca) 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.21 
Number of ploughs owned 0.89 0.88 0.01 0.18 
Number of spades owned 2.30 2.29 0.00 0.05 
Number of axes owned 2.09 2.15 -0.06 -0.63 
Number of cows owned 0.81 0.84 -0.03 -0.21 
Number of goats owned 0.96 1.04 -0.08 -0.34 
Number of bullocks owned 1.53 1.53 0.00 -0.01 
Time taken to travel to seat of local government 
(minutes) 126.19 115.73 10.46 1.51 
Distance to closest Agragamee field office (km) 4.41 4.75 -0.33 -1 
Village member elected as local political 
representative (1 = yes) 0.65 0.71 -0.06 -1.31 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 1.54 1.53 0.02 0.34 
Notes. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 4.A4: Balancing t-tests for propensity score model covariates, Sample (2) 
Matched treatment and comparison samples, based on kernel propensity score 
matching 
 
Means 
(Treated) 
Means 
(Control) 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic 
Household size 5.10 4.95 0.15 0.87 
Square of household size 28.41 27.00 1.41 0.78 
Number of adult females (15 years or older) 1.43 1.37 0.06 0.82 
Number of adult males (15 years or older) 1.37 1.36 0.01 0.1 
Age of head of household 35.49 35.09 0.41 0.43 
Highest level of education of any household 
member (years) 3.12 2.70 0.42 1.25 
Social group (1 = tribal) 0.96 0.97 -0.02 -0.79 
Amount of fertile (bila) agricultural land (acres) 0.52 0.60 -0.08 -0.72 
Amount of moderately fertile (goda) agricultural 
land (acres) 1.34 1.56 -0.22 -1.24 
Amount of infertile (dongar) agricultural land 
(acres) 1.25 1.38 -0.13 -0.99 
Amount of gold holdings (gm) 2.74 2.50 0.24 0.56 
Number of rooms in dwelling 2.56 2.61 -0.05 -0.57 
Flooring quality (1 = pucca) 0.14 0.09 0.05 1.33 
Number of ploughs owned 0.89 0.92 -0.03 -0.5 
Number of spades owned 2.29 2.28 0.01 0.1 
Number of axes owned 2.06 2.11 -0.05 -0.43 
Number of cows owned 0.77 0.92 -0.15 -0.86 
Number of goats owned 0.98 1.22 -0.24 -0.81 
Number of bullocks owned 1.52 1.50 0.02 0.15 
Time taken to travel to seat of local government 
(minutes) 93.23 86.62 6.62 1.52 
Distance to closest Agragamee field office (km) 3.99 3.73 0.26 1.17 
Village member elected as local political 
representative (1 = yes) 0.63 0.67 -0.04 -0.85 
Frequency of village meetings (1 = frequent/ as 
needed) 1.48 1.44 0.04 0.66 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 4.A5: Balancing tests using measure of pseudo R-squared and standardized bias 
 
Pseudo-R2  
(after matching) 
Wald test 
p-value 
Standardized bias 
Before matching After matching 
Local linear regression matching      
 Sample (1) 0.025 0.870 11.97 3.14 
Sample (2) 0.047 0.538 13.19 7.72 
Kernel matching     
Sample (1) 0.022 0.938 11.97 3.49 
Sample (2) 0.042 0.675 13.19 7.48 
Notes: Tests only on observations in matched sample having common support.   
 
 
 
 
Table 4.A6: Average treatment on the treated (ATT): Impact of grain bank 
participation on the incidence of borrowing 
Sensitivity to choice of bandwidth 
 
(1) 
Sample (1) 
(2) 
Sample (2) 
Local linear regression matching estimates  
Bandwidth = 0.05  -0.096*       -0.180*** 
 (0.052) (0.059) 
Bandwidth = 0.07  -0.100*       -0.192*** 
 (0.051) (0.059) 
  
Kernel matching estimates  
Bandwidth = 0.05    -0.111**      -0.187*** 
 (0.051) (0.058) 
Bandwidth = 0.07     -0.103**      -0.180*** 
 (0.050) (0.057) 
Notes.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates for matched sample having common support.  * 
Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 4.A7: Sensitivity of treatment effect estimates to unobserved heterogeneity 
 Sample (1) Sample (2) 
eγΓ =
 MHQ
+
 MHQ
−
 MHp
+
 MHp
−
 MHQ
+
 MHQ
−
 MHp
+
 MHp
−
 
1.0 1.445 1.445 0.074 0.074 2.246 2.246 0.012 0.012 
1.5 3.412 0.284 <0.001 0.388 4.008 0.530 <0.001 0.298 
2.0 4.839 1.661 <0.001 0.048 5.296 0.439 <0.001 0.331 
2.5 5.974 2.739 <0.001 0.003 6.324 1.375 <0.001 0.085 
3.0 6.925 3.631 <0.001 <0.001 7.188 2.147 <0.001 0.016 
3.5 7.749 4.398 <0.001 <0.001 7.937 2.808 <0.001 0.002 
4.0 8.481 5.074 <0.001 <0.001 8.602 3.390 <0.001 <0.001 
4.5 9.141 5.680 <0.001 <0.001 9.201 3.912 <0.001 <0.001 
5.0 9.745 6.232 <0.001 <0.001 9.748 4.386 <0.001 <0.001 
Notes: Γ : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors. 
MHQ
+
: Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect). 
MHQ
−
: Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect). 
MHp
+
: significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect). 
MHp
−
 : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect). 
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APPENDIX 1 
NOTES ON TRIBES OF KASHIPUR, ORISSA 
 
In this appendix, we first provide a brief overview of the tribal population in India.  
We then present an overview of the social and economic practices and characteristics 
of the main tribes in the household survey site, Kashipur, using field observations as 
well as secondary sources.  
 
1 Overview of tribal population in India
99
 
Possibly barring Africa, India has the largest concentration of tribal people in the 
world (Ministry of Tribal Affairs 2001). According to the 2001 Census, about 84.3 
million Indians, or 8.2 per cent of its total population, are classified as tribal.  The 
tribes of India are often referred to as aboriginal, autochthonous or adivasi (“first 
settlers”).  However, there is considerable racial diversity among tribal groups. In 
addition, there is no distinct separation in racial or physical traits between tribal and 
non-tribal populations, probably due to the coexistence and interpenetration between 
the two groups over a period of centuries (Beteille 1998).  Nevertheless, to a large 
extent, tribes can be distinguished from non-tribal populations based on their habitat 
(mostly forest and hill areas and peripheries of the subcontinent, including the 
islands), language and level of social, economic and political marginalization 
(ibid.).100 
Since the independence of India, the government’s tribal development policy 
has followed Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s panchsheel (five principles) of tribal 
development. Nehru called for integrating tribes with mainstream India and bringing 
                                                 
99 The overview of the tribal population in India is taken from Bhattamishra (2007). 
100 For more details on the socioeconomic characteristics of the tribal population in India, see 
Bhattamishra (2007). 
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them to an equal footing economically while, at the same time, maintaining their 
cultural distinctness.  Distinct policies for tribal development have earmarked 
resources from state and central budgets specifically for tribal areas to reduce poverty 
and improve physical and social infrastructure in these areas.  However, tribal 
communities continue to suffer from very low levels of socioeconomic development. 
 Of the 533 communities currently recognized by the Indian government as 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) (Ministry of Tribal Affairs 2000-01), the largest number, 62 
tribes, reside in the state of Orissa.  With over 7.6 million tribal people in rural areas, 
Orissa also has one of the highest concentrations of tribal populations among Indian 
states.101  While the ST population comprises about 8 percent of the national 
population, the tribal population comprises about a quarter of the total rural population 
of Orissa (Census 2001).  In the next section, we provide brief details on two of the 
largest tribes of Orissa, the Kandha and the Paraja Jhodia. 
 
2 Notes on tribes of Kashipur, Rayagada 
The main tribes in Kashipur block are the Kandha and Paraja.  The Kandha are the 
largest tribe of Orissa in terms of population (about 1 million according to the 1981 
Census).  The Kandha are descendants of Proto-Australoid and Mongoloid races.  The 
Paraja Jhodia is another large tribe of Orissa (about 270,000 people by the 1981 
Census) concentrated in undivided Koraput and Kalahandi.  The following section 
documents the habitat, agricultural cycle and customs of the Kandha and Paraja tribes 
in Kashipur, Rayagada. 
 
                                                 
101The tribal population in India is classified under the Scheduled Tribe (ST) social group as defined by 
the Census of India. These numbers therefore reflect the population classified as ST. 
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Habitat 
Both the Kandha and Paraja tribes in Rayagada are settled in areas near forests or at 
the foot of hills near a perennial water source (such as a stream or spring).  In many 
villages in Rayagada, these two tribes live together (sometimes with other tribes and 
castes such as Loharas, Goudas, Paikas, Naiks) while in others, they have uniethnic 
settlements.  In most cases, huts are constructed in two rows on either side of a street 
running through the length of the village.  Typically, each hut has a veranda in front 
and in the back, and one room (or two rooms, both in the same line).  Roofs are low 
and can be thatched or tiled, and there is not much light inside the huts.  In the clearing 
that runs through the middle of the village, there is an altar to the Earth Goddess.  
There is also an elevated mud platform for meetings held by village elders.  In some 
cases, there are youth dormitories for boys (Dhangda basaghar) and girls (Dhangdi 
basaghar).  By day, these dormitories can be used to hold meetings of village elders.  
By night, young girls and boys go the dormitories to interact with each other through 
song and dance, though this tradition is disappearing in villages that are in contact 
with the non-tribal population. 
 
Economic practices 
Both the Kandha and the Paraja combine settled subsistence farming (mainly on 
unproductive hilly land) with forest collection, hunting and fishing.  Land is classified 
into Beda  (wet cultivation of crops such as paddy, on low-lying land), Goda (non-
irrigated middle land for growing millets and paddy) and Dongar (non-irrigated hill 
slopes for growing millets, pulses and oilseeds).  The concept of private land 
ownership does not exist.  New land for farming is obtained by clearing forests, which 
are viewed as common property.  The distribution of land is clan-based.  Within a clan 
(which may comprise families across 8-10 villages), all families farm equal areas of 
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land.  The unit of production is the family.  Patrilineal inheritance is practiced and land 
is divided equally among all sons after a father’s death.  Simple implements, such as 
ax, hoe, spade and sickle are used in farming.  During the summer months, these tribes 
also seek wage work (e.g., in public works programs, mining, road construction).  
Cases of migration during the summer months in search of wage work are also found.   
Both the Kandha and Paraja tribes own cattle, goats and chicken mainly for 
their meat as well as buffalo for offering in sacrifice.  Bullocks are used for ploughing 
on low-lying plain agricultural land, for those that own such land.  These tribes 
practice barter economy, where they exchange grains, livestock, liquor, brooms and 
crafts (such as wood carving in the case of the Paraja tribe) for clothes, salt, jewelry, 
and other items as well as grains and liquor.   
Indebtedness is a common feature of many tribal households, as many are 
caught in annual debt cycles whereby they borrow grains or money to tide over the 
lean season that they are unable to return until the following harvest.   
Over the past decade, in the face of opposition from the tribal population, the 
Utkal Alumina consortium of firms has been in the process of establishing the first 
large-scale industry in Kashipur.  The Baphilimali, Kadingamali and Sasubohumali 
hills of Kashipur are rich in bauxite deposits, making the area lucrative for mining.  
However, the tribal population and their supporters fear that the mining enterprise will 
destroy their environment, as these hills are also sources of numerous perennial 
streams and forest products which are integral to the tribal way of living.  In addition, 
the prevalent sentiment among the tribal population is that the plant will result in few 
or no job opportunities for them, as most jobs will require educational qualifications 
that they lack.  Given the state of Orissa’s poor rehabilitation record, it is likely that 
the tribal population in the vicinity of the aluminum plant will be faced with 
displacement, deforestation and adverse changes in their way of life, at least in the 
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short run.  Whether the plant will offer new economic opportunities to the tribal 
population in the long run remains to be seen. 
 
Agricultural calendar 
The agricultural cycle begins in the Chaitra season (March-April) with the clearing of 
land by burning forest cover on a chosen patch.  The land is prepared for sowing in the 
monsoon (May-June) through hoeing.  Sowing is done in the rainy season (June-July), 
followed by weeding (August-September).  These months are the most difficult in 
terms of food availability, as the tribes depend wholly on collecting foods from the 
forest at this time.  The harvest season begins in the autumn, with short-duration crops 
(including paddy, millets) harvested in October-November and long-duration crops 
harvested in December-January.  After this, threshing and preparing the crops for 
storage takes place.  January-March is the time for weddings and merry-making as 
food after a good harvest is plentiful.  In some villages, March-April also marks the 
time for collection of mahua flowers in order to make wine.   
 
Social organization and practices 
Among the Kandha and Paraja tribes, there is very little specialization in social roles, 
except for the jani or muduli (village headman), pujari or disari (priest) and bejuni or 
gurumain (shamans) (Government of Orissa 1990).  Although there is role 
differentiation by gender, whereby men are responsible for heavier agricultural work 
and women are responsible for housework, women also engage in various agricultural 
activities alongside their men, such as sowing, weeding and threshing. Order is 
maintained by lineage heads and village heads and transgressions of social norms are 
handled according to the severity of the mistake (through physical punishments, social 
ostracization and excommunication from the tribe).  The social and political 
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organization is coincident.  Village heads are obtained by descent.  The priest conducts 
rituals for communal festivals as well as weddings, births and death ceremonies.  
Bejunis are believed to be endowed with special powers enabling them to rid people of 
sicknesses.   
Marriage rules prescribe marriage within the tribe (tribe endogamous) but 
outside one’s own clan (clan exogamous).  Marriages can occur by capture or consent.  
Brideprice is prevalent, and after marriage, the bride moves to the groom’s house 
(patrilocal).  Households typically comprise of the husband, wife and children, i.e., 
nuclear households are more common than extended families found in other parts of 
Indian society.   
Unlike the all-India sex ratio, the sex ratio in these tribes is skewed towards 
women, with about 1030 women for every 1000 men.  The literacy rate among the 
Kandha and Paraja Jhodia, particularly among women, is very low (about 12 percent 
in 1981).  This is partly due to the lack of properly functioning government primary 
schools in these areas, as well as instruction in Oriya instead of the native languages of 
these tribes.   
The language of the Kandha is Kuie and that of the Paraja Jhodia is Paraja.  As 
is common across the tribes of Orissa, many Paraja and some Kandha also speak Oriya 
when they interact with the non-tribal population. 
The major festivals include Chaitra Parba, celebrated in the month of Chaitra 
(mid-March to mid-April), Pous Parba, celebrated in the month of Pous (mid-
December to mid-January) and Dhana Nuakhai, celebrated in the month of Kartik 
(mid-October to mid-November).  As in other agricultural societies, these festivals are 
closely tied with the agricultural calendar.  Chaitra Parba marks the onset of a new 
agricultural cycle, while Pous Parba marks festivities following the harvest. 
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Religion 
The Kandha and Paraja practice a mixture nature worship, ancestor worship and 
animism.  Their rituals are closely related to agriculture and are seasonal in nature, 
coinciding with times of sowing, planting and harvesting.  They believe that divine 
spirits can be benevolent or malevolent, and practice animal sacrifice rituals to 
appease the latter.  The Kandha used to practice human sacrifice in a ritual called 
Tokimara, in which a pre-puberty girl would be sacrificed to appease the Earth 
Goddess in order to ensure a good harvest.  In many of the villages, Hindu deities such 
as Siva are also worshipped, reflecting the extent of external influences. 
   
Dietary practices 
The diet of these tribes comprise mainly of grains such as millet and to a lesser extent, 
rice.  Food habits change between the post-harvest and lean season due to the 
fluctuations in food availability.  When food is plentiful, it is consumed three times a 
day, although cooking typically takes place once a day, in the morning.  Common 
items in the diets of the Kandha and Paraja Jhodia tribes include millet (mandia anda, 
mandia peja), rice, tamarind gravy, and turmeric and chillies as condiments.  Meat is 
consumed only at festivals or special occasions, such as visit by guests.  Liquor (such 
as salap or sago palm wine, todi or date palm wine and mahuli or wine from mahua 
flowers) is an important part of the tribal diet, and is consumed by men and women 
alike.  During the monsoon months, when food is scarce, forest foods are 
complemented by tamarind seeds and mango kernels which are stored from the 
summer months. 
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APPENDIX 2 
SURVEY NOTES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1 Introduction 
In this appendix, we describe the data collected in Orissa, India in 2005 for a project to 
evaluate community grain banks.102  The project, which was directed by Ruchira 
Bhattamishra as part of her dissertation research, was undertaken in three phases: first, 
a household survey was implemented in January-March 2005 in 28 villages in 
Kashipur, Rayagada district in southwest Orissa (hereafter referred to as the post-
harvest household survey).  This household survey was accompanied by a village and 
grain bank survey.  Second, a village and grain bank survey was implemented between 
April-May 2005 in 80 villages in Dasmantapur block, Koraput.  Koraput and 
Rayagada districts are adjoining.  Third, a second wave of the household survey was 
implemented in 26 of the 28 initially sampled villages in Kashipur, between August-
early October 2005 (hereafter referred to as the lean season household survey). 
Advice on undertaking a survey in this region as well as helpful logistical 
support were provided by the management and staff of Agragamee, a non-
governmental organization (NGO) widely considered to be a pioneer of the grain bank 
movement in tribal Orissa.103  Useful insights on the Government of India’s Grain 
Bank program in Orissa were provided by Shibanarayan Mishra, Integrated Tribal 
Development Agency (ITDA) officer.  Data on children’s immunization and birthdate 
records were also provided by various anganwadi workers of surveyed villages in 
                                                 
102 The survey instruments and data are available from the author upon request. 
103 Special thanks are due to Agragamee staff members Jitendra Mohanty, Nakula Bisoi, Ashok, 
Agastya and Atul for their support.  Thanks are also due to Abhiram Jhodia, Adu Naik, Ganesh Nayak, 
Jaga Majhi, Kambhu Majhi, Phulsingh Majhi, Raghu Naik, Ramdhar Jhodia, Ramesh Chandra Majhi, 
Sashi Majhi, Shiba Pradhan, Surath Gopal, Tumbeshwar Majhi and Yudhisthir Jhodia, who served as 
guides during the survey. 
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Kashipur, under the guidance of the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) 
officer, Jhunu Kumari Patra.   
Funding for a pre-survey visit was provided by the Mario Einaudi Center for 
International Studies, Cornell University as well as the Department of Applied 
Economics and Management, Cornell University.  Funding for the first wave of the 
household survey as well as the grain bank and village survey in Dasmantapur was 
provided by the Graduate School, Cornell University and the Department of Applied 
Economics and Management, Cornell University.  Funding for the second wave of the 
household survey was provided by the National Science Foundation SES-0518424.  
All the above sources of funding are gratefully acknowledged. 
 
2 Background 
Over the past two decades, several NGOs in Orissa, a state in southeast India, have 
established grain banks in order to directly confront cyclical episodes of hunger and 
food insecurity.  A number of grain banks have been established in the “tribal belt” in 
southwest Orissa by Agragamee, one of the more prominent tribal and rural 
development NGOs in Orissa.  Given that Agragamee was a key player in the grain 
bank movement in Orissa and had one of the longest associations with the 
establishment of grain banks, the researcher contacted Agragamee’s management in 
order to secure their cooperation in implementing a household and grain bank and 
village survey in Kashipur and Dasmantapur.  The main objective of this project was 
to collect grain bank- and village-level data to implement an institutional analysis; in 
particular, an analysis of the determinants of grain bank survival and duration, given 
that a large number of grain banks collapsed after establishment.  A related objective 
was to examine what impact grain banks have on household food security and 
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consumption smoothing outcomes, in light of the fact that grain banks were 
established to confront food insecurity, especially of a seasonal nature. 
The post-harvest and lean season household surveys in Kashipur serve as the 
main source of data for the impact evaluation.  The village and grain bank survey in 
Dasmantapur serve as the main source of data for the institutional analysis.  The 
following sections describe the survey methods and data of the household and village 
surveys.   
 
3 POST-HARVEST HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
3.1 Survey methods 
3.1.1 Preparations
104
 
In order to ensure accuracy of the anthropometric measurements, standard equipment 
such as electronic mother-child weighing scales were obtained from SECA, Germany.  
In addition, height measurement boards were manufactured for accurately measuring 
the recumbent height of children below 2 years of age.  This was made possible by Dr. 
Dilip Mahalanobis, Society for Applied Studies, Kolkata, whose help for constructing 
measurement boards of an excellent quality is gratefully acknowledged. 
The survey data were collected on questionnaires written in Oriya, the 
language spoken by the majority of the population in Orissa, including most members 
of the Kandha and Paraja Jhodia tribes.  The questionnaires were originally written in 
English by the researcher, with editing assistance from Christopher B. Barrett, 
International Professor, Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell 
University.  The questionnaires were then translated into Oriya by the researcher in 
                                                 
104 The principle guide consulted on conducting field research was Barrett and Cason (1997).  For an 
overview on the Kandha and Paraja Jhodia tribal population of Orissa, the Tribal and Harijan Research-
Cum-Training Institute’s book ‘Tribals of Orissa’ (1990) was consulted.   
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collaboration with Manasi Satpathy, M. Phil., Anthropology, Utkal University, 
Bhubaneswar before leaving for the field.   
 The questionnaires were pre-tested in Kashipur and Dasmantapur outside of 
the survey sample, resulting in considerable revisions to improve clarity, to refine 
codes, to reduce the duration of the interviews and to ensure the usage of local 
terminology and local dialect translations.105   
The enumerators were trained as a group on the Oriya questionnaires. 
Extensive instructions on how to implement the anthropometric module was provided 
to the entire survey team following Cogill (2003), although, finally, only two of the 
enumerators were entrusted with taking anthropometric measurements in all sample 
villages.  
The household questionnaire included modules on household demographics, 
occupation, morbidity, mortality, food security, anthropometry, credit, grain bank 
membership, assets and agricultural output.  The village and grain bank questionnaire 
included questions on relevant village and grain bank characteristics, such as village 
and grain bank membership size, ethnic composition, transport and communication, 
social and physical infrastructure.  In villages where grain banks had failed, only 
retrospective information on grain bank design and functioning was gathered, whereas 
in villages with surviving grain banks, both contemporaneous and retrospective 
information on grain bank design parameters and functioning was gathered. 
The following sections describe the sampling methods, survey management, 
survey sites and data for the household survey.  
                                                 
105 The vast majority of respondents spoke and understood a local dialect of Oriya.  In very few cases, 
the respondents spoke only Kuie or Paraja, the languages of the Kandha and Paraja Jhodia tribes 
respectively.  In such cases, the local enumerators conducted the interview and translated responses. 
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3.1.2 Sampling  
The sample frame of villages was drawn in consultation with Agragamee staff and 
management.  Administrative divisions (locally called gram panchayats) undergoing 
unrest related to the establishment of the Utkal Alumina factory (such as Maikancha, 
Tikiri, Kucheipadar, Gorakhpur, Podapadi and Sanhkarada) were eliminated from this 
frame.106  In addition, villages that were practically inaccessible due to the rocky 
terrain or lack of communication facilities or were home to isolated primitive tribal 
groups (such as the Dongaria Kandhas) were not included in the sampling frame. 
From the remaining 11 gram panchayats, two separate lists of villages were 
constructed after consultation with Agragamee field officials and office records.  
These included 14 villages with functioning grain banks (hereafter referred to as grain 
bank villages, or GBVs) and 14 villages with failed grain banks or villages where 
grain banks were never set up (hereafter referred to as non-grain bank villages, or 
NBGVs).  The villages were spread across 9 gram panchayats, namely, Mandibisi, 
Godibali and Siripai in the east, Dongasil and Kodipari in the southwest, Manusgaon 
and Chandragiri in the west and Kashipur and Renga in the central part of Kashipur 
block. 
The villages were chosen so as to fulfill the following criteria: (1). grain banks 
in GBVs were continuously operational since inception for at least 5 years, and grain 
banks in NGBVs stopped functioning at least 5 years prior to the survey. (2). the two 
sets of villages shared as many characteristics as possible, such as socio-economic 
level of development, village size, distance from important geographical markers 
(such as seat of local government, NGO offices, local markets, etc), and (3). there was 
                                                 
106This was done mainly due to safety considerations for the survey team.  In addition, inhabitants of 
these areas experience issues that are distinct from adjoining areas where the grain bank survey was 
implemented, including conflict and violence, loss of agricultural land, environmental degradation, as 
well as the potential for an increase in employment and earnings.   
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variation in village size (small, medium large), distance from the main road (close, 
distant) and distance from Kashipur town (close, distant), which housed the 
administrative offices for Kashipur block and was also the site of Agragamee’s main 
office.  The first criterion was adopted in order to make possible a comparison of the 
impact of grain banks on health outcomes of children below the age of 5 years.  While 
grain banks can be expected to have some impact on the health outcomes of adults, it 
is unclear how to attribute this impact to grain banks vis-à-vis other factors prior to the 
establishment of grain banks.  The second criterion was adopted to obtain a set of 
treatment and control villages that resembled each other closely.  The third criterion 
was adopted in order to obtain variation in the characteristics of the sample villages. 
A list of all households (with the name of the household head) in these villages 
was drawn up. Within each of the selected villages, 20 households (or less, if the total 
number of households in a village was less than 20) were randomly selected.  
Sampling was thus not proportionate to village size.  The response rate was high, at 
97.6 per cent, and the few non-responses were due to the unavailability of sampled 
households at the time of the survey.107  A total of 557 households were sampled in 28 
villages.  Of these, 13 households could not be contacted due to non-availability at the 
time of the survey, bringing the total usable sample to 544 households.  Thus, the 
response rate was over 97 per cent.  Table A.1 shows the sample size and decay. 
                                                 
107 Villagers were generally willing to share time as well as the detailed socio-economic data that was 
asked as part of the survey since the majority of the information was non-private in nature (this is better 
understood in context, as given the physical and social proximity of households, members of the same 
village tended to have close to full information on one another)  
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Table A.1: Sample size and decay (Post-harvest household survey) 
Village name 
(Hamlet, if applicable) 
Number of 
households 
sampled 
Number of  
households that 
responded 
Number of 
households that did 
not respond 
Baliguda 20 20  
Chirikul 20 20  
Dhangdisil (Adivasi Sahi) 20 20  
Dhobasil 20 19 1 
Gaimundtunda 20 20  
Godibali (Tala Sahi) 20 20  
Gulmijholla (Harijan Sahi) 20 20  
Huder 19 19  
Jhodipadar (Adivasi Sahi) 20 20  
Kasnadora 20 20  
Keshkeri 20 20  
Kodikitunda 20 20  
Kukuragud (Bhatipas) 20 20  
Mahulkuna (Ranjuguda) 20 20  
Mandibisi (Haliasahi) 18 18  
Manusgaon 20 20  
Paraja Sila (Puruna Sahi) 20 20  
Patesh 20 18 2 
Patiasil 20 20  
Pipalpadar 20 20  
Potamund (Bajansil) 20 16 4 
Renga (Upar Sahi) 20 20  
Runjimaska 20 14 6 
Sanmatru 20 20  
Sargiguda 20 20  
Siriguda 20 20  
Sirlijodi 20 20  
Tharly 20 20  
TOTAL 557 544 13 
 
Notes. The total number of households in Haliasahi and Huder were 18 and 19 respectively. 
 
3.1.3 Survey sites 
Fourteen villages where grain banks continue to be functional and 14 additional 
villages where grain banks collapsed at least five years prior to the survey date (or 
were never established) were surveyed.108  In addition to the household survey, a 
                                                 
108 Grain banks were not established in Godibali (Tala Sahi), Sanmatru and Baliguda.  Conversations 
with Agragamee staff and villagers revealed that the reason in the case of the former was that they did 
not feel the need of a grain bank.  In the case of the other two villages, they were afraid of getting 
indebted to Agragamee by accepting the initial grant.  
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village and grain bank survey was conducted in each of these 28 villages in order to 
gather village and grain bank information. 
The following table provides the distribution of the usable sample of 544 
households across grain bank presence.  Out of these households, 269 lived in villages 
where grain banks were active, and 275 in villages where grain banks were absent. 
 
Table A2: Distribution of usable sample by grain bank presence (Post-harvest 
household survey) 
Grain bank present Grain bank absent 
Village name 
(Hamlet, if applicable) 
No. of households Village name 
(Hamlet, if applicable) 
No. of households 
Dhobasil 19 Baliguda 20 
Gaimundtunda 20 Chirikul 20 
Keshkeri 20 Dhangdisil (Adivasi Sahi) 20 
Kodikitunda 20 Godibali (Tala Sahi) 20 
Kukuragud (Bhatipas) 20 Gulmijholla (Harijan 
Sahi) 
20 
Mahulkuna (Ranjuguda) 20 Huder 19 
Mandibisi (Haliasahi) 18 Jhodipadar (Adivasi Sahi) 20 
Paraja Sila (Puruna Sahi) 20 Kasnadora 20 
Patesh 18 Manusgaon 20 
Pipalpadar 20 Patiasil 20 
Renga (Upar Sahi) 20 Potamund (Bajansil) 16 
Runjimaska 14 Sanmatru 20 
Siriguda 20 Sargiguda 20 
Sirlijodi 20 Tharly 20 
TOTAL 269 TOTAL 275 
 
3.1.4 Survey management 
The enumerators were divided into teams of two each.  The survey team, which also 
included the researcher, was introduced to the respondents by local Agragamee staff.  
Before the survey, villagers were informed about the purpose of the survey and the 
time it would require to complete it.  They were then requested to provide a time when 
it was convenient for them to remain in the village.  No survey interviews were 
conducted on the day of the weekly market.  All of these contributed to the low sample 
decay ratio. 
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The survey team, accompanied by the researcher or a supervisor, took care to 
arrive at the appointed time, usually early in the morning, before the men and women 
left for agricultural or household activities.  Before any interviews were conducted, the 
researcher or a supervisor explained the purpose of the research, the randomness of 
selection into the survey and the lack of affiliation between the research team and 
Agragamee or the government.  In addition, a prepared introduction to the survey was 
read to all respondents in order to explain the purpose of the research and assure them 
of the anonymity of the responses.  An English translation is provided in Table A3 
below. 
 
Table A3: Oral consent script 
 
Namaskar.  My name is _____________ and my colleague’s name is ____________.  We are doing 
a study on grain banks and their impact on food security in Orissa.  The purpose of this study is 
research.  We hope that this study will help to improve the food security condition of your 
community.  We would like to ask some questions regarding grain bank participation, household 
food consumption and other issues.  We would also like to take height and weight measurements of 
you and your children as part of the study.  This will help to analyse the nutritional status of members 
of your household.  I can assure you that all information that you submit during the interview will be 
treated confidentially, and your identity will not be revealed to anyone outside this research team.  
Since we want to learn about food consumption and children’s health, we would like to talk 
especially to the mother of the children.  The survey will take about half an hour and we will be very 
grateful if you could talk to us now.  Thank you for your cooperation.  May we proceed with the 
interview?” 
 
 
Respondents to the household questionnaire included all adults in the 
household.  It was not possible to conduct the interviews privately due to the nature of 
the homes in the survey villages – there is insufficient light inside the homes to 
conduct the interview, and the verandahs of the homes are not private. 
The village and grain bank questionnaire was administered in Oriya 
simultaneously to a group of inhabitants of the village where household surveys were 
also being administered.  These individuals were identified by the villagers themselves 
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as being knowledgable about grain bank operations.  They included women, who 
typically comprised half of grain bank management committees, as well as traditional 
village elders and younger individuals who had been elected as political leaders under 
the contemporary panchayat system, where relevant. 
The flow of questionnaires was controlled through an identification number 
unique to each questionnaire.  In order to ensure good data quality, completed 
questionnaires were passed through a series of quality control checks.  First, when a 
survey team completed an interview, the researcher or a supervisor proofed the 
questionnaire before leaving the village.  In addition, questionnaires were reviewed for 
feasibility of responses as well as missing responses.. When possible, corrections were 
made in consultation with the survey respondent before leaving the survey site. 
 
3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Data entry and cleaning  
After the survey interviews were completed, all the data were entered into Excel files 
by data entry technicians in Bhubaneswar.  Individual-level data in the different 
questionnaire modules are linked by unique village, household and personal 
identifiers.  Household-level data are linked by unique village and household 
identifiers.  The files were converted into Stata data format by the researcher.  
Extensive data cleaning was then implemented, including further checks for data 
inconsistencies and missing values.  No records were discarded completely, but 
implausible responses were deleted.  Missing values were not imputed.  All data have 
been stripped of names to protect the privacy of respondents per the requirements of 
the Cornell University Committee on Human Subjects. 
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3.2.2 Data quality assessment 
Some parts of the survey appear to have yielded quite useful and reliable data, such as 
the sections on demography and literacy, occupation, assets, dietary diversity and food 
security perceptions.  On the other hand, the anthropometry module has a number of 
missing records.  Of the total sample of 544 households, 400 had 1 or more children 
below 5 years of age, bringing the total sample of children to 599.  Of these, height 
data were missing in 51 cases (or about 9 percent) and weight data were missing in 40 
cases (about 7 percent).  However, diagnostics by treatment status reveal that the latter 
has no impact on the probability of an observation missing anthropometric data.  In 
addition, the missing observations are split fairly evenly between the treated and 
untreated groups.109 
Data on age and date of birth collected as part of the anthropometry module are 
not complete.  In a little over half the survey villages, birthdates were available from 
anganwadi records.110  However, these were incomplete and suffer from 
inaccuracies.111  Less than 11 percent of the observations for whom data were 
                                                 
109 Height data are missing for 30 children in participating households and 21 children in non-
participating households.  Weight data are missing for 21 children in participating households and 19 
children in non-participating households.  Diagnostics of missing observations by village reveal that are 
distributed across the sample (e.g., the missing height observations are distributed across 20 of the 28 
sample villages, with 1 observation missing in each of 6 villages, 2 missing in each of 5 villages, 3 
missing in each of 3 villages, 4 missing in each of 5 villages and 6 missing in 1 village.  Similarly, the 
missing weight observations are distributed across 19 villages, with 1 observation missing in each of 6 
villages, 2 missing in each of 7 villages, 3 missing in each of 4 villages, and 4 missing in each of 2 
villages). 
110 Records were complete (or near complete) in only 7 out of 28 survey villages, namely, Haliasahi, 
Paraja Sila, Bajansil, Pipalpadar, Renga, Sanmatru and Siriguda.  Records were incomplete in the case 
of 7 other villages for which anganwadi records were available, namely, Keshkeri, Ranjumaska, 
Kodikitunda, Gaimundtunda, Dhobasil, Manusgaon and Ranjuguda. 
111 For example, in the villages of Bhatipas and Sirlijodi, although anganwadi records were available, 
there was a lack of agreement in names, sex and age of children from the household survey records and 
the former.  Thus, from the point of view of collecting date of birth information for the anthropometry 
module, these records had to be discarded.  In another example, in one sample village, anganwadi 
records indicated that all children born after January 2000 had exactly the same birth weight.  Although 
the ICDS officer for Kashipur block was alerted to these issues, no further steps were taken by her.  
Unfortunately, poor quality and falsified records in the anganwadi system are not limited to these 
villages, as a survey of the ICDS program in six Indian states has revealed similar problems (CIRCUS 
2006). 
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collected in the anthropometry module possessed birthdates information from 
immunization cards which were produced by the children’s parents.  Therefore, 
birthdates could be recorded in only few cases: of the 599 children who were reported 
5 years of less, date of birth information was not available for more than 400.  In order 
to increase the accuracy in estimating the age of children below 5 years of age, the 
enumerators were trained to probe the season, as well as month of the Oriya calendar 
when the child was born, followed by a question on how many times that season had 
recurred since birth, in order to estimate the years completed by the child.   
Data on the terms of contract for outstanding loans are also not reliable, as 
respondents could not provide data on loan duration and rates of interest.  This also 
reflects the nature of the informal credit markets that prevail in the survey region, 
which are characterized by unwritten and loosely-defined credit contracts. 
 Data collected with the objective of capturing the nature of preferences 
(whether exponential or time-inconsistent) are also not reliable, as in most cases 
respondents seemed unable to comprehend the relevant questions. 
 
4 VILLAGE AND GRAIN BANK SURVEY 
Since there is a large amount of overlap in the survey methods used for the surveys in 
Kashipur and Dasmantapur, we do not repeat them here.  Only differences are noted. 
 
4.1 Survey methods 
4.1.1 Preparations 
Preparations were implemented concurrently with the preparations for the household 
survey in Kashipur. The same set of enumerators used in the household survey was 
used as they were already familiar with the purpose of the research project.  These 
enumerators were then trained extensively on the village and grain bank questionnaire. 
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4.1.2 Sampling  
The survey was fielded in Dasmantapur in 40 villages where grain banks were 
operational (in other words, surviving grain bank villages or SGBVs) and 40 villages 
where grain banks were once present but were no longer operational at the time of  
survey (in other words, failed grain bank villages or FGBVs).  First, a list of villages 
and their hamlets was obtained from Agragamee staff who have been active in the area 
for over a decade.  From this list, two lists were made in consultation with Agragamee 
field staff – villages with operational and those with non-operational grain banks.  
From the list of villages having currently functional grain banks instituted by 
Agragamee, 40 villages were randomly chosen.  Similarly, from the list of villages 
where grain banks had been instituted but collapsed, 40 more villages were randomly 
chosen.  In 6 of the 40 FGVBs originally sampled, surveys could not be conducted.112  
In order to maintain the desired sample size, they were replaced by 6 villages 
randomly chosen from the list of FGBVs that had not already been included in the 
sample.  These 6 replacement villages were located across 3 different gram 
panchayats, including Chikamba, Mujanga and Podaguda.  
The sample numbers of surviving and failed grain bank villages were balanced 
and not proportionate to the population numbers of surviving and failed grain bank 
villages.  According to the most recent records available from Agragamee, out of the 
232 grain banks initially established, only 71 were still operational.  Thus, the 
population proportion of operational grain banks was 30.6 percent.  Proportional 
sampling would have resulted in a lower number of observations of surviving grain 
                                                 
112This was due to opposition by an NGO that was active in Chanabad and had adversarial relations 
with Agragamee.   
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banks, and given the objectives of the study to study the factors that influence grain 
bank sustainability, operational grain bank villages were intentionally oversampled.   
 
4.1.3 Survey sites 
Table A4 presents the survey sites for the village and grain bank survey. 
 
4.1.4 Survey management 
The enumerators were divided into teams of two each.  Each team included at least 
one enumerator who was not from Dasmantapur and unrelated to likely survey 
respondents, in order to reduce respondent bias.  Villagers were notified in advance 
regarding the purpose of the survey team’s visit.  Their availability for the survey was 
requested, and surveys were undertaken on days that were deemed convenient for 
most respondents.  The survey team was also trained to keep detailed notes on field 
observations and information obtained through informal conversations during their 
visit (e.g., problems associated with grain bank, primary school and anganwadi 
operations; important crops; main source of livelihood) in order to complement the 
information obtained through the survey questionnaire.   
The questionnaire was administered in Oriya simultaneously to a group of 
members of the sampled village who possessed knowledge on the resources of the 
village and more specific information on grain bank operations.  The flow of 
questionnaires was controlled through an identification number unique to each 
questionnaire.  After completion of interviews by the survey team, the questionnaires 
were reviewed for feasibility of responses as well as missing responses by the 
supervisor.  Corrections were made in consultation with the survey team with the help 
of their notes. 
.
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Table A4: Distribution of sample villages (Village and grain bank survey) 
Surviving grain bank village Failed grain bank village 
 Gram 
Panchayat 
Village (hamlet)  Gram 
Panchayat 
Village (hamlet) 
 Chanabad Kitesh (Salapguda)  Bejapadar Chandankhuti (Nuaguda) 
  Kadamjhola (Kadamjhola)   Mangaraguda 
  Kadamjhola (Tandiputa)  Chanabad Kitesh (Lataput) 
 Chikamba Dhalagadla   Chanabad 
  Pirimachi   Kitesh (Depoguda) 
  Phatkijam (Adivasi Sahi)  Chikamba Dakamara (Barijholla) 
 Dasmantapur Goudabarikanta 
(Goudabarikanta) 
  Upar Gadala 
  Baghchema (Baghchema)   Dhunakhala 
  Mundar (Mundar)  Dasmantapur Chaulakanti (Chaulakanti) 
  Goudabarikanta 
(Dudijhola) 
  Chaulakanti (Ladibeda) 
  Paraja Barikanta (Paraja 
Barikanta) 
  Dandabada 
  Mandiaguda (Mandiaguda)   Chaulakanti (Janiguda) 
  Goudakanti   Chaulakanti (Khajuriguda) 
 Gadiaguda Bilanosila (Lamatapur 
Bariguda) 
  Durkaguda 
  Balighat (Balighat)   Pedisil (Pedisil) 
  Padeiput (Khajuriput)  Dumbaguda Bhandisil 
  Bilanosila (Bramanasuku)  Gadiaguda Paikapuki 
  Gadiaguda   Parajapuki (Garudamunda) 
  Malimunda (Malimunda)  Girliguma Rohiamba (Bijimara) 
 Girliguma Dakribeda (Harijan Sahi)   Chadri (Alachi) 
  Dhalaghata (Bada Majhi 
Sahi) 
 Kucheipadar Gambhariguda 
  Chhotamba (Bada Adivasi 
Sahi) 
 Malkangiri Malkangiri 
  Girli (Sundhigirli)  Mujanga Kankaraput (Upar sahi) 
  Dakri (Fundaguda)   Runchaguda (Durakaguda) 
  Rohiamba (Majhi Sahi)   Kankaraput 
(Dongaladhaput) 
  Ratabandha (Banapadar)   Batisil 
  Girliguma (Parajagirli)   Kilaro (Dumbaguda) 
  Bhagalmati (Tikirapada)   Mujanga (Dhaiguda) 
  Gadri (Gadri)  Podaguda Naranga 
  Bhagalmati   Rautaputa (Dudulaguda) 
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Table A4 (Continued) 
 Mujanga Mujanga (Tentuliguda)  Podaguda Mundar 
  Kankaraput (Baliguda)   Mundar (Sundhiputguda) 
  Kilaro (Daluguda)   Anchalguda 
  Malingajodi (Badaguda)   Kantabeti 
  Batisil (Keshabguda)   Patamaliguda (Bhanjapadar) 
  Mujanga (Thelaguda)   Upar Naranga (Tala 
Naranga) 
  Mujanga (Bhejapadar)   Majhiguda 
  Tentuliguda (Punjisila)   Rautaputa (Chamakaliguda) 
 Podaguda Rautaputa (Rautaputa)   Patamaliguda (Lukumari) 
  Chakarjholla   Chotaguda (Majhiguda) 
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4.2 Data 
4.2.1. Data entry and cleaning  
After the survey interviews were completed, all the data were entered into Excel files 
by the researcher and then converted to Stata data format.  Checks for data 
inconsistencies and missing values were implemented.  No records were discarded 
completely, but implausible responses were deleted.  Missing values were not 
imputed.   
 
4.2.2 Data quality assessment 
Most of the village-level data are fairly reliable.  Distance data (e.g. distance of the 
village from the seat of local headquarters, from the main road, etc.) are based on 
reports by the team of survey respondents and reflect the distances actually perused by 
the majority of villagers (whose main mode of transport is walking and who typically 
use short-cuts on unpaved roads whenever possible).  
For SGBVs, data on grain bank stocks were obtained in local units from one or 
more grain bank committee members, which were later converted to metric units for 
comparability.  These are rough estimates, and it was not possible to crosscheck the 
actual weight of the stocks using standard weighing scales.  The measurement units 
that were used locally were puti, mana and ada.  According to the inhabitants of the 
region, 1 puti equaled 20 mana and 1 mana equaled 4 ada.  Depending on the crop, 1 
mana was converted into metric units, per the advice of grain bank committee 
members, as follows: 
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Crop name Metric equivalent 
Local millets (mandia, kosala) 4.00 kg 
Paddy rice 4.00 kg 
Local lentils (biri, kandula) 4.00 kg 
Local oilseeds (alasi, mustand)  3.25 kg 
 
For FGBVs, survey enumerators were instructed to obtain data from account 
books.  However, these were typically not available and data were obtained using 
corroborating accounts from former committee members and former grain bank 
members. 
 
5 LEAN SEASON HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
The second wave of the household sample survey was conducted in Kashipur towards 
the end of the monsoon season (August-early October of the same year).  The timing 
of the survey corresponds with the agricultural lean season when food shortages are at 
their most critical.  The same villages were surveyed, excluding Bhatipas and 
Gulmijholla.  They could not be contacted due to flooding of the access bridge to the 
former and the outbreak of a cholera epidemic in the latter. 
 
5.1 Survey methods 
5.1.1 Preparations 
The survey methods are similar to those of the post-harvest household survey.  The 
same group of enumerators and supervisors were used in this wave to maintain 
comparability.  An additional module related to shocks and safety nets was included to 
the original questionnaire.  A pared down version o
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was administered in all the sample villages in order to complement the data already 
collected as part of the post-harvest survey. 
 
5.1.2 Sampling 
A rotating panel sample design was adopted in order to balance the objectives of 
obtaining a large number of panel observations without reducing the sample size.  This 
was done keeping in mind that the survey was being conducted at a very critical time 
in the agricultural calendar.  Since this was the sowing season, adult members of the 
household were likely to leave their village during the day to perform agricultural 
tasks in their fields. 
Within each sample village, attempts were made to contact 15 out of the 20 
sample households selected in the first wave and to contact 5 new households based 
on the original household listings.  This was possible in all but 3 sample villages, 
where more new households had to be sampled due to the absence of more than 5 
households from the previous wave.  Households that could not be contacted had 
indeed left for agricultural tasks in spite of prior notification by the survey team.   
A total of 516 households were sampled.  Contact was reestablished with 400 
households from the first wave, and 99 new households were added.  This brought the 
total usable sample to 499 households; 250 households were in grain bank villages, 
and 249 were in non-grain bank villages.  The response rate was close to 97 per cent.  
Table A5 shows the sample size and decay. 
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5.2 Data 
5.2.1. Data quality assessment 
In most cases, the survey appears to have yielded quite useful and reliable data, such 
as information on household demographics, assets, and food security perceptions.  
However, there are a number of missing records in the anthropometry module. 
 
 
Table A5: Sample size and decay (Lean season household survey) 
Village name 
(Hamlet, if applicable) 
Number of 
households censused 
Total number of 
households 
responding 
Number of 
households not 
responding 
Mandibisi (Haliasahi) 17 17  
Patesh 20 18 2 
Pipalpadar 20 20  
Dhobasil 20 19 1 
Renga (Upar sahi) 20 20  
Sirlijodi 20 19 1 
Keshkeri 20 20  
Kodikitunda 20 20  
Gaimundtunda 20 20  
Paraja Sila (Puruna sahi) 20 20  
Mahulakana (Ranjuguda) 20 20  
Siriguda 20 20  
Runjimaska 20 17 3 
Tharly 20 20  
Potamunda (Bajansil) 20 15 5 
Jhodipadar (Adivasi sahi) 20 20  
Dhangdisil (Adivasi sahi) 20 20  
Sanmatru 20 16 4 
Chirikuli 20 20  
Baliguda 20 20  
Huder 19 18 1 
Godibali (Tala sahi) 20 20  
Manusgaon 20 20  
Kasnadora 20 20  
Patiasil 20 20  
Sargiguda 20 20  
TOTAL 516 499 17 
Notes. The total number of households in Haliasahi and Huder were 17 and 19 respectively.  Since 
the time of the post-harvest survey, two households in Haliasahi had merged to form one household. 
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Of the total sample of 499 households, 375 had 1 or more children below 6 years of 
age, bringing the total sample of children to 571.  Of these, height data were missing 
in 37 cases (about 7 percent) and weight data were missing in 44 cases (about 8 
percent).  However, diagnostics of missing observations by treatment status reveal 
that, as in the post-harvest survey, the latter has no impact on the probability of an 
observation missing anthropometric data.  In addition, the missing observations are 
split fairly evenly between the treated and untreated groups. 113 
Unlike the earlier survey when anthropometric measurements were taken of 
children up to 5 years of age, measurements were taken for children up to 6 years of 
age.  This was done so as not to lose observations of children who were under 5 in the 
previous survey but had crossed 5 years by the time of the monsoon survey.   
As in the post-harvest household survey, data on age and date of birth are not 
complete.  Birthdates from anganwadi records and immunization cards were available 
in only 30 percent of cases.114  When available, the records appear to suffer from 
deficiencies.115 
                                                 
113 Height data are missing for 16 children in participating households and 21 children in non-
participating households.  Weight data are missing for 23 children in participating households and 21 
children in non-participating households.  Examining the distribution of missing observations by 
village, we find that the missing height observations are distributed across 22 of the 26 sample villages, 
with 1 observation missing in each of 14 villages, 2 missing in each of 3 villages, 3 missing in each of 3 
villages, and 4 missing in each of 2 villages.  Similarly, the missing weight observations are distributed 
across 22 villages, with 1 observation missing in each of 12 villages, 2 missing in each of 3 villages, 3 
missing in each of 3 villages, 4 missing in each of 3 villages and 5 missing in 1 village 
114 Anganwadi records were complete for the most part in 9 out of the 26 survey villages, namely, 
Haliasahi, Ranjuguda, Jhodipadar, Dhangdisil, Ranjumaska, Sargiguda, Siriguda, Patesh and 
Pipalpadar.  Records were incomplete in 9 other villages for which anganwadi records were available, 
namely, Baliguda, Godibali (Tala Sahi), Gaimundtunda, Keshkeri, Renga, Huder, Sanmatru, Chirikul, 
Paraja Sila.  Records were unavailable for the remaining villages. 
115 For example, in many of the villages in Godibali panchayat, namely Chirkul, Sanmatru, Huder, 
Godibali (Tala Sahi), the names of the children and parents in the anganwadi records did not match 
those collected from the household survey.  In Jhodipadar, the birthdates of children within a household 
were interchanged for 2 households.  In Dhangdisil, there were inconsistencies in the year of birth as 
entered in anganwadi records compared to the reported age as well as the weight of the child.  In 
Ranjumaska, there were multiple entries for the date of birth for a child having the same name and the 
same parents. 
302 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Barrett, Christopher B., and Jeffrey W. Cason. 1997. Overseas Research: A Practical 
Guide. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Beteille, Andre. 1998. The Idea of Indigenous People. Current Anthropology. v39 
(n2):187-91. 
 
Bhattamishra, Ruchira.  2005. Field notes, Kashipur.  February-March 2005.   
 
Bhattamishra, Ruchira. 2007.  Tribal Development.  In Kaushik Basu, (ed). The 
Oxford Companion to Economics in India.  New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Census of India. 2001. New Delhi: Government of India. 
 
Cogill, Bruce. 2003.  Anthropometric Indicators Measurement Guide. Food and 
Nutrition Technical Assistance Project. Washington D.C: Academy for 
Educational Development. 
 
Government of Orissa. 1990.  Tribals of Orissa.  Bhubaneswar: Tribal and Harijan 
Research-Cum-Training Institute. 
 
M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation (MSSRF) and World Food Programme 
(WFP). 2001.  Food Insecurity Atlas of Rural India. Chennai: MSSRF. 
 
Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Government of India. 2001. Annual Report. New Delhi: 
Ministry of Tribal Affairs. 
